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Conference Foreword 
The annual Security Congress, run by the Security Research Institute at Edith Cowan University, 
includes the Australian Information Security and Management Conference. Now in its fifteenth year, 
the conference remains popular for its diverse content and mixture of technical research and 
discussion papers. The area of information security and management continues to be varied, as is 
reflected by the wide variety of subject matter covered by the papers this year. The papers cover 
topics from vulnerabilities in “Internet of Things” protocols through to improvements in biometric 
identification algorithms and surveillance camera weaknesses. 
  
The conference has drawn interest and papers from within Australia and internationally. All 
submitted papers were subject to a double blind peer review process.  Twenty two papers were 
submitted from Australia and overseas, of which eighteen were accepted for final presentation and 
publication. 
 
We wish to thank the reviewers for kindly volunteering their time and expertise in support of this 
event. We would also like to thank the conference committee who have organised yet another 
successful congress. Events such as this are impossible without the tireless efforts of such people in 
reviewing and editing the conference papers, and assisting with the planning, organisation and 
execution of the conference.  
 
To our sponsors, also a vote of thanks for both the financial and moral support provided to the 
conference. Finally, thank you to the administrative and technical staff, and students of the ECU 
Security Research Institute for their contributions to the running of the conference. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Conference Chair 
Associate Professor Mike Johnstone, Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University 
 
Congress Organising Committee 
 
Congress Chair:  
 Professor Craig Valli 
Committee Members:   
Professor Gary Kessler – Embry Riddle University, Florida, USA 
Professor Glenn Dardick – Embry Riddle University, Florida, USA 
Professor Ali Babar – University of Adelaide, Australia 
Dr Jason Smith – CERT Australia, Australia 
Associate Professor Mike Johnstone – Edith Cowan University, Australia 
Professor Joseph A. Cannataci – University of Malta, Malta 
Professor Nathan Clarke – University of Plymouth, Plymouth UK 
Professor Steven Furnell – University of Plymouth, Plymouth UK  
Professor Bill Hutchinson – Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia  
Professor Andrew Jones – Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE 
Professor Iain Sutherland – Glamorgan University, Wales, UK 
Professor Matthew Warren – Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia 
Congress Coordinator:  
Ms Emma Burke 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 2
    
Table of Contents  
FINANCIAL FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE………………………………… 5 
Raymond Lutui, Tau’aho ‘Ahokovi  
SECURITY READINESS EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR TONGA E-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES…. 14 
Raymond Lutui, Semisi Hopoi, Siaosi Maeakafa  
EVALUATING IP SURVEILANCE CAMERA VULNERABILITIES………………………………………………………… 25 
Brian Cusack, Zhuang Tian  
TONGA’S ORGANISATIONAL VULNERABILITY TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING……………………………………. 33 
Raymond Lutui, Viliami Fe’aomoeata  
ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN WEARABLE DEVICES………………………………………. 42 
Brian Cusack, Bryce Antony, Gerard Ward, Shaunak Mody  
NEUROSECURITY FOR BRAINWARE DEVICES……………………………………………………………………………… 49 
Brian Cusack, Kaushik Sundararajan, Reza Khaleghparast  
INTELLIGENT FEATURE SELECTION FOR DETECTING HTTP/2 DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS………. 57 
Erwin Adi, Zubair Baig  
A SRI LANKAN HACKING CASE STUDY………………………………………………………………………………………… 64 
Ishan Senarathna,  Matthew Warren  
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND CYBER THREAT ANALYSIS OF THE AMQP PROTOCOL FOR THE 
INTERNET OF THINGS…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 68 
Ian Noel McAteer, Muhammad Imran Malik, Zubair Baig, Peter Hannay  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMEASURES IN A SMART 
SHIP SYSTEM………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 81 
Dennis Bothur, Guanglou Zheng, Craig Valli  
THE 2017 HOMOGRAPH BROWSER ATTACK MITIGATION SURVEY…………………………………………… 88 
Tyson McElroy, Peter Hannay, Greg Baatard  
A REVIEW OF DATA BREACHES AND LOSSES THAT OCCURRED FROM LAPTOPS THAT WERE 
STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED IN 2015 AND 2016……………………………………………………………. 97 
Samuel Griffith Wakeling, Peter Hannay, Zubair Baig  
A COMPARISON OF 2D AND 3D DELAUNAY TRIANGULATIONS FOR FINGERPRINT 
AUTHENTICATION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 108 
Marcelo Jose Macedo, Wencheng Yang, Guanglou Zheng, Michael N Johnstone  
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 3
LITERATURE-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCES OF THE NEW FORCES ON ISMS: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 116 
Zahir Al-Rashdi, Dr Martin Dick, Dr Ian Storey  
CORE ELEMENTS IN INFORMATION SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE CLOUD………………………… 125
Zahir Al-Rashdi, Dr Martin Dick, Dr Ian Storey  
AN INVESTIGATION INTO SOME SECURITY ISSUES IN THE DDS MESSAGING PROTOCOL……………. 132 
Thomas White, Michael N. Johnstone, Matthew Peacock  
DECEPTIVE SECURITY BASED ON AUTHENTICATION PROFILING…………………………………………………. 140
Andrew Nicholson, Helge Janicke, Andrew Jones, Adeeb Alnajaar  
THE CONVERGENCE OF IT AND OT IN CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE……………………………………………… 149 
Glenn Murray, Michael N. Johnstone and Craig Valli  
 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 4
FINANCIAL FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
 
Raymond Lutui1, Tau’aho ‘Ahokovi2  
Auckland University of Technology1, Christ’s University in Pacific2 
School of Engineering, Computer & Mathematical Sciences1, School of Business & Law2 
rlutui@aut.ac.nz1, tahokovi@bigpond.com 
 
 
Abstract 
Risk management is important so that risk is assessed, understood and appropriately managed. This is important 
both for conformance and performance. It is essential that strategic planning and management decisions are 
made appropriately in the context of the risk appetite of the corporation and its various stakeholders – especially 
its shareholders. If a company does not have a good understanding of risk, the likelihood of conformance and 
performance failure is high, this implies good internal and external corporate intelligence. Large global 
corporations have a significant impact on economies around the world. These entities are subject to intense 
competition and require investor and customer confidence to underpin their activities. Poor governance 
adversely affects customers and investors, and makes corporation uncompetitive. This can also affect entire 
economies. In the context of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman 
brothers demonstrates that corporate failure can hurt economies globally. The failure of Lehman Brothers to 
properly manage and understand risk is a clear example of the failure of good governance. 
 
Keywords: Fraud Risk Management, Corporate Governance, Good Governance, Fraud,  
INTRODUCTION 
The upsurge of financial scandals in the era of the 21st century raised awareness of deep-seated fraudulent activities 
(Kerr and Murthy 2013). Financial statement fraud has cast an increasingly adverse impact on the individual 
investors and the stability of global economies (Zhou and Kapoor 2011). The failure of Enron has caused about a 
$70 billion lost in the capital market. The Computer Security Institute reported a significant increase in financial 
fraud cases recently (Reddy et al. 2012). The rise of many fraudulent occurrences is a serious inhibitor for 
potential investors because fraudulent financial reports have created a substantial negative impact on company 
reputations and market value (Hogan et al., 2008). 
Financial statements are basic documents to reflect a company's financial status (Beaver 1966). Fraudulent 
financial reports are perpetrated to increase stock prices or to get loans from banks (Ravisankar et al., 2011). 
Financial statement fraud detection is vital because of the devastating consequences of financial statement frauds 
(Ngai et al. 2011). Fraud behaviours are often subtle in the beginning (Chivers et al., 2013), therefore, it is 
difficult to detect them. Regulations play an important role to emphasize the responsibility of auditors to assess the 
risk of fraudulent financial reporting adequately (Srivastava et al. 2009). However, detecting frauds remains difficult 
because of the lack of a commonly accepted definition of reasonable assurance, limitations of audit methods and the 
cost constraints (Spathis, 2002; Hogan et al., 2008). 
The board of directors is the body that oversees the activities of an organisation. The board has a wide range of 
roles and functions that address both performance and conformance. It is preferable that the roles and 
responsibilities of the board be explicitly set out in a written chatter or constitution. The board must ensure 
appropriate procedures are in place for risk management and internal controls, and it must also ensure that it is 
informed of anything untoward or inappropriate in the operation of those procedures. Any major operation 
issues will also be brought to the attention of the board for appropriate consideration and decision making. 
Despite these expectations, in many high-profile corporate collapses it is apparent that the board was informed 
about key business decisions or simply chose to comply with management. For example, in the case of a former 
prominent Australian company, HIH Insurance, it was apparent that the major takeover of another company, FAI 
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Insurance, was undertaken without rigorous debate at board level or due diligence being carried out before the 
transaction was finalised (CPA, 2016). 
Companies that can demonstrate good corporate governance practices have advantages. With the increasing 
globalisation of business and competition for capital, companies that can provided assurances that the company is 
being appropriately managed the cost of capital. Furthermore, the expansion of company shareholdings to a 
broader base (in many countries, small shareholders are becoming increasingly common, either by direct 
investment or indirectly through their superannuation plans), combined with more organised and active 
shareholders lobby groups, is placing more scrutiny on company management (Drever et al., 2007, p. 153). In 
this paper, a review of the risk management and corporate governance principles is made in order to identify 
weaknesses in corporate governance and also to identify how to improve. It then proposes a focus on 
improvement for risk management and the corporate governance benefit.  
 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk management is defined as the “process of understanding and managing risks that the entity is inevitably 
subject to in attempting to achieve its corporate objectives (CIMA, 2005). For an organisation risks are potential 
events that could influence the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Risk management is about 
understanding the nature of such events and where they represent threats, making positive plans to mitigate them. 
Fraud is a major risk that threatens the business, not only in terms of financial health but also its image and 
reputation. 
Risk management is also an increasing important process in many businesses and the process fits in well with the 
precepts of good corporate governance. In recent years, the issue of corporate governance has been a major area 
for concern in many countries. In the UK, the first corporate governance report and code of best practice is 
considered to be the Cadbury Report in 1992, which was produced in response to a string of corporate collapses. 
There have been a number of reports since, covering provisions around area such as executive remuneration, non-
executive directors, and audit committees. The principles of these various report have been brought together to 
form the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Combined Code). 
The Need for Governance 
Governance describes the overall guidance of organisations and focuses on achieving strong performance while 
ensuring compliance with obligations. Effective governance is very important and poor governance has often led 
financial disasters for individual companies, and even whole economies. Governance is the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled, and accountability is assured. While the concept is usually associated 
with corporate governance, that is the governance of large listed corporations, similar governance principles 
should apply to all enterprises. Governance relates to the responsibilities of the board of directors towards 
investors and other stakeholders, and involves setting the objectives and direction of the company and is 
distinguished from the management of the enterprise on a daily basis, which is the job of full-time executives. 
The governance of enterprises is broadly structured by the law, not just corporate law but also employment law 
and so forth. It is the first duty of directors to ensure that the enterprise operates with in the law. However, 
beyond requiring a board of director’s exercise certain duties such as the duty of care and diligence, corporation 
law gives considerable scope for directors to exercise decision-making in the best interests of the company. It is 
here where the skills of governance become critical: the capacity to understand and interpret the strengths and 
weaknesses of the enterprise, and how to direct the enterprise towards business success while maintaining 
accountability and good relationships with all stakeholders. Good governance is a hallmark of enterprises that 
achieve improving and sustainable performance even in changing and unpredictable environments. 
Good governance aims to ensure that organisations are properly run in the best interests of their shareholders, 
including the optimal performance of national and international economies. At an organisational level, the 
behavioural styles and business management practices of managers (and other employees) or directors can result 
in outcomes that are not in the best interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. These situations can range 
from relatively minor technical breaches of policies or practices, to more serious cases where excessive risk-
taking or poor controls place the ongoing survival of the organisation at risk (CPA, 2016) 
Many other countries have also produced reports on corporate governance, usually accompanied by codes of 
best practices. For example, South Africa has had the King Report (version I and now II) since 1994, Malaysia has 
had its Code of Corporate Governance in place since 2000 and Sri Lanka issued the Rules on Corporate 
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Governance as part of its Listing Rules in January 2007 (CPA, 2016) 
Corporate governance requirements in the US are now largely set out within the Sarbox legislation, as previously 
mentioned (US Congress 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002); these requirements extend beyond the US, capturing 
any company that is SEC listed and its subsidiaries. Some other countries have also introduced a statutory 
approach to corporate governance, such as that in the US, although none are currently as comprehensive. A 
number of international organisations have also launched guidelines and initiatives on corporate governance, 
including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European 
Commission. 
In extreme cases, public organisations may be run more as personal fiefdoms where personal greed is put ahead 
of the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. To reduce undesirable consequences for shareholders and 
other stakeholders and to ensure personal accountability, organisations need an appropriate system of checks and 
balances in the form of corporate governance framework. This framework emphasises both conformation and 
performance as vital elements of the way the companies are run. 
The Role of the Board 
As corporations grow in size, there is also a separation of the ownership and management. Over time, the legal 
duties and responsibilities of directors have evolved to protect the interests of the owners, who are not able to 
observe closely the daily occurrences within a corporation. In most jurisdictions, there is a core group of 
director’s duties and responsibilities that have arisen from either statue or case law. The key duties are to: 
 Avoid conflict of interest and where these exist, ensure they are appropriately declared and as required 
by law, otherwise mange correctly 
 Act in best interests of the corporation 
 Exercise powers with proper purposes 
 Retain discretionary powers and avoid delegating the director’s responsibility 
 Act with care, skill and diligence 
 Be informed about the corporation’s operations, and 
 Prevent insolvent trading 
Consequently, the board of directors should have implemented a strategy settings design to identify potential 
events that may affect the entity (Gelinas, Dull & Wheeler, 2012).  These strategy settings reflect in a framework 
which is called “Enterprise Risk Management” (ERM).  
In formal corporate governance principles, managers are the agents of the board responsible for pursuing the 
vision of the company as developed by the board, and fulfilling the strategic direction determined by the board. 
The CEO in most companies is also a director and a member of the board (and there are often other executive 
directors such as the CFO of the company). These executives’ directors have a full role working with the board 
to advance strategic direction and establish the policies and value of the company. Once these are decided, it is 
the manager’s duty to actively pursue these, and the board’s role is to monitor the results for the business.  
Of course, in reality the interface of governance and management is more complex. Often boards and 
management respect and understand the different roles and have a commitment to make the relationship work. 
However, sometimes tensions do emerge, for example, in the choice of strategy. Because of rapidly changing 
markets and technology, boards often have to be continuously engaged in strategic decisions, unlike in the past. 
At times, managers may feel that the board is becoming too involved in the implementation of strategy when it is 
the management team who have operational experience required to guide strategy to success. On other 
occasions, the board may feel that managers are making significant strategic decisions without properly securing 
the approval of the board (CPA, 2016). 
Skeet (2015) examines this issue from the perspective of both the board of directors and the management team. 
When CEOs are asked what issues contribute to the board and management being at cross purposes, they point 
to two main factors: directors acting ‘out of position’ and attempting to play a management role; or a conflict of 
interest where, even if disclosed, directors are not able to place the interests of the organisation above their own 
or those of the group they are representing. 
Often what boards interpret as arrogance of the CEO and the management team can be, in reality, a lack of 
experience, strategic direction differences or deceit. These can all lead to the management team withholding 
information from the board. Board members should consider what information they do not currently have and 
then request this additional information if they feel the CEO and the management team may be concealing 
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something. This is a legal right of the board, and the management team is not permitted to suppress this 
information, once requested. The board is able to draw on multiple points of view when making decisions, which 
is strength of shared governance (Skeet, 2015). For example; there was a tension occurred some years ago at 
BHP Billiton when a newly appointed CEO began negotiating for major acquisitions without fully consulting the 
board. The board became concerned about the serious risk implication of the CEO’s actions, and the contract of 
the CEO was terminated. With the appointment of another CEO, the BHP board was careful to agree on a series 
of protocols regarding the scope for independent decision-making by the CEO on financial and other matters, 
and the issues that always needed to be brought to the board for consideration. These protocols appear to have 
worked well, and in other large corporations, similar, clear understanding exists between board and executive 
management on their respective roles and powers (CPA, 2016). 
This tension, occurred some years ago at BHP Billiton when a newly appointed CEO began negotiating for 
major acquisitions without fully consulting the board. The Board concerned about the serious risk implication of 
the CEO’s action, and the contract of the CEO was terminated. With the appointment of another CEO, the BHP 
board was careful to agree of protocols regarding the scope for independent decision-making by the CEO on the 
financial and other matters, and the issues that always needed to be to the board for consideration. These 
protocols appear to have worked well, and in other corporations, similar, clear understanding exist between 
board and executive management on their respective roles and powers. 
It is certainly the case that it is management at the sharp end of delivering the aspirations of the board for the 
company. Boards of directors are often highly skilled at financial analysis, strategic thinking and policy 
development, but it is the managers who have to implement all of these, which requires considerable intellectual, 
operational and intellectual skills. It is the management who must inspire employees with the goals of the 
enterprise, delight customers with the quality of the product or service, convince suppliers and distributors that 
the company deserves their full support, and keep stakeholders onside (CPA, 2016). 
Ensuring that there is the energetic commitment of managers to their task of realising the vision of the board and 
making the success of the company is ultimately the role of the CEO, who is the essential link between the 
governance mechanisms and the operational mechanisms of the company. 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Globalisation has caused major changes in the way incorporations are run. Inevitable changes in the size and the 
structure of companies, including their ownership structures, have had a substantial effect on the way 
corporations are controlled. For example, many traditional Australian companies, some listed on ASX, are now 
effectively controlled by owners in diverse locations such as the United States, China, Singapore, India, the 
United Kingdom and Germany. These owners are subject to governance standard that differ from those in 
Australia. Even so, listing in Australia means that they must comply with Australian governance standards in 
addition to those of their own country (CPA, 2016) 
United Kingdom 
In 1991, following a series of high profile corporate collapses, the London Stock Exchange, together with 
industry and accounting and finance professionals, established the Cadbury Committee. The Cadbury report, 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (CFACG, 1992), gave recommendations to companies that have 
been adopted in varying degrees by the European Union, the United States, the World Bank and many other 
countries and regions. The recommendations on governance had an important feature that is still used today – the 
concept of ‘comply or explain’. This approach meant that if a company chose not to comply with a governance 
recommendation, the company had to identify the non-compliance and then explain it to shareholders. This may 
also be described as ‘if not, why not’ reporting. 
United States 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organisation of the Treadway Commission (COSO) was formed in 1985 to 
sponsor the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting. Its 1994 report, Internal Control-
Integrated Framework (COSO, 1994), provided a detailed definition and discussion of internal control. In 1999, 
it reported on fraudulent financial reporting (COSO, 1999). Important findings included the frequent 
involvement of the CEO and CFO in frauds, captured boards that were dominated by insiders, and unqualified 
opinions by auditors despite the fraud. 
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In response to a loss of investor confidence following corporate scandals in the United States, the US Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The purpose of the Act was to protect investors and provide guidelines 
for financial reporting.  
Australia 
The Ramsay Report (Ramsay 2001) examined the adequacy of Australian legislative and professional 
requirements regarding the independence of external auditors and made recommendations for changes. Some 
parts of the report were concerned directly with audit independence and others were designed generally to 
enhance audit independence; for example; establishing audit committees and board to oversee audit 
independence issues. In 2002, the Australian Stock Exchange (since renamed Australian Securities Exchange) 
responded to calls for it to play a greater role in corporate governance through the establishment of the Corporate 
Governance Council. The Council released the first edition of its Principles of Good Corporate Governance and 
Best Practice Recommendations (ASX CGC 2003). These were revised in 2007 and titled Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations. The 2007 revision was amended in 2010. The third edition was released in 
2014. 
Again, the Australian government released a discussion paper (CLERP, 2004) in the aftermath of the collapses 
of, among others, Enron in the United States and HIH Insurance in Australia. This paper known as Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) outlined proposals for audit and financial reporting reform, as well as 
other legislative proposals, to improve corporate governance practices in Australian companies. This report was 
passed by the Australian Government, coming into effect on 1 July 2004. There are many other international 
organisations that focus on improved corporate governance. Many of them, such as the Business Roundtable, an 
association of chief executives of leading US companies, and The International Corporate Governance Network 
(ICGN), a not-for-profit body founded in 1995, have produced their own recommended codes and guidelines. 
OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), with members and funding sources 
from countries with major market-oriented economies, has developed international best practice principles of 
governance which was first published in 1999 (OECD, 1999) and were updated in 2004 (OECD, 2004) with a 
new first principle giving a broad view of governance including performance. A review of these principles 
started in 2014 and following an extensive consultation, the updated principles were released in September 2015, 
entitled G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (QECD, 2015). These principles were considered as the 
international best practice by referring to specific guidance, codes and recommendations on corporate 
governance produced by the OECD and the Financial Reporting Council of the United Kingdom, who were 
become global leaders in the development of corporate governance principles. It also considers the ASX 
Principles, as they also provide leadership in corporate governance. 
The OECD Principles specify six principles: 
 Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
 The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions 
 Institutional investors, stock markets, and other intermediaries 
 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
 Disclosure and transparency; and 
 The responsibilities of the board 
DISCUSSION 
Although corporate governance is usually linked to management, there is a strong bond between corporate 
governance and ethics and/or social responsibility of the business. Corporate governance encourages a 
trustworthy, moral, as well as ethical environment. From this point of view governance takes into account the 
transparency of the internal and external audit, the sincerity of the managers regarding the company’s financial 
results and financial statements, the manager actions towards the small stakeholders and many more (Panfilli 
2012). Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) considers that corporate governance 
has the role to specify the distribution of rights and of responsibilities between different categories of people 
involved in the company like: board of directors, executives, shareholders and others, establishing rules and 
procedures for making decisions on the activity of a certain company. OECD also mentions that corporate 
governance is at the same time, both a set of relations between management, board of directors, shareholders and 
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other interested groups and the structure through which company sets the objectives and the necessary means to 
reach those, but also the system of incentives offered to the board of directors and management in order to 
increase the objectives in the interests of shareholders and society. 
Poor ethical leadership, lack of personal integrity, mismanagement, fraud, corruption, and violation of corporate 
governance rules are the main contributors towards bankruptcy and financial failures in large organizations. 
Most of these organizations have comprehensive corporate governance codes in place, implemented by the left 
brain Big Four accountancy firms (PwC, KPMG, Ernst & Young and Deloitte), McKinsey, America’s Top 
Corporate Governance Law Firms, which apparently are not working at all. They made things worse and created 
a stable basis for more corruption (Ramperad & Fawumi, 2015). Current approaches to corporate governance are 
extremely formal, bureaucratic, cosmetic, not holistic and non-authentic, and therefore provide no protection 
from potentially catastrophic ethical failures. A sustainable and innovative solution to this global epidemic is 
needed urgently. It is time that awareness that corporate governance cannot be controlled effectively with formal 
and exhaustive rules, regulations, guidelines, and procedures only. It is about decency and personal integrity and 
this must be cultivated from within. Personal integrity has no need of rules and laws. 
It must be a way of life: To quote what Plato said in 340 BC: “Good people do not need laws to tell them to act 
responsibly, while bad people will find a way around the laws”. Research shows that a large percentage of the 
world’s population is bad (Rampersad & Fawumi, 2015) For example, America has around 5% of the world’s 
population, and 25% of its prisoners. Roughly one in every 107 American adults is behind bars. Among them are 
also many Executives, leaders and professionals. Most corporate governance programs make things worse by 
creating a stable basis for more corruption and are doomed to fail. Why is the lesson from Plato not learned and 
focus on creating a culture of good people, in which personal values are aligned with the laws and embedded in 
the mind of the people, instead of focusing on laws (corporate governance) only? An innovative methodology 
was launched for creating a culture of good Chairman’s, Presidents, CEOs, CFOs, managers and employees, in 
which high ethical values are aligned with their corporate governance rules, regulations and guidelines and 
embedded in their mind (Ramperad & Fawumi, 2015). 
Many law, accounting and business management professors at the US top schools are blamed for most of the 
corporate governance failures. They lack both emotional and spiritual intelligence. This inner process starts with 
self-knowledge, or knowing, which leads to wisdom. Between knowing and wisdom lies an enormous distance 
which can be reduced by systematic application of the authentic governance system. This will help them to 
create balance between the left and right sides of their brain. The left half of their brain has mainly an analytical, 
logical and quantitative function, while the right half of their brain has an intuitive and holistic function. They do 
not have a proper balance between the left and right sides of their brain. These professors and most of their 
graduates use the left side of their brain only; because of this, they miss opportunities that allow them to become 
more adept at using the right hemisphere of the brain and to deal with complex corporate governance problems 
in an integrated and authentic way. This is also the main reason why Harvard Business School professor 
Kaplan’s balanced scorecard implementations fail and lack sustainability (Ramperad & Fawumi, 2015). 
Many public company shareholders have been unpleasantly surprised by major accounting charges resulting 
from previously undisclosed enterprise risks. These charges typically come without warning in prior audited 
financial statements. Public shareholders have a right to wonder why they have not received warnings of these 
risks in prior audited financial statements and question the effectiveness of the board of directors in performing 
its oversight role (Lipman, 2012). Most directors of public companies focus on the tone at the top of the 
organization.  However, these same directors do not necessarily know whether that “tone” reaches throughout 
the organization and may fail to assess the culture of the organization. Independent directors cannot adequately 
perform their oversight role without receiving enterprise risk information from lower-level employees. 
Independent directors who rely on independent auditors to disclose unasserted claims arising out of enterprise 
risks should be aware of the very limited duties of independent auditors in investigating such risks. Typically, 
this issue is handled by the independent auditors by having top management of the company represent in writing 
to the independent auditor that they are not aware of unasserted material contingent liabilities and having the 
company’s counsel agree to advise management of any such contingent liabilities. However, top management 
may not themselves be aware of such unasserted enterprise risks because of silos within the organization or 
because of the reluctance of employees to use hotlines. Even if management knows of possible contingent 
liabilities they might incorrectly determine that these liabilities are immaterial. Independent auditors currently 
are not required to check on the effectiveness of these employee hotlines or the employee culture, including the 
willingness of employees to use hotlines to report enterprise risk (Lipman, 2012). 
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RECOMMENDATION 
After considering risk management and corporate governance principles employed by a different country, it is 
clear that all the policies and principles adopted were mainly focussing on how to avoid and minimise risk and 
also to maintain good corporate governance. It can also take into account the self-interest characteristics of 
individual. This study recommends various contributions in order to improve and effectively enforce the 
principles and policies stated. 
 
1. Establishing of a Forensic investigation team 
Whenever an allegation arises, it is recommended that the Forensic Investigation Team head by a qualified 
Forensic Accountant should handle the investigation. This is to ensure the board and the management are 
not acting in any favour or bias. 
 
2. Formulate a response 
 The objectives of the investigation should be clearly identified along with resources 
required, the scope of the investigation and the timescale. 
 The objectives will be driven by the organisation's attitude to fraud and the preferred 
outcome for dealing with fraud. 
 An action plan should be prepared and roles and responsibilities should be delegated in 
accordance with the skills and experience of the individuals involved. 
 The individual in overall control  of the investigation should be clearly identified, as should 
the powers available to team members. 
 Reporting procedures as well as protocols for handling and recording evidence should be 
clearly understood by everybody. 
 
3. Follow up action 
 There are lessons to be learned from every identified incident of fraud. 
 The organisation's willingness to learn from experience is as important as any other 
response. 
 Large organisations may consider establishing a special review to examine the fraud with 
a view to recommending improvements to systems and procedures. 
 Smaller organisations may consider discussing the issues with some of its more experienced 
people, with the same objectives in mind. 
 It is important that recommended changes are implemented promptly. 
CONCLUSION 
The secret of a successful company is the ability of its board and senior management to assess its principles and 
policies in order to make decisions that achieve the correct balance over time. While the best corporations do this 
well, poorer corporations do it less effectively and those that do it worst almost inevitably cease to exist. The 
many rules and expectations confronting corporations, along with the relationships must be understood and 
managed.  It has been identified that both conformance and performance are central components of corporate 
governance. Both aspects of corporate governance must be satisfied so that diverse international societies achieve 
effective utilization of the capital resources employed in their enterprises. The United Kingdom is one of the 
world’s most important investment locations. This is due to the fact that their corporate governance practices was 
deemed to be the best practice which other nations like New Zealand and Australia were willing to follow and 
incorporate it to their governance practice. The rules relating to investment in and through the London Stock 
Exchange have provided leading-edge practical approaches that have been followed successfully in many 
jurisdictions. Without vigilance, good governance is often forgotten in strong economic times, only to be 
remembered when financial trouble arises. 
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Abstract 
The rapid expansion of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the Pacific have reached the 
Kingdom of Tonga. The submarine fibre-optic cable which connects Tonga to Fiji and onward to a hub in Sydney 
went live 2013. Now the people of Tonga experience the high-speed impact of digital communication, fast 
international access, and social changes such as the government is implementing a digital society through e-
government services. This study focuses on identifying the factors that will later become a vulnerability and a risk 
to the security of Tonga government e-government initiatives. Data was collected through interviews with three 
government officials, document analysis, and critical reflection on the theory context. Consequently, a security-
readiness evaluation framework has been designed from the data analysis to inform the e-government initiatives. 
This study contributes a security-readiness evaluation framework for use in developing countries to guide the 
implementation of e-government initiatives. 
Keywords: E-Government, information security, information systems, cyber security, security threats, security 
risks, socio-technical  
INTRODUCTION 
The immense growth in the communication technologies’ domain over the last two decades, have changed the 
way we live our lives and conduct day to day businesses. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is 
one of the most vital traits of every new development (Alshehri & Drew, 2010, p.35). This trend of technological 
advancements has reached the Kingdom of Tonga. In 2010, Tonga Communications Corporation (TCC) – the 
country’s leading provider of complete end-to-end telephony and Internet services – launched the new mobile-
broadband-enabled GSM to replace the previous macro-GSM network (Grealish, 2010, P.1). On the 21st August 
2013, the first submarine cable (fibre optic) that connects Tonga to the outside world went live (Matangi Tonga, 
2013, P.1). 
The Kingdom of Tonga is one of the developing countries in the South Pacific with a population of just over 107 
thousand. In 2009, the Government of Tonga has identified Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
as an engine for growth in a national ICT vision and strategy. This focuses on Education, Health, Environment 
Sustainability, and Industry Growth. The National ICT policy for Tonga consists of six main components - 
Provision of ICT in Homes and Communities, Education and Skill Development, E‐Government, Industry Growth 
and Economic Development, An enabling technical infrastructure and the ICT related legislation (Ma'u, 2015, 
p.1). The rapid growth of ICT technologies in Tonga is evident in the literature. In 2010, the Tonga 
Communications Corporation (TCC) – the country’s leading provider of complete end-to-end telephony and 
Internet services – launched the new mobile-broadband-enabled GSM to replace the previous macro-GSM 
network. Before the introduction of the fibre optic cable, only 20% subscribers across the country for Internet. At 
the time of writing this paper, over 75% of the country subscribes for an Internet connection.  
The Government of Tonga is now talking about implementing e-Government services as part of the National ICT 
policy for Tonga. The aim is to generate a more efficient way for its government to deliver information and 
services to its citizens and the business community over the Internet (Cullen & Hassall, 2017, P.4). The completion 
of the fibre optic cable project, boosted the experience of the people of Tonga in cyber space. The e-government 
initiative is in its planning stage but need to consider all factors that might affect its successful completion. The 
aim of this study is to develop a framework to evaluate the readiness of Tonga e-government with regards to cyber 
security. 
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According to Grönlund and Horan (2005), the e-government field appeared in the late 1990s. E-government is 
also known by other names such as e-Gov, Electronic Government, Digital Government, Electronic Governance, 
and so on (p.39). E-government is defined as, the government owned or operated systems of information and 
communication technologies that transform relations with citizens, the private sector and/or other government 
agencies so as to promote citizens’ empowerment, improve service delivery, strengthen accountability, increase 
transparency, or improve government efficiency (Ndou, 2004, p.18). Ndou (2004) rightly argued that, e-
governance is more than just a government website. The strategic objective is to support and simplify governance 
for government, citizens and businesses. The use of ICTs can connect all three parties and provide support for 
processes and activities (p.18).  
The potential of what ICT technologies can provide towards public administration and governance procedures is 
apparent. However, technology trends such as mobile computing, social media, etc., have introduced new 
challenges in e-government service design and implementation (Layne & Lee, 2001, p.122). On the other hand, 
challenges introduced by e-government to information security and privacy is significant. Taking into account the 
importance and criticality of systems involved in a comprehensive e-government services framework such as e-
health, e-tax services, e-education, e-ID, e-procurement, etc., a security breach is immense due to the amount of 
personal information collected (Layne & Lee, 2001, p.125). Figure 1 shows the security priorities of e-
government. 
As a result, with e-government, information security issues are becoming ever more prominent. An attack on e-
government information system such as hacker attacks, malicious software intrusions, computer crimes and 
privacy breaches constitute great threats to information security. In addition, developments in both science and 
technology have posed new challenges to information security (Zhang et al., 2015, p.3). This study can contribute 
to both theory development for security system integration and practical guidance for operational system that 
protect information. Taking a socio-technical approach to e-government will show that the balance is between the 
system and the users. This has to be sensitively and economically managed in order to gain the optimal 
performance. 
The biggest threat to information security today is social engineering and the socio-technical interface between 
systems and its users. Theoretically, most information system can be strongly protected from attacks but the 
vulnerability remains of human factors who either by mistake, by trickery, or by intention, knowingly or 
unknowingly compromise information security (Algarni, et al., 2013, p.510). The literature suggests that it is 
possible to design e-governance system that interlocks management systems and operational control systems. 
However, such relationship is dynamic along the lines of interaction so that concepts such as defence in depth are 
no longer relevant. The security of an information system has both technical and social dimensions.  
SOCIO-TECHNICAL APPROACH 
The increasing availability of ICT technologies quantified the complexity of socio-technical systems (Vespignani, 
2012, p.32). Sociotechnical system (STS) is defined as an approach to complex organizational work design that 
recognizes the interaction between people and technology. The term also refers to the interaction between society's 
complex infrastructures and human behaviour (Salnitri, Paja, & Giorgini, 2014, p.50). Therefore, STSs are 
complex systems where social (human and organizational) and technical components interact with each other to 
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Figure 1: E-Government security priorities 
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achieve common objectives. For instance, healthcare systems, smart cities, air traffic management, etc. Based on 
the statement, e-government systems are complex systems and only make sense to employ socio-technical 
approach in designing such a system. This study is a social technical system design study which is designed to 
deal with the governance, management and control of security risk. 
In a smart city, citizens will be constantly accessing e-government services such as tax-payment, e-visa 
application, e-electricity, etc. The amount of information exchanged in such system is substantial, and such 
information is sensitive and should be secured. In the modern holistic view, the sociotechnical system (STS) is 
the whole system, not one of two side-by-side systems (Whitworth, 2009, p.395). For instance, a pilot plus a plane 
are two side-by-side systems with different needs, one mechanical (plane) and one human (pilot). Human 
Computer Interaction (HCI) suggests these systems should interact positively to succeed (Issa & Isaias, 2015, 
p.20). However, the plane and the pilot can be seen as a single system. On the mechanical level, the body of the 
plane and the body of the pilot both have weight, volume, and so forth. However, the pilot adds the human thought 
level which is above the plane’s mechanical level. This allows the plane and pilot system to strategize and analyse.  
The socio-technical concept that will be developed changes the priorities, for example, if a social system sits next 
to a technical one, it is usually secondary. Then, when a social system sits above a technical one, it guides the 
entire system and that is the primary factor in system performance (Miller, 2004, p.31). Online communities such 
as e-government, are social-technical systems (STS), built upon social requirements as well as technical ones like 
bandwidth. As technical problems are increasingly solved, social problems like spam rises. If software can do 
almost anything in cyberspace, there is still the challenge of what should it do? (Whitworth, de Moor, & Liu, 
2006, p.249). 
Social Element of Information Security  
Securing information assets whether in storage or transmitting around the system is critical and challenging for 
businesses who rely on ICT to support day to day processes (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000, p.125). However, 
advancements of information security technologies do not always guarantee security of information assets. The 
human factors of information security will always be a challenge and an issue in terms of managing of security 
(Siponen et al., 2014, p.217). As a result, a security framework is required to combine systems, operation, and 
internal controls to ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability of the critical information assets. Due to the 
seriousness of threats of unauthorized access over the Internet, effective information security management is one 
major concerns. A malicious insider is defined as a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner 
who - has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data, has intentionally exceeded or 
intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
the organization’s information or information systems (Silowash et al., 2012, p.9). 
Security mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and electronic access systems to enter 
the building or rooms. These are implemented particularly as a protection against external threats. However, that 
still does not address the issues of insider threats. Insiders not only aware of their organization’s policies, 
procedures, and technology but, they also aware of the known vulnerabilities in the system. The ISACA’s 
Cybersecurity Snapshots of the issues facing organizations revealed that, the top three cyber threat are social 
engineering, insider threats and advanced persistent threats. The 2017 Cyber Security Survey reported that 65% 
of the IT security professional respondents are not confident in their organizations security posture (Meyer, 2017, 
p.2). According to (CERT, 2011), the threat of attack from insiders is real and substantial. Another study 
conducted by (CSO Magazine, 2011, p.1) explained that 46% of the respondents thought that damage caused by 
insider attacks was more severe than damage from outsider attacks. The study found that the most common insider 
crimes were - unauthorized access to or use of corporate information; unintentional exposure of private or sensitive 
data; viruses, worms, or other malicious code; theft of intellectual property (IP). 
(Silowash et al., 2012, p.2) discussed that, insider threats are influenced by a combination of technical, 
behavioural, and organizational issues and must be addressed by policies, procedures, and technologies. (Silowash 
et al., 2012, p.9) also added that their current analysis recognizes that - intellectual property (IP) theft, IT sabotage, 
fraud, espionage, and accidental insider threats seems to be the unique patterns of insider threat behaviour. Siponen 
et al., (2014) pointed out that, the key threat to information security comes from employees who do not comply 
with information security policies (p.220).  
Technical Element of Information Security 
In von Solms (2010), the author discussed the five waves of information security. The first wave is technical wave, 
second wave is management wave, third wave is institutional wave, fourth wave is information security 
governance wave, and the fifth wave is the cybersecurity wave (p.2). In the era of the technical wave, Information 
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Security main concern was a form of Identification and Authentication for logging onto the mainframe system, 
and Logical Access Control. Most of these functions were handled by technical people.   
Whitman and Mattord (2016) explained that, there are six critical components of information system, the 
hardware, software, networks, people, procedures, and data enable information to be input, processed, output, and 
stored (p.114). Each of these IS components has its own strengths, weaknesses, characteristics and security 
requirements. The hardware component is dealing with technical and physical technology that is responsible 
executing, storing and transmitting of the data. Settanni et al., (2017) stated that, today’s information systems are 
increasingly complex. Their interconnected nature exposes them to advanced cyber threats (p.167). Anderson and 
Fuloria (2010) pointed out that, a failure of critical infrastructure can cause significant damage within a short 
period of time (p.55). There are a number of various threats to critical infrastructure such as the most obvious, 
natural disasters such as flooding, fire, equipment malfunction or also human error. However, recently, targeted 
attacks by hackers on the information system infrastructures has become significant (Miller & Rowe, 2012, p.51).   
There is a lot involved in physical/technical elements of information security. However, physical/technical 
security system such as a 24x7 security guard and surveillance cameras.  Access to areas where confidential work 
is done usually require electronic access cards or biometric access system. Security cameras is in place and uses 
of personal memory devices or CD/DVD ROMs are not allowed. All network/Information System traffics are 
configured to go through a firewall and a proxy server so web access and activities can be monitored and 
controlled. Access rights are controlled so no one can have the rights to execute .exe files. All files are redirected 
to store on the server not locally so they can be backed up regularly and stored offsite. 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
Exploratory research, on the other hand, is employed in this type of study as it allows the researcher to gain a 
deeper understanding of an issue or problem. Jebb et al. (2017) describe that, exploratory perspective is designed 
ready to find patterns that are different than expected. Such patterns may provide theoretical insights or provide 
information to guide further analyses (p.266). As a result, Exploratory research is the chosen methodology for this 
study.  
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Figure 2: Design of the study 
The study is designed to first identify the problem – the gap for this study based on the literature survey. The next 
task is to define the problem and extract its significance. This involves analysing the existing and relevant 
literature; identify the problem, interview experts in the field. This presents an opportunity to employ a gap 
analysis strategy by completing a component-by-component analysis. Therefore, influencing how the interview 
questions should be designed to create awareness of factors that will affect the security readiness of Tonga e-
government initiative. The next stage is designed to deal with the formulation of the interview questions for data 
collection. The next stage deals with data analysis, in this phase, the factors that will affect the security readiness 
of the Tonga e-government will be identified. The data gathered from this phase will be used to construct the 
security evaluation framework for the Tonga e-government initiative. The final phase is designed to allow the 
researcher to employ various scholarly electronic databases to communicate the outcome of the study. This 
communication might include the problem and its importance, the artefact and its effectiveness to other 
researchers and practitioners in the field including the Government of Tonga. It is also suggested that researchers 
should conclude the study with communicating the implications of the result for the practical field. 
Data Analysis and Discussions 
An interview was conducted with three senior government officials of the Tonga government. At the moment, 
there only two government ministries that was formed to work on the Tonga e-government initiative together with 
a consultant from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) based on the National ICT policy for Tonga. This is why 
this study only interview the three top officials that are working on the Tonga e-government. The three officials 
are the consultant from the ADB, the CEO of Tonga Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the Senior 
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Engineer from the Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Climate Change and 
Communications (MEIDECC). Table 1 summaries the answers received and has been categorised into four 
categories but grouped into only two main groups.  
Table 1: Security requirement categories interview data 
Questions Technological Policies & Regulations 
 What are the benefits of 
employing ICT? 
 What are the challenges faces 
by the Government in 
implementing ICT? 
 How well are e-Government 
initiatives aligned with Tonga 
frameworks and requirement? 
 Who is driving these initiatives? 
 How are they going to be 
funded?  
 Access to information 
 Decision making 
 Centralized DataBase 
 Share Information 
 Easy communication 
 Build each Ministry’s ICT 
capacity 
 Unsecured software 
application   
 Unsecured ICT infrastructure 
 Inexperience staffs 
 Unskilled IT staffs 
 Lack of proper tools for the job 
 Lack of funding 
 Lack of inter-ministry 
communication 
 Lack of top management 
support 
 Too much politics 
 Dependent on overseas 
donations 
 Out-of-date computer crimes 
act 
 
The next phase is to prepare and get the data organized. The next phase is designed to provide a description of the 
case considered. During this phase, data coding is done also, a number of questions is asked such as, what is this 
incident about? what category does this incident indicate? what property of what category does this incident 
define? what is the ‘main concern’ of the participants? The coding of the data was based on their properties and 
security requirements. Properties considered in this study are conditions, causes, consequences, hierarchies and 
contexts. However, this study further grouped these categories into two groups as it shown in table 1. The purpose 
is not only to summarize the interview data but to identify their inter-relationships and establish how they help to 
explain the phenomenon under study.  
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Figure 2: Data analysis technique 
The final phase is designed to allow for interpretation, developing explanations and provide meaning for the data. 
As mentioned earlier, this study is taking a socio-technical approach to cyber security of e-government, more 
specifically, Tonga e-government. Looking at the interaction between social and technical dimensions of modern 
life as dynamic, constantly changing that both emerge from and shape modern society. As the technological age 
advanced, however, it presented an ever-growing array of new issues and unknowns. In response, practitioners 
began to focus on more specific areas for action, and most researchers began to select more narrowly defined 
subjects for study. The security needs are expressed through the processes. 
SECURITY READINESS EVALUATION FRAMEWORK  
Based on the coding done of the interview data, following are the security challenges to Tonga e-government can 
be identified. However, due to the complexity of e-government systems, these security challenges might affect 
implementation and management. According to Evans (2011), by 2020 there will be over 50 billion connected 
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objects against a population of 7 billion. An object can be anything embedded with computation, storage and 
communication capabilities with different capacities (sensor, actuator, mobile phone, desktop, laptop, printer, car, 
fridge, oven, etc.) (p.7). Therefore, security in such environment is paramount. The main objectives of e-
government initiatives are to provide one-stop quality public services and value-added information to citizens and 
businesses. At the same time, to enable government agencies to work together and achieve internal efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations (Lee et al., 2005, p.99).  
The UN survey reported that efforts are being made to ensure privacy and security of personal data yet challenges 
remain. Some related to the technical difficulties associated with ensuring interoperability of systems. However, 
proliferation of technologies makes it difficult to provide integrated services such as e-health, etc. Major security 
services required for e-government consists of three aspects that should be considered: 
o Confidentiality: refers to protection of information from unauthorized disclosure e.g. to the press or to 
release through improper disposal techniques, or to those who are not entitled to have the same. 
o Integrity: is about protecting information from unauthorized modification, and ensuring that 
information, such as a beneficiary list, can be relied upon and is accurate and complete. 
o Availability: is to ensure that the information is available when it is required. 
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Figure 4: Security e-readiness evaluation framework. 
Information and Data Security 
E-government initiatives are goals set up by governments and accomplished through the use of ICTs. E-
government initiatives are focused on capturing, management, use, dissemination, and sharing, of information. A 
number of the challenges relate to the information at the core of E-government initiatives. Researchers in the e-
government domain principally focused on the issues relating to quality and accuracy of the data. However, legal 
experts expressed their concerns regarding the fact that every data processing duplicates the risk of abuse (intended 
or not). On the other hand, poor data quality increases operational cost because time and other resources are spent 
detecting and correcting errors. Information is power and organizations tend to be sensitive about giving out 
information as it reflects on the quality of their operations. As a result, information has to be used differently and 
its management in order to satisfy the digital requirements. System usability and ease of use are an important 
factor to consider when designing E-government initiatives. Complexity and newness of technology are also 
constraints that can potentially affect the results. The lack of relevant technical skills within the ministries has 
been found to be an important factor as well as the shortages of qualified technical personnel.   
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Organizational and Managerial  
The size of the implementation and the diversity of users and organizations involved are two of the main 
challenges for E-government initiatives. There are at least two other problems related to the goals and objectives 
of the initiative. First is the lack of alignment between organizational goals and the E-government project. This 
alignment may be understood as a certain type of balance that needs to be in place to achieve one or more goals. 
Contextual factors are often addressed in information systems (IS) research as situational, organizational, 
environmental, task, and technology characteristics with influence for the outcome of an E-government project.  
E-government initiatives are required to be value-driven and not technology driven. The promised benefits of E-
government cannot be based on digitizing information and putting it on the web alone. Technology needs to be 
fully realized and the transformation brought about to better serve the citizens. E-government is to facilitate an 
information society that can influence every aspect of daily life. Yet, more detached observers maintain that there 
is no post-industrial society therefore, individual interests and associated behaviours lead to internal conflicts 
about change and resistance to innovation is such as E-government.   
Legal and Regulatory  
Government ministries operate according to a specific and formal sets of rules. Li (2003) pointed out that, e-
government is not a technical issue, but an organizational issue (p.45). As a result, to successfully implement e-
government principles and functions, will require a new set of rules, policies, and laws. There will also be changes 
to satisfy the requirements for electronic activities such as electronic archiving, signatures, transmission of 
information, data protection, computer crime, intellectual property rights and copyright issues and so on. Dealing 
with e-government means signing a contract or a digital agreement, which has to be protected and recognized by 
a formalized law (Hwang et al., 2004, p.10). In Tonga, e-business and e-government laws are not yet available. 
Institutional and environmental challenges 
The availability of resources is an economic challenge associated with emerging technologies that is a great 
challenge for developing countries. Obstacles with funding, regulations, and patents that can derail technology 
development and adoption (Woodson, 2016, p.1410). However, in this environment, institutions are not only laws 
and regulations, but also norms, actions, or behaviours that people accept as good or take for granted. On the other 
hand, deployment of security measures can lead in to an intrusion on users’ privacy. Privacy and related security 
issues are challenges that must be adequately addressed in E-government IT initiatives (Arroyo et al., 2015, p.455). 
In this digital age, it is not possible to imagine conducting day to day work without the use of technology.  
External pressures such as policy agendas and politics may affect the results of IT initiatives. The discussion 
highlights the range of complex and various challenges public managers must face as they work in the e-
government area (Walker, 2015, p.297). Success is not only about choosing the right technology, but also 
managing organizational capabilities, regulatory constraints, and environmental pressures. For E-government 
managers to be successful in their initiatives they must be aware of these challenges and use appropriate strategies 
to overcome the institutional and environmental challenges. 
Digital Divide 
The digital divide refers to the gap in opportunity between those who have access to the Internet and those who 
do not. Those who do not have access to the Internet will be unable to benefit from e-government services. Digital 
Divide is a very serious matter in Tonga, not all citizens currently have equal access to computers, it can an issue 
of affordability or lack of necessary skills (Lu, 2001, p.1). Government should look providing Internet-enabled 
computers in schools and public libraries. Yet, few types of challenges that government may face are-affordability, 
elderly, language barrier, and the inexperienced or computer illiterate or not so well educated (Hassani, 2006, 
p.250). Government should provide basic skills training to both its employees and citizens in order to let them 
participate in e-government development applications.  
CONCLUSION 
The result of the literature survey highlighted the fact E-government is a complex system and Socio-technical 
system (STS) is defined as an approach to complex organizational work design that recognizes the interaction 
between people and technology. As a result, this study decided to take a Socio-Technical approach to e-
government security because, in the modern holistic view, the sociotechnical system (STS) is the whole system, 
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not one of two side-by-side systems that is – social and technical. Human Computer Interaction (HCI) suggests 
these systems should interact positively to succeed.  
Interview was used as the method of data collection. The growth of ICT technologies is very fast however, the 
country is very small and lack of expert personnel in the field seems a real issue. The interview data was collected 
from three experts in Tonga that are currently involve with the e-government initiative. The purpose of the study 
is to identify the factors that may become a risk and a vulnerability of Tonga e-government services. E-government 
presents several technical, economic and social challenges that will surface as the E-government development 
moves forward. Looking at various reasons to why security-readiness is so important to both governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, the ease of using these measures is most prominent. Having an easily 
quantifiable set of indicators is vital. This will provide the government of Tonga with an overview of their 
situations. It can be also used as a basis for comparison and future planning. This advantage arises from the fact 
that security-readiness measures have the ability to summarize a broad set of characteristics of the Kingdom of 
Tonga.  
There are a number of existing security-readiness evaluation frameworks with various objectives, methodologies 
and results. However, there is no one fits all evaluation framework yet, and this study has contributed a security-
readiness framework that is both relevant and practical for implementation in a developing country.  
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Abstract 
Hacking of IP surveillance camera systems came to public attention in 2016 when the high bandwidth and resources 
were exploited for a massive DDoS attack that affected one third of all US Internet services. A review of previous 
studies show that a vast number of IP cameras have been hacked because the default usernames and passwords 
have not been changed from the factory defaults. In this research we asked, What are the vulnerabilities of an IP 
surveillance camera?  The purpose of the study was to provide identification of vulnerabilities and guidance for 
the protection of surveillance camera systems. The research shows that the tested surveillance camera had many 
vulnerabilities and that there is urgency for distributing alerts and best practice guidelines. 
Keywords: Hacking, CCTV vulnerability, Evaluation, Security 
INTRODUCTION 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems have proliferated in businesses and for private use. The surveillance 
systems are relatively inexpensive and provide multiple sensors that feed information back to a centralised 
processing station and monitoring screens. The application is for monitoring assets and human behaviour for risk 
management. The sensors provide different data types that include visual, audio, infrared, and other spectrum data. 
Monitoring may proceed by human observation, automation, archival mapping, or a combination of these. Many 
systems have software to assist human decision-making, and resource management systems to optimise the cost 
of surveillance against the benefits it may deliver. Research has shown that these CCTV surveillance systems have 
critical points of failure (Costin, 2016). In addition, Ozkan (2016) shows that over 100,000 wireless Internet 
Protocol (IP) cameras in the research sample had little or no information security protection. Others show that 
surveillance cameras from 79 vendors are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Kirk, 2016; Costin, 2016). 
The security problem is increased by vendors are selling IP cameras using the “white labelling” business model 
with the same firmware developed by the same company across the product range and with unprotected RCE. The 
vulnerability allows an attacker to seize control of the camera for manipulation. Manipulation can have several 
features, such as, data seizure, mechanical manipulation, anti-forensic data planting, exploitation of the bandwidth 
resource, end-user deception, and zombie exploitation (McKee, et al., 2017). A significant weakness is that most 
IP cameras only log authenticated requests and have no traces on the camera of user activity or unique 
identification. Hence, an attacker can be anonymous while acquiring real-time video streams, archived footage; 
email, FTP, other credentials, and access to the system resource controls. The significant vulnerability grants an 
attacker invisibility and the ability to host malware; run arbitrary software such as botnets, proxies and scanners; 
and create backdoors for future access. Consequently, a CCTV system is generally available to unauthorised 
control, and the system itself, can sponsor attacks on other systems (Coole, et al., 2012; Cuputo, 2014; Costin, 
2016). In this paper, we test an out-of-the box camera to identify security vulnerabilities. 
BACKGROUND 
On 21 October 2016, a massive DDoS attack against Dyn, a domain name system (DNS) provider, broke a large 
portion of the Internet, causing a significant outage to hundreds of websites and services (CCTV, 2017). Although, 
Dyn did not disclose the actual size of the attack, but it has been speculated that the DDoS attack could be much 
bigger than the one that hit French Internet service and hosting provider OVH that peaked at 1.1 Terabytes per 
second (TBps), which is the largest DDoS attack known to date (Smith, 2013). The attack was caused by a botnet 
that consisted of 100,000 devices infected by malware named Mirai. The Mirai malware targeted Internet of Things 
(IoT) devices such as IP cameras and digital video recorders (DVR) that have weak default passwords, making 
them easy to infect (Wu, et al., 2010; Zanella, 2014; Kirk, 2016). A similar study by Minin (2015) found that a 
malicious attacker took control of the cameras remotely and controlled movement, redirected the video feeds, and 
worked out the password for the wireless network the device was connected. The owners of the surveillance camera 
systems were not aware of the system compromise and the use for a massive attack. A similar study analysed 
Motorola’s Focus 73 (Minin, 2015) outdoor security camera. Images and video taken by the camera can be 
delivered to a mobile phone application. One attack showed how it is possible to scan for cameras connected to 
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the Internet and then to get a reverse root shell to forge control credentials. Additionally, by tampering with DNS 
settings, the attacker can intercept the alerts that the camera sends to its owner, as well as to see video clips that 
would be sent to a cloud storage service. Further analysis showed that the firmware is a generic and used in other 
kinds of IP cameras. The code is not encrypted or digitally signed leaving open a backdoor for malware to be 
uploaded to the camera (Gotham Digital Science, 2012).  
The argument for protection when the surveillance system is on a dedicated network without access to other client 
systems, is shown to be false (Tekeoglu et al., 2015). The experiment was performed on MicroDigital, HIVISION, 
CTRing and a substantial number of other rebranded devices. The result shows the tested surveillance systems 
transmit the user name and password in clear text over port 5920 transmission control protocol (TCP) during 
authentication stage. The experiment also used a Metasploit framework to perform brute-force and dictionary 
attacks on the tested devices. The sample showed that 70% of the instances utilised had the default vendor 
passwords that had not been changed.  
The list of known CCTV vulnerabilities have been published in a database (CCTV Calculator, 2017). They list 
vulnerabilities existing in the vendors product range including Siemans, ZoneMinder, Zhuhai RaySharp, Samsung, 
Grandstream, WESPMonitor, WebGate, D-link, Panasonic, Cisco, Hikvision, FOSCAM, Y-Cam, TRENDnet, 
CIPCAMPTIWL, Dahua, TVT, AVTECH, Brickcom, TP-LINK, AirLive, Axis, Sony, QNAP, Arecont Vision, 
GeoVision, March Networks, Canon, FlexWATCH, Mobotix and Linksys. The vulnerability discovered in 
GeoVision DVR systems allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code by calling the GetAudioPlayingTime 
method with arguments. Tian (2014) shows more detailed vulnerabilities in GeoVision include directory traversal 
in geohttpserver and SanpShotToFile in GeoVision LiveX. Weak encryption schemes for passwords allows 
attackers to obtain the password via sniffing (Wu, et al., 2010). The sysinfo script in GeoHttpServer allows remote 
attackers to cause a DoS via a long password, and triggering a buffer overflow. When GeoHttpServer is configured 
to authenticate users, it allows attackers to bypass authentication and access unauthorised files via a URL that 
contains %0a%0a – code injection (Bruschi, et al., 2003; Bojinov, et al., 2009). These examples indicate the 
GeoHttpServer has several vulnerabilities that gives access for an attacker to perform unauthorised activities 
within the surveillance system. Nonetheless, these vulnerabilities were discovered in the period between 2004 and 
2011 and no information is provided regarding whether or not these vulnerabilities have been fixed by the 
manufacturers since. Further research (Gotham Digital Science, 2012; Kyaw, et al., 2016) shows a remote file 
disclosure vulnerability in GeoHttpServer. The code has no authentication requirement and hence an attacker can 
exploit this vulnerability to retrieve and download stored files on the server such as ‘boot.ini’ and ‘win.ini’. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The aim of this research was to answer the research question: What are the vulnerabilities of an IP surveillance 
camera? To answer the question, the research has six phases (Figure 1). These phases include literature review, 
system setup, pilot testing, data collection, data analysis and its comparison with results of previous research. 
Different research phases employ different research methods. The literature review section, for example, provided 
understanding for the work of different authors and their recommendations for future research. This phase 
constitutes the qualitative part of the study. The data collection, on the other hand, included a pilot study and 
experiment conducted by testing the camera by trying different exploits. The system setup phase set up the 
equipment for the field trials. These rational phases constitute the quantitative part of the study. The final phase 
compares the results obtained from both parts of the study in a mixed methods approach (Bryman, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Phases 
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System Design  
The following devices are used in the research, and the system design is in Figure 2: 
 Target IP surveillance camera (10.0.0.2): GeoVision GV-FD220D 2MP H.264 IR fixed IP Dome camera 
 Network switch: Thomson TG585 v8 ADSL2+ wireless gateway 
 Client (10.0.0.5):  Lenovo laptop Thinkpad X200 Table with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU L9600 2.13GHz ×2, 
242.9 GB HDD and Windows 7 32-bit 
 Attack device 1(10.0.0.6): Lenovo laptop Thinkpad X200 Table with Intel Core 2 Duo CPU L9600 
2.13GHz ×2, 242.9 GB HDD and Kali Linux Rolling 2016.2 32-bit 
 Attack device 2 (10.0.0.3): Acer laptop Aspire V3-371-501P with Intel Core i5-4210U 1.7GHz, 4GB 
DDR3, 500 GB HDD and Windows 8.1 64-bit 
 
Figure 2. System Design 
Pilot Test  
After setting up the IP surveillance system network, a pilot run was made to configure and test the camera 
functionalities as well as network connections amongst all the devices. The user can connect to the IP camera 
either through Windows Explorer by entering its IP address in the URL field; or use GeoVision DMMultiView 
client software to connect the camera’s DVR by selecting the host IP address and type of device. A User can use 
GvIP Device Utility to find the IP camera IP address. GV IP Device Utility is an application software to help the 
user to manage IP cameras, update their firmware, identify them by their IP addresses within a local area network 
(LAN) or backup and restore their settings (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. GeoVision DMMultiview User Authentication and GeoVision DMMultiview Live Capture 
 
The attacking device ran Kali Linux, so we also needed to test whether it can connect to the IP camera in the 
pilot study, and to ensure a penetration test is possible using preinstalled tools from the attacking device.  
Data Management  
The tools Angry IP Scanner, WireShark, ophcrack, Burpsuite and Cain & Abel, were tested in the pilot study for 
performance and functionality. Each has their own built-in data processing ability as specified by the distinct 
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features and functions of the tool. Others tested, such as Nmap Hydra, Nikto and Metasploit, are command-line 
based and are relevant for data collection from IP cameras. The collected data are automatically processed and 
analysed by these tools. The results can be saved to a file; analysis performed, and a report generated. Data 
collection was undertaken with website and IP camera DVR penetration testing tools and techniques. For result 
accuracy, the same tools are used 3 times and then the collected data compared to identify any variations. Data 
dump files are created for each penetration tool used, and the collected data analysed. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Angry IP Scanner and Nmap were used to collect information about the target system, such as its IP address, media 
access control address (MAC), manufacturer and server information. The Angry IP Scanner is a fast lightweight 
cross-platform IP address and port scanner; used to scan IP addresses in any range. It includes information on any 
of the ports by simply pinging each IP address to check if it is alive, then optionally resolving its hostname, 
determining MAC addresses and the vendor (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Angry IP Scanner Network Scanning Result   
The result shows that our target IP surveillance system’s IP and MAC address, its manufacturer information as 
well as its active ports. Once, we obtain the target IP address, we used Nmap for further reconnaissance. Nmap is 
a free and open source utility for network discovery and security auditing. It uses raw IP packets to determine 
available hosts on the network, services offered, operating system (OS) they are running, type of pocket filters 
and firewalls in use as well as other user characteristics.  From the Nmap scanning results, the target IP camera 
has TCP port 80, 111 and 10000 open. Hence, it is shown again that a user can login to the target IP surveillance 
system through Windows Explorer via port 80, and port 10000 is the virtual switch system (VSS) port for video 
streaming. Thus, to further the research IP packets were collected, and packet sniffing and spoofing performed to 
identify any vulnerabilities in the system. Packet sniffing and spoofing are methods that identify the weak points 
of network system, particularly on a layer 2 switched network. A LAN uses address resolution protocol (ARP) 
with holes enabling the attacker to sniff packets and lodge ARP spoofing attacks.  
WireShark was put into monitoring and capturing mode to authenticate to the target surveillance system website 
application, in order to capture the user name and password either in clear text or in hash values. The captured 
packets were then analysed and by following the TCP packet streams, other matters for further investigation were 
discovered. Firstly, we were able to find the user name and password; and the two MD5 hash values. There were 
also two groups of 50 bits assigned to two variables, namely gUserName and gPassword. Finally, we saved both 
MD5 hash values to be decrypted. Similarly, Cain & Abel was used to recover passwords by sniffing the network, 
cracking encrypted passwords using dictionary, brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks, recovering wireless network 
keys, revealing password boxes, uncovering cached passwords and analysing routing protocols. Cain & Abel sniffs 
the network for the target device, and then launches attacks. We used ARP poisoning to perform a man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack. During a MITM attack, the attacking device secretly intercepts, replays and potentially 
alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other – in 
this case the camera and its control. The ARP poisoning feature caught the username and password when a client 
computer authenticated with the target IP surveillance system. There were 9,652 packets transmitted between the 
target IP surveillance system and its client were captured. The two MD5 hash values captured when logging into 
the target IP surveillance system from Windows Explorer browser, were sent to a hash value cracker – ophcrack 
to decrypt the hash values. ophcrack is a free open source program that cracks hash values, and Windows log-in 
passwords by using Lan Manager hash (LM) through a rainbow table. After entering both captured MD5 hash 
values into Wireshark, it returned the results as “empty”. Thus, WireShark did not capture any packets related to 
the user name and password in either clear text or hash values. Thus, we required the alternative software for hash 
value cracking and to gain the user name and password for the target IP surveillance system. Two cracking 
techniques were used, namely: brute-force and dictionary.  
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To identify the range of vulnerabilities a IP camera may have we used many cracking tools including Hydra. It is 
also called THC-Hydra, and is a command-line-based network logon cracker that can use a dictionary attack to 
decrypt passwords from many protocols and applications. Before using Hydra to run a dictionary attack on the 
target IP surveillance system, we needed to generate a word list. Based on the previous research reviewed, we 
formed a dictionary of possible default passwords, including admin as a common user name. Previous studies 
show that GeoHttpServer have several vulnerabilities; and HTTP header contains much useful information. Thus, 
we used these clues to run Hydra with the http-head command (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Hydra Http-Head Dictionary Attack Result 
The results showed, 17 tries on 22 possible passwords; and one pair valid user name and password found. To 
confirm the result, we used the identified user name and password to login on the target surveillance system 
through Windows Explorer. The result confirmed they were correct. Hydra with http-get command was run to 
compare the results.   
DVR is the heart of IP surveillance system network and has a weak default password. Therefore, we evaluated 
how well the target IP surveillance system can resist such an attack. Metasploit was chosen for the task of 
developing and executing exploit code against the remote target machine. The results showed the attacking 
computer was not able to establish connection with 10.0.0.2 on port 5920 - the port used by most IP surveillance 
systems. We also tried the ports 4550, 5550, 6550 and 10000, which are the system’s data port, audio port and 
VSS port. Metasploit did not provide the option for a user to specify which port to exploit so we tried other tools. 
Nikto was used to perform web server scanning on the target IP surveillance system. Nikto is an open source web 
server vulnerability scanner, which performs comprehensive tests against web items, including over 6700 
potentially dangerous files/programs, checks for outdated versions of over 1,250 servers, and version specific 
problems on over 270 servers. It also checks for server configuration items such as the presence of multiple index 
files, HTTP server options, and will attempt to identify installed web servers and software. The following 
vulnerabilities were identified: 
 The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present 
 GET The X-XSS-Protection header is not defined. This header can hint to the user agent to protect against 
some forms of XSS 
 GET The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content 
of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type 
 OSVDB-2119: GET/shopexd.asp?catakigud=’42:VP-ASP Shopping Cart 5.0 contains multiple SQL 
injection vulnerabilities. CVE-2003-0560, BID-8159 
 OSVDB-3092: GET /htpasswd: This might be interesting... 
 OSVDB-3268: GET /tmp/: Directory indexing found. 
 OSVDB-3092: GET /tmp/: This might be interesting... 
 OSVDB-3268: GET /images/: Directory indexing found 
 OSVDB-3268:GET /images/?pattern=/etc/*&sort=name: Directory indexing found 
Another tool used was the Burp suite, which is a Java based software platform of tools for performing security 
testing of web application. The suite of products combines automated and manual testing techniques and consists 
of a number of different tools, such as a proxy server, web spider, scanner, intruder, repeater, sequencer, decoder, 
collaborator, extender, and to brute force a login page. After installing the attacking device with Burp, Internet 
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Explorer is then configured to work with Burp. It can operate as MITM between the web browser and the target 
IP surveillance system web server, and it intercepts the traffic exchanged between the browser and the server. 
Internet Explorer (IE) was used to connect to the server and enter the correct user name and password. The 
interception and capture of the POST request gave the username and password that is supplied to the server. This 
can occasionally be a GET request also. The result shows that both the username and password are MD5 hash 
values (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Burp Network Packet Capture Result 
We then used Intruder and Sniper to perform dictionary attacks on the MD5 hash values captured. Instead of trying 
to decrypt the captured hash values, Intruder and Sniper allows the attacker to perform a dictionary attack precisely 
on the captured MD5 hash value fields. The dictionary attack is performed, and a valid user name and password 
will be shown. Based on the word list used for the attack, there are 27 words used, 54 requests tried and responses 
in total. Table 1 summarises the vulnerabilities identified in the research and the software used.  
Table 1 Summary of vulnerabilities 
Software Functionality Attack 
Pilot Study 
Windows Explorer   Get Camera IP address Vector 
GeoVision DMMultiView Connect the camera’s DVR Vector 
GvIP Device Utility Manages IP camera, firmware updates, IP addresses within 
a local area network (LAN), backup records and restore 
settings  
Vector 
Main Study 
Angry IP Scanner Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information 
Reconnaissance 
WireShark Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information; packet capture 
Reconnaissance 
ophcrack Hash value cracker Analysis 
Burpsuite Performs security testing of web applications Reconnaissance 
Cain & Abel Recovers passwords, cracks encrypted passwords using 
dictionary, brute-force and cryptanalysis attacks, recovers 
wireless network keys, passwords and routing protocols 
Analysis 
Nmap Collects IP address, media access control address (MAC), 
manufacturer and server information, and system 
characteristics 
Reconnaissance 
Hydra (THC-Hydra) A network logon cracker that can use a dictionary attack to 
decrypt passwords for many protocols and applications 
Analysis 
Nikto Web server scanning for the target IP surveillance system Reconnaissance  
Metasploit Develops and executes exploit code against a remote 
camera 
Active agency 
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CONCLUSION 
In this research, we tested an out of the box GeoVision GV-FD220D 2MP H.264 IR fixed IP Dome camera for 
security vulnerabilities. Although the code injection and directory traverse exploitation techniques were rebuffed, 
many other points of vulnerability were identified. The two points of entry to the camera system were openly 
accessible through Windows Explorer or the GeoVision DMMultiView client. The password to the system was 
easily cracked (the factory default) and the GvIP Device Utility entry gained to control the IP camera. A fuller 
exploration of the whole surveillance system demonstrated the scope of a number of tools and the ability to gain 
control of critical information. Countermeasures are required to protect the IP camera from hacking and 
exploitation of the communication resources. Strong advice is to change the access password from the default, and 
then to change the password regularly. Detection of surveillance activity is required on a moment-by-moment 
basis and layers of protection are required to satisfy an attacker but also to maintain system integrity. Similarly, 
critical information requires encryption, protection by tunnelling, and cryptographic complexity to confuse 
analysis. The defeat of active agency can come by change management controls, benchmark auditing on a moment-
by-moment basis, and the regular updating of IP Camera anti-virus software. Our research suggests that IP cameras 
are vulnerable to exploitation and we advocate for a greater urgency in distributing countermeasures.     
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Abstract 
Tonga is a small developing island in the south pacific and ICT is still in its early stages. In this paper we ask the 
questions, what is social engineering and who is this social engineer, what are the threats to Tonga, how can these 
threats be identified and which countermeasures can be taken to mitigate the risk of social engineering? The 
answers to these questions will lead to a social engineering risk management framework to make the risks of social 
engineering more transparent and help organisations implement mitigating controls against social engineering. 
The study was performed in four chosen organisations in Tonga, who were involved with Information 
Communications, Finance, and Cyber Security in order to model threats and countermeasures and develop a risk 
management framework.  
  
Keywords: Risk management; Social engineering; Information security; Cyber security; Organisational 
Vulnerability; Security threats; Threat assessments.     
INTRODUCTION 
The technical aspects of information security have been in the spotlight for several years (Solomon and Chapple, 
2005, p.56), and has made much progress. In general, large improvements in security can no longer be attained 
by upgrades in hardware or software. It is therefore difficult for attackers to achieve their goal through technical 
attacks alone and their focus shifts (even more) to the organisations employees (Richards, 2008, p.41). As a result, 
organisations need to direct increased attention toward the undertreated human factor of information security to 
guard and stay in control of their critical information. For many organisations, the weakest link in information 
security is now human (Mahfuth et al., 2017, p.1). Organisations need to raise the security on this human factor 
to an even par with the technical security Legg et al., 2015, p.1). In response, information risk management the 
top training priority for Information Technology security professionals (Luiijf, 2012, p.57). Organisations are 
looking to develop flexible frameworks that give insight to the risks involved and help them adapt to changing 
environmental factors. 
Although there have been studies conducted on the human factor of Information Technology, it is still a relatively 
unexplored field of scientific research. In most cases, the literature does not have a scientific foundation and does 
not give a clear overview but merely discuss case descriptions (Tsohou et al., 2010, p.227). However, all of the 
previous mentioned studies show that the human factor can cause great damage to organisations, not only financial 
but, also to the organisation’s image, which in turn influences the organisations goals and continuity in the long 
run (Drevin et al., 2006, p.448). 
Ironically, employees are not only important assets, but also pose a great threat. Employees not only know where 
to look but have the advantage of obtained trust and accessibility to systems (Nurse et al., 2014, p.271). Attackers 
can misuse the employees or could even be one of them. There have been known cases of technical hack, and the 
most notorious human hacker, Chris Hadnagy, asserts that breaches start with a phishing email or vishing call, 
then they go to a technical hack (Shin, 2017, p.1). This study will primarily focus on the threats from external 
parties, however, also internal threats and culminate in a high level social engineering risk management model. 
This can be used to gain transparency on the subject, implement mitigating controls, and help organisations 
manage their social engineering risks. 
This study focuses on 'social engineering', the manipulated compromise. Mitigating the threats of this 
manipulation will also reduce the intentional and unintentional compromising of systems and information 
therefore, lower overall risk. While this research hopes to provide incentives that may help to ensure business 
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continuity and give organisations in Tonga a clear view on social engineering, it also aims at finding out how to 
strengthen the weak link in information security, the human factor, by looking at: 
“How social engineering occurs in organisations?” 
The measures that can be used to stop social engineering from causing harm. How an organisation can measure 
the risks and their protection from social engineering threats and if necessary apply appropriate countermeasures 
to mitigate these risks and stay in control of their information, thus ensuring business continuity. 
LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
Social engineering has been defined as the unauthorised acquisition of sensitive information or inappropriate 
access privileges by a potential threat source, based upon the building of an inappropriate trust relationship with 
a legitimate user (Dudek, 2006, p.1). That is, pretending to be someone you are not, with the goal of misleading 
someone into giving out information they should not give. Social engineering is an aspect that involves both 
intellect and technical experience, but more importantly it is an evolving phenomenon that needs to be monitored 
constantly. If attackers are willing to be consistent in finding loopholes in the system, then security experts should 
balance and overcome that attempt. With that thought in mind, the basis of this literature analysis is to find out 
what is trending in not only the cyber world, but also to assess the status of organisations in Tonga with regards 
to social engineering security.   
As a result, it is evident in the literature that a number of researchers have invested time and resources into 
exploring social engineering. In addition, they look for the latest techniques. However, despite the vastness of the 
exploration, this analysis will focus on a certain number of key elements that relates to the area of interest. 
Hackers and Social Engineers 
Hacking and social engineering are closely related. Social engineering tactics are applied to gather information in 
preparation of a hack and the motives and goals of both types of attacker are related (Ziccardi, 2013, p.75), as 
social engineers are also known as ‘people hackers’. It is therefore important to know who these (people) hackers 
are (Warren, & Leitch, 2010, p.427). In this section, a description of hacking and the hacker will be given along 
with the motives a social engineer may have. 
Hackers, Crackers and Phreakers  
There are hackers with good intentions. For instance, searching for vulnerabilities in the information system so 
they can be controlled. There are also hackers with bad intentions, using the identified vulnerabilities for personal 
gain. There are three types that all get the predicate ‘hacker’ in the media; hackers, crackers and phreakers 
(Milberry, 2012, p.112). The jargon dictionary defines a hacker as: “A person who enjoys exploring the details of 
programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who prefer to learn only 
the minimum necessary” and “one who enjoys the intellectual challenge of creatively overcoming or 
circumventing limitations” (Watson, 2012, p.260). A hacker is therefore someone who seeks challenges and 
overcomes boundaries using his or her skills. Hackers follow an ethical code and do not act illegally, which 
differentiates them from the crackers (Long & Wiles, 2008, p.104) 
A cracker is someone who breaks into the system with the goal of theft or vandalism and therefore does not act 
ethically (Rahalkar, 2016, p.90). Crackers form small groups within the hacking community and are seen as ‘a 
lower form of life’ by other hackers (Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 2003, p.178). Another name for these crackers 
is ‘dark-side hackers’ (Svensson, 2016, p.90). Finally, phreakers use information and social engineering skills to 
break into telephone systems and use these for various purposes such as, making long distance phone calls at 
another’s expense, stealing phone card numbers or pretending to call from a secure location. People hackers - in 
contrast to technical hackers - focus on the weaknesses in the human, instead of the technology they use. The 
people hackers referred to in this study all have malicious intent and could therefore be classified as ‘people 
crackers’ according to previous classification (Barghuthi & Said, 2014, p.2). For the purposes of this paper, the 
term hacker will imply to those hackers, or crackers working with malicious intent (Richards, 2008, p.40). 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING ATTACKS 
Knowing why social engineers might attack is crucial for estimating the likelihood of a social engineering assault 
on a specific organisation, and to implement appropriate measures and controls to counter this assault (Lafrance, 
2004, p.12). The motivation of different subcultures within the hacking community will now be discussed 
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followed by the motives of the social engineers. Bodhani (2013) identifies four subcultures within the hacker 
community, each with different motivation; casual hackers, political hackers, organised crime, and internal agents 
(p.65). There are also hackers that do not act as a member of a subculture. The Australian government performed 
research on the personal motives of a hacker (Madarie, 2017, p.80) such as monetary gain, intellectual challenge, 
power, and so on.  The motives of the social engineer can be classified according to a variation on the results of 
this research (Krone, 2005, p.2). For each category, a general description of the motive is given, a classification 
in malicious or good intentions, and what role social engineering can play in an attack with this motive.  
The way social engineering can be used in an attack is subject to the goal of the attack. If the goal is to acquire 
specific information, social engineering can play a great part in the attack. But the main challenges taken up by 
attackers are still technical; in most cases therefore social engineering will be used to gather information and 
prepare for the final attack. To stop the social engineer from succeeding, organisations need to apply measures to 
counter the social engineering attacks and tactics. They can change the environment of the asset, they can choose 
to act on occurring attacks or they can mitigate the social engineering risk by the structured implementation of 
countermeasures (Smith et al., 2013, p.250). This study focuses on transparency of social engineering and 
therefore on the structured implementation of countermeasures.  Also, the information security controls, which 
encapsulate several measures to mitigate the social engineering risk will be classified and listed. After which the 
key elements pertaining to the human factor are discussed in more detail.  
Information Security Controls  
In order to secure organisation’s data, certain controls must be in place. There are several proposed classifications 
found in the literature however, Harnesk & Lindström (2012) defines the three most cited dimensions - 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) (p.80). Kind of measure; physical, logical or organisational. 
Moment of action; corrective, repressive, preventive and detective. Most other models do not classify the reason 
of protection because, social engineering threatens the confidentiality, integrity and availability and the applied 
controls need to protect against all of these (Luiijf, 2012, p.56). The classification is based in part on a 
classification by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and complemented with input from 
the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL), they both classify the controls on two dimensions. The classification proposed 
here also consists of two axes, the first according to the function of control, the second according to the level in 
the organisation (Dempsey et al., 2011, p.5). 
Function of Control 
The function of a control is related to its place and effect in the security management process. (Tse, 2004, p.1507). 
The ITIL classification for security management is used to complement and add an extra level to the process 
(McPhee, 2008, p.5), defined by the NIST as this only discusses a limited number of functions. Security controls 
are safeguards or countermeasures employed in order to avoid, detect, or minimise security threats or risks to 
information, computer systems, or other assets (Tayouri, 2015, p.1098). These controls can be classified based on 
several criteria. For instance, the time they act, in relation to a security incident: Before the event, preventive 
controls are employed to prevent security incident from occurring such as, locking out unauthorized intruders; if 
a security incident occurs; during the event, detective controls are intended to identify and characterize an incident 
in progress such as, by sending out an alert; after the event, corrective controls are in place to limit the extent of 
any damage caused by the incident e.g. by recovering the organisation to normal working status as efficiently as 
possible (Whitman, 2004, p.52). To support the specific controls against social engineering some general security 
controls need to be implemented. These form a base for the more specific controls and will probably -in part- be 
implemented already to protect other assets from other forms of attack. 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
A guidance of a methodology is highly recommended to maintain the integrity of the findings. Information 
security experts are aware of social-engineering threat but to date have never seemed to focus their efforts on 
studying and understanding in depth how and why cyber criminals are using social-engineering method as a 
weapon (Alexander, 2016, p.2). Yildiz (2007) argued that, some research suffers from definitional vagueness of 
its concept (p.647). A researcher has to decide the type of research to be conducted in order to answer the pivotal 
research question that will disclose new knowledge. Exploratory research, on the other hand, is employed in this 
type of study as it allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of an issue or problem (Straub, et al., 2004, 
p.63).     
Due to the fact that this topic has not been explored in depth and never in Tonga, Exploratory Research approach 
is employed to guide this study. An exploratory study is a valuable means of finding out ‘what is happening; to 
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seek new insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light (Saunders et al., 2012, p.139). 
Exploratory research design does not aim to provide the final and conclusive answers to the research questions,  
but merely explores the research topic with varying levels of depth but to help to give a better understanding of 
the problem (Singh, 2007, p.38). Unstructured interviews are the most popular primary data collection method 
with exploratory research (Sreejesh, et al., 2014, p.47). The interviews were held using a leading questionnaire of 
open questions. The questionnaire consists of the following stages as represented in figure 2: 
1
Interview 
introduction
Introduce the 
study
Confidentiality 
information
2
Interviewee 
introduction
Introduce to the 
organisation
Relevance to 
Information 
Security
3
Verification 
definition
Social 
Engineering 
definition 
Verify 
interviewee 
knowledge
4
Model walk 
through
Social 
engineering risk 
management
5
Closing
Verify Its 
usefulness
Recommendation
Acknowledge 
interviewee 
participation
 
Figure 2: The questionnaire steps 
The questionnaire structures the interview but still makes it possible to go deep enough to answer the research 
questions with a clear foundation. 
Case Selection 
The interviewed organisations were chosen based on the reliance of their business on information and IT and the 
level of risk of a social engineering attack. The interviews have therefore been held with an international IT service 
organisation  due to its business focus on information processing and storage for external parties; a consulting 
organisation whose greatest assets are its personnel and knowledge; a regional governmental organisation due to 
its increased risk to a social engineering attack; and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the Tongan 
government (CERT) as the focus of this organisation is on the cyber security within the government by 
coordinating IT security incidents, informing and advising on these incidents and supporting the governmental 
Formulate the 
problem
Design the study
Collect the data
Analyse the data
Research output
Processes
Input
Output
 
Figure 1: The design of the study 
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organisations in the prevention of, and response to security incidents. All these organisations have a different 
perspective on information, its value, the risks they run and possible counter measures. Within the visited 
organisations the interviews where held with security officers and/or other security responsible personnel. 
Together these interviews represent a valuable perspective on social engineering as these organisations and 
specific interviewees should be the ones at the forefront of information protection from for example social 
engineering. Next to these interviews, the opportunity presented itself to discuss this matter during a cyber security 
seminar held at Tonga National Centre followed by discussion between the security representatives of several 
governmental organisations, as well as organisations from the private sector. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings from the interviews have been de-identified and have only in part been related to the organisations 
or market. The confidential use of interview findings was a precondition for cooperation of the organisations as 
the provided information could be used in identifying participating organisations and vulnerabilities within these, 
which is not the intention of this research. Therefore, diagrams and organisational descriptions cannot be made 
any more detailed. The following findings are related to the organisations activities and are structured according 
to the stages of the questionnaire followed by relevant comments not directly related to the questionnaire. 
Organisation
Support Services
Finance Personnel Equipment Education
Organisational 
Infomation
 
Figure 3: Organisation’s activities 
The organisation is divided in two parts, one executive in which the main activities are performed, the other 
supporting in which administrative activities are performed. The interview clearly focused on the organisational 
information division. The interview was held with the Chief Company bureau services, responsible for the 
organisational information. 
Social engineering risk assessment model  
The interviewee was not familiar with the term ‘social engineering’ but did recognise the description and 
examples. During the interview, the stated definition was used as reference. 
Organisational Description 
As the interview focused on the ‘organisational information’, the organisational description follows. The 
workplace and workstations are not related to the functions except for data mining. Access is not restricted to the 
local environment; however private use is restricted. Internet access is only available when necessary for the role 
or function an employee performs. The functions can be divided in three groups; primary, supporting and 
management. Authorisations are granted on a need to know basis and related to functional profiles. More 
authorizations may be provided on request. Segregation of duties is implemented within and between the 
functions.  
Threat Identification 
The organisation handles highly sensitive information, which is of great interest to criminal organisations as well 
as curious social engineers and hackers. But in general, all information in the organisation is of interest and can 
be of use to the social engineer. A short list of threats where identified, detailed threats more specific to the 
organisation have not been listed: 
o Internal reports do not follow a workflow and can be anywhere on the work floor. 
o Not all information is classified and can therefore be handled improperly. 
o Access is logged. However, it happens that people log on to another’s profile or use another’s password. 
o Some external parties need access to the system before they can be screened. However, these persons 
should be under supervision constantly. 
o It is possible to intercept classified communications. 
o People working at home create a threat. 
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Vulnerability Identification 
Some vulnerability can be derived from the threats: 
o It is not known where information is during processing; there is no accountability. 
o Classification procedures are not followed. 
o The password security policy is not followed. 
o The authorisation process is not suitable for some activities. 
o Some means of communication are not secure; however, they are necessary for operations. 
o Procedures for media usage are not followed. 
o People do not follow the information security procedures outside the office. 
Prior to the interview, this organisation was faced with bad media coverage due to leakage of information after 
careless handling. The organisation thereafter performed a specific assessment on the information crossing the 
organisational boundary, this lead to the implementation of specific controls to counter this vulnerability. 
Control Analysis 
Some examples of controls are - Policy is implemented to stop information from crossing the organisational 
boundary. USB ports are generally disabled, Information that does need to leave the organisation on a memory 
stick or over the internet is secured through encryption, There is an awareness project that relates to the awareness 
of the information you use and training in how to use this so it stays secure, Leakage through personal contacts is 
traced and measures are taken if necessary, There are heavy penalties on deliberate leakage, Physical access is 
restricted through specific measures and the last one is, Penetration tests are performed, focusing on technical 
hacking through for example WIFI connections and Smartphones. But also, social engineering is tested through 
physical penetration testing and desk sniffing. The findings from this are used to confront people during the 
awareness trainings. 
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Figure 4: Social engineering risk assessment model 
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Likelihood Determination 
There is a fair likelihood a social engineer can gather information from this organisation. However, more critical 
information will be less likely to leak due to the need to know basis on which it is spread through the organisation. 
In contrast, some threats on less critical information are simply accepted. So, the likelihood depends on the 
information and cannot be determined in general. 
Impact Analysis 
There are two general consequences of a successful social engineering attack; 
o The image of the organisation can be harmed. 
o The organisational processes and even people can be harmed. 
Determine Risk 
Even though awareness training and penetration tests are implemented there is still some social engineering risk. 
The organisational process sometimes prevails over the risk of leaking information. However, the risk is still 
present due to careless personnel. 
Recommendations 
Organisations need to follow a security management process consisting of a policy statement, followed by 
awareness, in turn followed by audits. In discussion with the interviewee, the following controls where identified 
which were already implemented in part - Authorisation management should be implemented, Physical access 
should be restricted through for example access gates, Data should always be classified, Physical pieces of 
information should be kept behind locked doors or in a vault, Server rooms should also be locked and hard disks 
with confidential information should be locked up and finally, Audits should be performed on the adherence to 
policy and procedures. 
A general conclusion was that people see the world around them in which information is stolen, however they do 
not see the need to be careful with information they handle. Awareness training is required to remove this 
misconception. 
DISCUSSION  
To solve the research problem three main research questions where stated, the deliverables related to these 
questions will now be discussed to see if the research questions have been answered: 
Which risks do organisations run as to social engineering? 
To be able to identify social engineering risks the definition of social engineering is given in the introduction. 
Based on the knowledge gained on the findings and discussions, a risk assessment can be made. This risk 
assessment should be performed structurally this is also a component of the social engineering risk management 
model as in the discussion. When an organisation follows the steps in this model and more specifically the risk 
assessment this will help them to get a view on their specific social engineering risk. It however cannot give a 
general risk level, because of the great diversity in organisations.  
The actual social engineering risk management model structures the risk management process and generates 
assurance for the management on their level of control over social engineering consisting of 10 steps - System 
and environment characterization, Objective setting, Threat & Vulnerability identification, Likelihood 
determination, Impact analysis, Risk Evaluation, determination & Response, Control analysis & Implementation, 
Supporting policy and procedures implementation, Information and communication management, Ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation. These steps can be related to the management process components of the Enterprise 
Risk Management Integrated Framework (ERM) of the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway 
commission (COSO) and therefore be implemented as part of this overall management process. The components 
are: internal environment, objective setting, event identification, risk assessment, risk response, control activities, 
information and communication and monitoring. 
Therefore, this model is relatively elaborate and should be tailored to the organisation and/or incorporated in the 
organisations ERM process. Based on this social engineering risk management model and the observations from 
the research conclusions have been drawn and stated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The paper discusses the social engineering risk management using a model in line with Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). The discussion started with the definition of social engineering risk management and its 
relevance and benefits to organisations; the limitation of social engineering risk in accordance with the 
organisations objectives. Also, the goal of implementing a social engineering risk management model based on 
existing risk management models is stated; to assist the organisation in managing the social engineering risk. 
In conclusion, the social engineering risk management model could solve the research problem: The model is 
however still defined on a high-level and application in practice should show the actual usefulness. On this some 
recommendations for further research are stated. 
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Abstract 
Wearable devices have proliferated in usage and human experience, and they provide convenience for personal 
information requirements. These devices are both sensory and immersive for the diverse global network that is 
generally termed the Internet of things (IoT). The immediacy of the two-way communication created in the IoT has 
made vulnerable human behaviour and raised debate around information ownership and privacy expectations. The 
legitimacy of ownership of information and its reuse are prevalent problems. In this research, we tested four 
wearable devices that share 44% of the current market, for security vulnerabilities. We found serious weaknesses 
that could result in the unplanned disclosure of information and recommend further research into users 
expectations for safety. 
Keywords: Wearable Devices, Vulnerabilities, Privacy, Hacking, Disclosure 
INTRODUCTION 
Wearable devices have been around for decades in the form of small electronic devices that compensate for human 
failure in for example, sight and hearing. Wearable hearing aids have been available in different forms for an 
extended period; however, the technology today is very different in flexibility and functionality from what was 
available 15 or 20 years ago. Today wearable devices are integrated into a body area network (BAN) for two-way 
communication and placed into a context that is generally termed the “Internet of Things” (IoT) (PwC, 2016). The 
purpose of these devices is not only to compensate for human physical and psychological failure, but more 
commonly to extend the reach of the human through interconnectivity with information sources (NIST, 2010). 
Consequently, today a human using a wireless Bluetooth earpiece may not be compensating for physical 
challenges but rather extending their sensory capability by connecting with personal or remote information 
sources. Developments that are more recent have included devices that monitor personal biological data, 
geolocation, and emotions. Some of these are used for health purposes, information exchange, and others for 
navigating around unfamiliar environments. The value of this technological opportunity is a global human 
experience of interconnectivity that has collapsed the barriers between internal and external environments and 
provided full personal immersion. In this fashion, a human may experience a fully augmented reality for the 
betterment of themselves and the systems in which they participate. The simplest functional architecture provides 
a connection between a wearable broadcast mechanism and a receiving station (Zhou, et al., 2014). Because most 
people have a smart phone on them most of the time, then the smart phone has become the receiving station for a 
multiplicity of different devices that the human may carry within their BAN. There are many examples of 
connectivity that both transmits information and receives information in the two-way relationship between the 
base station and the broadcast mechanism or sensors. The eyeglass that streams information to the user and directly 
to the eye has significant publicity. In addition, wearable watches and biometric monitoring equipment such as the 
Fitbit, provide personal information for decision-making (Burlacu, 2016; Stack, 2015). 
The personal nature of the information managed by the BAN has raised the issue of information ownership 
(Schelleus, et al., 2014). Personal expectations to control the information from a wearable device, such as a Fitbit, 
may be a foregone conclusion of the user, and yet the patient owners of the device, the owners of the software, 
and the owners of the cloud services, and others involved in the brokerage and intermediation of services may all 
assert ownership of the data. The borderless interconnectivity of human and networks also presents inter-
jurisdictional challenges regarding ownership of informational properties, and identification of who has the rights 
of disclosure and transaction. The fundamental principles of security design require the confidentiality, integrity, 
and accessibility to information. In situations where the user of a wearable device expects the exclusive ownership 
of the information that they produce using the device (Zhou, et al., 2014), then the confidentiality and the integrity 
of the information has to be preserved. Our research is concerned the vulnerability of wearable devices to attacks 
that can disclose the information the device produces. This research is an attempt to satisfy customer expectations 
for the confidentiality of their information, and the management of unwarranted disclosures. We tested four 
wearable devices that had 44% of the market share at the end of 2016 (IDC, 2016), for the presence of security 
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mechanisms that would preserve the confidentiality of information the device produced from the user actions. 
Each of these devices was presented on a watch strap to be attached to the wrist of the human. Each device had 
sensors that trapped a range of biometric data from the end user and also had interconnectivity to broadcast that 
information for processing, archiving, and providing feedback to the user. The majority of the information 
processing was done by cloud services in the form of historical logs that tracked and kept account of the user 
biometric data. All of the devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy as the wireless communication protocol for 
synchronisation back to the user smart phone (Great Scott, 2015). If the user did not wish to use their smart phone 
in for example, a gymnasium or a motor vehicle, then they could tether the device to the exercise machine, the 
motor vehicle network, or to any other local wireless network via the Bluetooth low energy connection for the 
same effect. The Bluetooth wireless and the tethering protocol is vulnerable to attacks that could violate the 
confidentiality of information, the integrity of information, and the accessibility to information when hijacked and 
subjected to service disruption (Cyr, et al., 2014). 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND METHOD 
A consistent theme in literature is the security vulnerability during the pairing of the wearable device with the base 
station. At the point of pairing the exchange of information is vulnerable. When pairing for the very first time 
Bluetooth employs one of three Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) strategies:   
 Just works – pairs automatically as it requires with no user interaction. Convenient for IoT accessibility 
but the least secure.  
 Numeric comparison - When pairing for the first time both the wearable and smartphone display an 
identical four to six-digit numerical key. If they match, the smartphone prompts the user to accept the 
connection. 
 Passkey entry - both devices have a user interface for entering a four to six-digit code. One, or both 
devices must enter a passkey to successfully pair. The authors credit this approach as being the most 
secure (Lotfy & Hale, 2016; Pieterse & Olivier, 2014) 
A review of three wearables by Lotfy and Hale (2016) found that the security of pairing strategies had significant 
gaps and potential vulnerabilities including:  
 Man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, and packet injection. These kinds of attacks allow attackers 
to actively spy on wearable devices (user-correlation) and misuse the data. 
The Pairing processes are defined as: 
o Generic Access Profile (GAP) – the wearable defines a specific advertising protocol. This is 
important in our research design as this happens subsequent to initial pairing during recurring 
connection instances.  
o Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) – service framework on top of the underlying transport 
protocol, called ATT (Attribute Protocol), which sets the mutually agreed data transfer standard. 
o Both GAP and GATT operate in the 2.4 GHz bandwidth, transmitting at a speed of 1Mbit/sec. 
While Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) operates on the same frequencies as other Bluetooth technologies, it operates 
differently on the link and physical layer. BLE uses 40 total channels; three are used for advertising by unconnected 
wearables. The remaining 37 channels are used during GATT for data transmission after pairing. The sequential 
pairing process is shown in Figure 1 (Lotfy and Hale, 2016, p.3).  
 
Figure1: GAP BluetoothLE advertising process showing advertising data, scan request, scan response and gap 
initiation packets 
Personally identifiable information (PII) is information that is assignable to a particular human system factor and 
in some jurisdictions has legal protection (Boyle & Panko, 2014). Broadcasting a fixed MAC address, tied to an 
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individual’s identity would fail the PII test by creating a unique user signature. When wearables create such a risk 
without user notification, then breaches the privacy has to be considered jurisdiction by jurisdiction. For example, 
the European Parliament’s, Protection of Personal Data Directive, enacted on 5 May 2016 and requiring member 
states to have introduced into their national law by 6 May 2018, extends the definition of personal data to include 
that which can “be identified, directly or indirectly” (European Parliament, 2016, p. 3). A fixed MAC address, 
which risks unseen surveillance, breaches this requirement. The literature analysis identified that there are many 
attack classes (see Figure 2) in and around the use of Bluetooth connectivity. To focus our research and to make 
it feasible in the laboratory we selected the two attack classes and the five specific attacks highlighted in blue 
(Hassen, et al., 2017). In respect to Surveillance class, the risk created by a digital signature can be sub-categorised 
as:   
i. Blue-Printing – MAC address spoofing for a man-in-the middle attack. 
ii. Blue-Stumbling - Forced re-pairing attack. 
iii. Blue-Tracking – a brute force attack designed to determine the data encryption key if one is used.  
 
Figure 2 – Classification of Bluetooth Attacks (Hassan et al., 2017, p. 5) 
In this research we tested four wearable devices that were selected from the top sales performers in the market and 
together they held a 44% share of the market at the end of 2016 (Cry, et al., 2014; Guo, 2015). The analysis was 
conducted in the research laboratory during the first two months of 2017. Figure 3 shows the release dates and 
devices selected (software versions were those at the time and do not account for any more recent updates). 
 
 
Figure 3. The wearable devices tested 
The research was structured to address concerns around device information visibility, pairing visibility, 
surveillance potential, and information disclosure. The major focus was on potential eavesdropping and 
surveillance attacks. All of the wearable devices relied upon Bluetooth low energy (BLE) as the wireless 
communication protocol for data synchronisation between the device and the user smart phone (or other paired 
network) (Grassi, 2014). The only variation was the Samsung Gear3 that was using version BLE 4.2 rather than 
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BLE 4.0. The testing with different smart phones was to confirm the consistence of the protocol on different 
devices. BLE is feasible for use across the Apple iOS, Android, Apple Mac OS, Linux and Microsoft Windows 
operating systems. In the testing we used a Samsung S6 edge, HTC 1M7, and an Apple iPhone 5S, but did not 
detect any variations in the BLE protocol execution that related to research concerns. For sniffing tools we selected 
Ubertooth, the HCI snoop log and the Adafruit sniffer (Lofty, et al., 2016). 
The method used two Android phones, and the Adafruit for capture of the BLE packets, and TCP dump in to 
pcapng and pcap files respectively. The files acquired were then uploaded into Wireshark, an open source packet 
analyser with a graphical user interface and filtering capability. Using Wireshark the data was examined to 
determine whether it was transmitted in plain text, or in an encrypted format. Other analysis proceeded to locate 
any digital signatures, device identification, mappings for the wearer's movements and habits, internet access to 
device logs and databases, and geolocation correlation data. All the wearables include a back-end cloud service in 
which an individual’s data is stored to ensure portability across devices, and we looked for any credentials 
providing access rights. The research design is shown in Figure 4, and the blue box indicates the target zone for 
the sniffing of pairing activity. 
 
Figure 4. Research Design 
FINDINGS 
The HCI snoop log is an application that sits on smart phones. It was used in each instance to successfully capture 
the BLE log file which was then uploaded to Wireshark for analysis. Both encrypted and unencrypted information 
was found. The unencrypted packets were advertising packets that included the connection request and response. 
The remainder of the packets were encrypted suggesting that once the exchange protocols and keys have been 
agreed, all messages were encrypted. We found that the majority of the wearable devices packets were encrypted 
and the extent of the security mechanisms varied on a device-by-device basis, despite all of them relying upon the 
BLE protocol. The Adafruit sniffer could successfully follow a device once the connection had been established. 
The Ubertooth had a similar performance. Using the Adafruit for interception we found that when the wearable 
device and the base station paired the identity was disclosed in plain text. It may be good for efficiency purposes 
to have the brand and the watch identity publicly displayed in the wireless network, but for an attacker this is a 
bonus and makes an easy target. Each wearable device had a different performance and a different susceptibility 
to attack. Surprisingly the Amazon fit broadcasted the long-term encryption key in plain text during the initial 
setup as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A Plain Text Encryption Key captured 
Notably the other wearable devices had encrypted this information. However, the MAC address of the Charge and 
Surge did not change once connected, an identical result to the Amazon fit. The literature we had read stated that 
Fitbit had addressed the MAC vulnerability, but our findings suggested otherwise. A fixed MAC address for a 
session creates the risk of an attack vector based on user correlation or blue tracking. However, the research did 
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show that some of the previously reported vulnerabilities had been addressed by the end of 2016. For example, the 
Gear S3 was found to have advanced security mechanisms that were in keeping with the newer BLE version 4.2, 
and was the most secure. However, our research showed that the HCI snoop log functionality found in most 
smartphones captured the identity of the message senders, as well as the message in plain text. With this function 
enabled the smart phones owner’s conversations using email, SMS and messaging applications such as Facebook 
are preserved until a log is deleted. In Figure 6 this vulnerability is illustrated from our experiments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Snoop log plaintext disclosures 
Overall, the lab testing of these devices shows that manufacturers have made big steps to improve the security 
around wearable devices. The security improvements in BLE version 4.2 have shut down some of the previous 
attack vectors and undoubtedly, further improvements are evolving during 2017. In the wearable devices tested, 
the security vulnerabilities detected indicate the threat classes potentially faced by a user. It is also notable that the 
different wearable devices have different vulnerabilities but the most predominant issue to date is the disclosure 
of the MAC, which allows for user correlation and blue printing attacks. The Amazfit performed the poorest out 
of the four tested. It failed in each of the four threat classes, whereas the Gear S3 with the updated BLE version 
performed the best in our tests. The implication of these findings is for corporates, such as health insurers, who 
provide benefits to the customer when they are using wearable devices that have health control feedback loops 
(MLC, 2017). In the case of a wearable device that is vulnerable to manipulation, the sponsoring corporate may 
not have confidence that the information they are receiving, and the information on which they will make decisions 
regarding providing benefits to their customer, can be trusted. In the bigger picture, wearable devices may fail 
compliance criteria such as the requirements of the European Personal Data Directive. In these situations, the 
purchaser requires notification in the specifications of the device regarding the security precautions for information 
protection. There also needs to be independent testing so that the shrink-wrap claims may have some external 
validation. Figure 7. shows the results from the laboratory testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of Vulnerability 
CONCLUSION 
Wearable devices are convenient technologies that extend human natural senses and capabilities. Our research 
shows that further consideration of information protection is required to avoid disclosure failures. The 
improvement of information security by adopting countermeasures for pairing vulnerabilities will allow the 
producer of the information choices regarding the control of its ownership.   Further research topics arising from 
this research for future projects are: 
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The HCI Snoop log paired with the base station – Is the number of log files, and degree of information captured 
controlled by the base station, the device, or both?  
The Decrypt packets of the Amazfit – Future research should confirm that having the long term key is sufficient 
to decrypt the information exchanged with the smartphone. Also, consumer testing should be broadened to include 
data synchronisation from the smartphone to the web application.  
PII failings – Determine whether the security vulnerabilities breach consumer privacy laws in key markets.  
A broader range of attacks – Extend the man-in-middle attacks to intercept and manipulate communications. This 
has far-reaching implications, not just limited to wearables but also to other IoT setups.  
Framework – A compliance framework which brings visibility to data protections in wearables, addresses 
standards, and reduces industry wide variations. 
Further research is required to establish baselines for wearable device user expectations. At present the technology 
is made functional and accessible to users but we argue that development is required to meet the full scope of 
socio-technical expectations. Current users want the advantages of the technology, they are using it in increasing 
numbers, but they also want assurances unwanted surprises of a personal nature will not be forthcoming. Such 
unwanted attention is unsolicited advertising, personal profiling, geolocation matching, and so on. Our research 
shows that the confidentiality and potential integrity of data produced by wearable devices tested were easily 
compromised. More than a regular patch-by-patch updating of software is required to assure users their 
information safety has been adequately addressed. 
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Abstract 
Brainware has a long history of development down into the present day where very simple and usable devices are 
available to train for the control of games and services. One of the big areas of application has been in the health 
sciences to provide compensatory control to humans who may lack the usual capabilities. Our concern has been 
the protection of information in brainware so that a human intention may have confidentiality, integrity, and 
accessibility to the required implementation mechanisms for services. The research question was: What are the 
consequences of security failure in brainware? Our research tested a brainware device and found vulnerabilities. 
The most significant vulnerability was the ability to capture and inject communication packets so that a human 
intention could be hijacked. The consequences of this communication failure are for psychological harm to the 
human and unplanned for actions in the material environment. 
Keywords: Security, Failure, Brainware, Hijacking, Harm 
INTRODUCTION 
Electro activity in the human brain has been studied for over a century and various applications devised that 
enhance human capabilities in areas where capability may be deficient. In particular thinking ability and motor 
control have been beneficiaries of brainware devices (Allison, et al., 2007; da Silva, 1996). Significant progress 
has been made from the times when invasive surgical operations were required to insert brainware devices inside 
a human brain to gain the benefits. Today brainware has become nonintrusive and the latest advancements have 
dry electrodes that sit on the human head collecting the electro activity of the brain (Wyecoff, et al., 2015). These 
are significant technological advancements that provide ease of use and ready access for research and learning. 
Some are woven inside baseball caps and other socially integrated headgear, and the device acts as an 
inconspicuous aid for enhanced human capability (Bonaci, et al., 2014; Kroeker, 2011). The headsets are also 
relatively inexpensive and available for purchase online or in gaming and electronics shops. They can be trained 
to control a wide variety of applications including, model cars, wheelchairs and games (Wolpaw et al., 2002). The 
simplest ones have a single electrode and minimal control functions such as up, down, left, and right; which is 
sufficient for a toy or a computer game. Other headsets have 14 and more electrodes and a greatly increased 
capacity to harness a wider variety of emotions in the human brain and to create a more refined control interface. 
The use of brainware is relatively simple once it has been trained (Jeunet, et al., 2016; Donoghue, 2002). The 
training of brainware software is similar to the training of voice activation and transcription software. The user in 
each situation has to go through a series of standardised algorithms that link the human variability to the 
standardised software processes. In brainware that is used for playing a game or controlling a wheelchair, the user 
has to think and not to move or speak. So for example, if I was training my brainware application to steer a remote 
control car, I would have to continue to think the word “left” until the electro activity in my brain mapped onto 
the preprogramed software for turning the car left. Sometimes the matching takes longer than others but providing 
the user is prepared to concentrate and put in the time to train the software, the effects are created by thinking. In 
the radio controlled car situation, once the brain-ware is trained, then it is possible to put on the headset, look at 
the remote control car (power on in car) and control its movement up to approximately 3 meters by using the 
correct thoughts. Similarly, for the training of the control of a wheelchair and other medical applications the user 
has to spend time synchronising their electro brain activity with the application they wish to use, but once 
completed the communication is relatively effective (Millan, et al., 2004).  
A significant problem for human behaviour and human psychological stability arises once the user has trained the 
brainware to perform particular functions. If the application does not behave in the ways that it has been trained 
and the user expectation satisfied, the relationship is destabilised and the effectiveness of the technology 
undermined. There are several ways that this may occur but our specific research interest was in the situation were 
the brainware is hacked and unexpected responses to thoughts are presented to the user (Denning, et al., 2004). In 
this situation many unintended human behaviours may be demonstrated and the purpose of the technological 
advantage lost. Consequently our research took a brainware device and tested it for security vulnerabilities 
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(Martinovic, et al., 2012; Li, et al,. 2015). The results show that the communication between the headset and the 
computer interface or the device has vulnerabilities that disclose information regarding the intended control 
function and the brain to device mapping. We also performed test attacks to disconnect the thought from its 
intended action. In this research our objective was to demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the use of brainware, but 
anecdotally it was obvious the intervention had a negative impact on the user. Our concern is that suitable 
consideration is given to the securing of the communication between the headset and the devices so that the user 
intention is conveyed through to the effect. The implication of disruption in the communication channel is for 
unplanned actions, frustration and potential harm to the user. The consequences may be insignificant when a 
remote control car is being used for fun, but it is a much more serious case when humans are controlling prosthetic 
arms, wheelchairs, and sufficing control effects (Wolpaw, et al., 2002; Kroeker, 2011; Lauer, et al., 2000).  
Other writers have defined Neurosecurity as the protection of neural devices from adversaries trying to exploit, 
block, eavesdrop, or generally disrupt neural signals (da Silver, 1996; Darvis, et al., 2004; Nijholt, et al., 2009). 
Confidentiality is critical in maintaining the privacy of information and it is for the developers to assure that the 
properties of the device cannot be exploited to disclose signals or any other protected information (Lauer, et al., 
2000; Golub, et al., 2016; Li, et al., 2015). Similarly, an attacker should not be able to change device settings or 
initiate unauthorised operations that compromise the integrity of the device and its information. The availability 
of the device for clear and intended communication requires strong security measures. Neuro security is 
consequently the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the neural devices for the intended 
user, in such a way that the safety of a person’s neural mechanisms, neural computation, and free will, are protected 
(Millan, et al., 2004). Our laboratory tests on devices suggest that neural security is lagging in some readily 
available brainware headsets on the market today. 
DEVICE TESTING 
The brain computer interface (BCI) consists of four components and a connecting signal (see figure 1). 
BCI requires a human user who has a sensing device that collects the electro chemical energy 
transmissions from the brain. The sensing device communicate s to a signal processing module that puts 
the sensor signals into a manageable format for transmission either through wired or wireless media. 
The forth component is an application that will drive an effect, such as movement, decisions, control, 
and so on.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Brain Computer Interface Architecture 
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We chose the Emotiv Insight 5 channel EEG headset for testing. The Emotiv Insight is designed to detect 
performance levels of certain parameters that include the human attention level, focus level, engagement level, 
interest level, relaxation level and stress level. In addition to detecting performance, it also detects mental 
commands and facial expressions. These expressions include blink, wink, frown surprise, clench and smile. All 
these parameters are recorded using a computer based interface called Emotiv Xavier Control Panel. The control 
panel shows signal quality of the brainwear, mental commands, facial expressions, and the inertial sensors. In 
addition to these features, the control panel also provides connectivity to other platforms of Emotiv for information 
conditioning. Once all the five channels are green then training can begin, and once trained the headset can be 
used many times by the same user. 
 
Figure 2. Emotiv Insight 5 channel EEG headset (Emotiv, 2016) 
Previous research has established the vulnerability of devices to disclose critical information when tethering in 
Bluetooth wireless networks (Li, Ding, Conti, 2015). We assumed the vulnerability and only briefly checked the 
matter to confirm the problem and potential violation of confidentiality. However, this research was concerned with 
intervention in the communication between the headset and the device. Could we hijack the headset control and 
substitute alternative commands, unknown to the user; and hence, violate the integrity of the system?  
 
Figure 3. Research Design 
Consequently, the Ubertooth-one and Adafruit sniffers were not capable of manipulating and resending changed 
packets, and hence a framework called ‘Btlejuice’ was deployed. The framework makes use of external Bluetooth 
dongles CSR 4.0, creates a clone of the target device, and intercepts the Bluetooth General Attribute Profile 
(GATT) from the top most layer of the Bluetooth protocol stack. The support software requires setting the target 
device (the headset), and then double clicking the headset icon so that the Bluetooth dongle proxies the services 
and characteristics of the Insight headset and pairs with the headset. The packets are then captured on the proxy 
for manipulation and the system tricked into accepting the proxy communications in a replay attack. Figure 3a 
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shows the normal information flow between the headset and the device and figure 3b how we hijack and replay 
fake messages to alter the device effect. 
RESULTS 
The implementation of the research design was challenging as we had to customise many of the tools used to fit 
the context. Similarly we had to access the Emotive code layer in order to audit the findings. Initially the standard 
Bluetooth sniffing tools functioned as expected and easily compromised the confidentiality of the communication 
between the headset and the device. However, the violation of communication integrity required the 
implementation of the Btlejuice system of hardware and software in order to create replay attacks that changed the 
intended device effects. The headset communication was connected to a proxy client which had the same 
characteristics and services as the Insight headset. On launching the application called Mental Commands, a 
dummy headset is displayed on the proxy, and can be manipulated to recreate any of the headset commands. The 
compromised commands were then sent back to the headset to broadcast to the device. As soon as the proxy 
application connects to the headset, the Btlejuice suite starts to capture all the data sent. The following set of screen 
shots (figures 4 to 9) show the results. 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot of Btlejuice intercepting communication 
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the application Mental Commands sending commands to the headset 
All the data transmitted by the application on the proxy destined for the Insight headset could be intercepted and 
also had the option to modify the data. This feature known as ‘on the fly modification’ could be performed. 
Initially, any command sent by the headset will be sent to the proxy to confirm whether the data should be 
forwarded to the headset for sending to the device or not. Figure 6 presents a screenshot of the active data 
intercepted with an option to forward the data or simply devoid the headset of that specific data. This intercepted 
data could also be modified with a different command to the headset for a different or unintended function to 
perform. 
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 Figure 6. Screenshot of the active data sent from the proxy application to the headset 
Figure 7 shows specific data captured for command 1800, and the way it may be modified to any other command. 
In this situation 1800 was associated with the device turning left effect. On this screen the turn right command 
180f can be inserted to replace 1800, and the device effect subsequently changed. The lexicon of commands can 
be obtained from the headset or from the support literature. 
 
Figure 7. Screenshot of the modification of commands 
The command change can also be seen in the Btlejuice terminal window in figure 8.  
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 Figure 8. Screenshot of the modified data sent back to the headset 
The images report the feasibility of a data modification attack and a replay attack; to violate the integrity of 
Brianware communication to a device. On further analysis, the nrf Bluetooth application could list both the 
devices, the real Insight headset with the mac address f2:78:4a:15:77:bb along with the fake Insight headset on 
the proxy with the mac address 00:1a:7d:da:71:14.  
 
Figure 9. Screenshot of the nrf Bluetooth application showing the real and the fake control 
The headset is connected to the proxy and the fake application on the smartphone. The fake device has been cloned 
with the same features and characteristics as the original device which fools the application to think that the fake 
device is the real device. Figure 9 presents a screenshot of two Insight headsets with different mac address that 
look identical, including the serial number of the headset. 
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CONCLUSION 
The confidentiality of the headset was easily compromised but the violation of integrity was more 
difficult. We fundamentally structured a man in the middle attack where fake packets were substituted 
for the real ones. The attack progressed in two phases. In the first phase, the p rimary channel of 
communication sent the packets correctly but then the control was switched to a fake proxy. The proxy 
took the correct packets and substituted alternative ones back to the headset, and subsequently the 
communication stream to the device. This meant that the radio controlled car would get one signal that 
would tell it to turn right and then almost immediately another signal to turn left. The consequence was 
that the car would buzz but turn neither left nor right and remained frozen in the c urrent state. The 
second phase of attack was to divert the primary communication channel and to substitute new control 
commands. This meant that if the primary channel had told the car to turn right then we removed the 
control packets and substituted a fake command to turn left. These attacks were successful and the 
remote control car became in control of the secondary information source. The effect demonstrated that 
it is possible to shift the primary control to a secondary source but there is still more research to design 
a sandbox that would quickly process the incoming raw signals and to substitute the fake commands. 
These findings are disturbing and indicate that the accessibility to the communication channel between 
the headset and the device or game, can also be disrupted. A simple denial of service attack can be 
hosted by multiple secondary sources substituting packets into the communication stream. These packets 
could be both meaningless and meaningful in the command and control structures, but eithe r disposition 
would bring disruption to channel access. The implications are for disruption of human intentions and 
unintended actions. 
The consequences of security failure in brainware devices are yet to be documented in sufficient numbers  
and scope, that regulatory requirements are implemented for device performance specifications. We also 
observed that with different brainware headsets that there were no standardised ways of doing a smile 
for example. This is something that the industry might look at in the future so that when a user is training 
a headset then a human characteristic is consistent between the different brands and different algorithms. 
The headsets are also sensitive to underlying emotions and can be used for feedback to the user and not 
just to an external control situation. For example the five electrode headset also reported to the user 
other parameters that included the user attention level, the user focus level, the user engagement level, 
the user interest level, the user relaxation level, and the user stress level. These emotional contexts are 
part of the feature extraction the brainware computes and provides as output. Our concern here is that 
not only is there information with an external control capability, but these headsets are als o linked into 
an information feedback loop to the user. If either of these two information streams is compromised, 
then there are unplanned for consequences arising from the use of the technology.   
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Abstract 
Intrusion-detection systems employ machine learning techniques to classify traffic into attack and legitimate. 
Network flooding attacks can leverage the new web communications protocol (HTTP/2) to bypass intrusion-
detection systems. This creates an urgent demand to understand HTTP/2 characteristics and to devise customised 
cyber-attack detection schemes. This paper proposes Step Sister; a technique to generate an optimum network 
traffic feature set for network intrusion detection. The proposed technique demonstrates that a consistent set of 
features are selected for a given HTTP/2 dataset. This allows intrusion-detection systems to classify previously 
unseen network traffic samples with fewer false alarm than when techniques used in literature were employed. The 
results show that the proposed technique yields a set of features that, when used for network traffic classification, 
yields low numbers of false alarms. 
Keywords:  HTTP/2, feature selection Denial of Service, machine learning 
INTRODUCTION 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) has been the standard for web browser communication since the end of the 
20th century. Until recently, most web communications were reliant on HTTP version 1.1, which was designed to 
transfer texts. As current web sites render large sized content such as audio and video, users routinely experience 
slow web browsing experience through HTTP/1.1.  Hence, the new version, HTTP/2 (Belshe, Peon, & Thomson, 
May 2015), was designed to deliver web services at higher transfer rates, enhancing the end-user experience. 
HTTP/2 has been accepted as the next generation standard for web communications. The protocol had its 
preliminary version deployed in 2010, was formally published in 2015, and is currently deployed by approximately 
10 million websites globally, or 19% of all the websites (Usage of HTTP/2 for websites, November 2017). Major 
web browsers such as Mozilla, Chrome and Microsoft Edge support the protocol; and popular web sites such as 
Google services, Facebook and Twitter operate their web services employing the protocol.  
As with all technological advances, the threat posed by the adversary class is ever existing. Adversaries can send 
a large volume of HTTP traffic towards a target HTTP/2 web service, causing resource exhaustion and eventual 
prevention of access for legitimate users. Such exploit is commonly known as a flood-based attack, or a Denial of 
Service attack. To detect flood-based attacks, previous studies have applied machine learning techniques. These 
techniques can learn from data samples, adapt to new environments, produce rule sets, and predict the class of 
unseen data. In detecting flood-based attacks, these known techniques construct a model of legitimate (normal) 
traffic, and classify attack traffic as instances where feature values extracted from the network traffic deviate from 
the baseline legitimate model. 
A selection of studies that have previously classified traffic into flood-based and normal (Moore & Zuev, 2005; 
Mukherjee & Sharma, 2012; Baig, Sait, & Shaheen, 2013; Katkar & Kulkarni, 2013; Al-Jarrah et al., 2014) 
employed feature ranking and selection techniques to reduce the complexity associated with large scale data 
classification. Techniques such as Information Gain (Kullback & Leibler, 1951) and Gain Ratio are commonly 
used for feature ranking. The higher the rank of a feature, the more relevant the features are for the traffic 
classification process. Subsequently, the order of the rank number can be applied to select a set of most relevant 
features. 
The main issue introduced with feature ranking and selection based on the above techniques is that they do not 
always yield the same subset of relevant features for varying datasets (Witten & Frank, 2005, p. 154). Specifically, 
different members of {1 . . . n} features are yielded, given different datasets. Over time, additional dataset samples 
are required to extend previous knowledge, to construct models that represent the current situation, and to classify 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Hence, there is a need to select a chosen set {1 . . . n} of features that will 
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yield a consistent list of members in the set, regardless of the data set choice. This study proposes a feature selection 
technique to address the aforementioned need. Specifically, this study proposes selection of a chosen set of 
features, given two different datasets that describe the characteristics of HTTP/2 traffic, to perform better than 
when HTTP/1.1 features are processed and ranked. The significance of this study is twofold: first, it proposes a 
novel feature selection technique for HTTP/2 traffic; and second, it examines how the technique can be applied to 
analyse HTTP/2 traffic based on variable datasets. 
BACKGROUND 
In detecting HTTP/1.1 flood-based attacks, reported studies have found that attack traffic showed higher number 
of packets when compared to the number of TCP connections that were established for a given target web service 
(Jung, Krishnamurthy, & Rabinovich, 2002; Ni, Gu, Wang, & Li, 2013). The introduction of HTTP/2 changed this 
concept significantly. The novel HTTP/2 mechanisms for communicating parties can be leveraged by adversaries 
to create previously unseen attack vectors to disrupt these services.  
A recent study (Adi, Baig, & Hingston, 2017) showed that HTTP/2 flood-based attacks can be modelled to mimic 
the number of TCP connections observed on legitimate network traffic. The flood traffic, when examined through 
methods known in the literature to detect such attacks (Kumar, Joshi, & Singh, 2007; Lakhina, Crovella, & Diot, 
2005; Rahmani, Sahli, & Kamoun, 2012), yielded a high number of False Alarms, indicating that the attack traffic 
mimicked normal traffic, thereby bypassing intrusion-detection systems. This showed that an urgent challenge 
exists to understand the characteristics of HTTP/2 flood-based attack traffic. 
The above study (Adi et al., 2017), henceforth named Stealthy Attack Model, also proposed a set of 42 features as 
input to machine learning techniques to differentiate attack from normal network traffic. The study showed that 
the proposed set of features yielded fewer False Alarms compared to when HTTP/1.1 features were ranked and 
used for classification. These features were obtained from the statistical properties of captured HTTP/2 packets, 
which were grouped based on 3 features, namely, count, size, and lapse. The count features were obtained from 
the number of packets captured in an instance of time. The size feature was the total number of bytes of packets 
captured in an instance. The lapse feature was the time difference between the connection initiation of a packet 
(indicated by a SYN packet) and the time when the packet was captured. The study ranked the features with both 
Information Gain and Gain Ratio techniques, and analysed machine learning classification performance when 
applied on varying sets of ranked features. It showed that machine learning techniques such as Naïve Bayes, 
Decision Trees, JRip, and Support Vector Machines can be employed to classify HTTP/2 traffic into attack and 
normal class with good accuracies. 
 
False Alarms is a notable performance measure employed by studies in the field of intrusion detection, to classify 
traffic into flood-based and normal (Wang, Zhang, Hei, Ji, & Ma, 2016; Manzoor, Kumar, et al., 2017; Suhasaria, 
Garg, Agarwal, & Selvakumar, 2017; Suganya, 2016; Osanaiye, Choo, & Dlodlo, 2016; Latif, Abbas, Latif, & 
Masood, 2015). False Alarms, described by the equation shown below, is defined as the percentage of instances 
incorrectly classified out of the total number of the whole instances S in a dataset. The False Positive FP is the 
ratio of normal traffic that a machine learning technique incorrectly identifies as attack traffic. The False Negative 
FN is the ratio of attacks that the technique incorrectly identifies as legitimate traffic. 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝐴𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑚 =
FP + FN 
S
 × 100% 
The percentages of False Alarms are illustrated on the Y-axis of a graph, as a function of 1 to {1 . . . n} features, 
presented on the X-axis of the graph. A lower percentage of False Alarms implies a better performance of the 
classifier. Observations based on human intervention are required to analyse which set of features are best 
employed for classification tasks to yield the lowest percentage of False Alarms. This was demonstrated in the 
Stealthy Attack Model analysis: different features sets were chosen to obtain the desired performance when 
different machine learning techniques were employed (Adi et al., 2017, Sec. 5.3). 
The aforementioned study demonstrated that the results were observed and analysed to compare the performance 
when different sets of features were selected. On the other hand, the study reported in this paper places the 
observation before the classification results are obtained. The study also highlights that relationships exist between 
various features of a data set, and leverages this relationship to select relevant features. 
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DATA PROCESSING AND FEATURE SELECTION 
Machine learning performance can be optimised through analysing relationships that exist in the data (Witten & 
Frank, 2005, p. 78). Learning involves examining relationships between objects rather than between instances. Of 
particular interest in this study is the concept of a sister in any family. Traditionally, when translated to a dataset 
representation, a sister is technically described as when two people can be labelled as sister = yes or sister = no. 
However, this representation can be prohibitive in terms of storage cost: describing the sister relationship of 100 
people would require 1002 = 10,000 instances. Describing such a relationship in real datasets poses a further 
problem: the number of objects that form relationships in datasets are unknown (Witten & Frank, 2005, p. 48). 
The solution to this problem is to inspect the objects and their relationships in the dataset before selecting features, 
to identify whether the two objects have the same parents (Witten & Frank, 2005, p. 48). This is illustrated in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. A representation of a sister relationship 
Name Parent 1 Parent 2 Name Parent 1 Parent 2 Sister 
P A B Q A B Yes 
Table 1 also lists P and Q as two objects, to examine if they are sisters. For the purpose of simplicity, the illustration 
ignores the gender of the objects. The table describes that P and Q are sisters because they have the same parents. 
This observation serves as the framework of the proposed feature selection technique, which is presented in the 
next section. 
PROPOSED FEATURE SELECTION TECHNIQUE 
This study observes that a sister relationship exists between count and size feature groups of the two datasets that 
were acquired from the Stealthy Attack Model (namely Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy Attack-2 that are discussed 
in the next subsection). 
Referring to Table 1 as the framework, this study proposes that P = count and Q = size. These two parameters are 
sisters since they have the same parents. Parents were defined based on features of network traffic. One parent (A) 
was defined from packets generated by bots, that are uniform in their number of packets and packet sizes, compared 
to those generated by heterogeneous devices. In the Stealthy Attack Model, the bots were implemented by at most 
two C-libraries, i.e. curl (Stenberg, 1996–2016) and nghttp2 (Tsujikawa, 2015). This contrasts with real network 
traffic which is generated by different devices from different manufacturers, having different hardware/software 
implementations. Real network traffic generates heterogeneous packet sizes. Instead, the bots were generated 
through a model that dictates how client-to-server packets are formed. Particularly, Stealthy Attack Model 
launched only one HTTP/2 packet type (namely window update packet), where the packet size was defined by the 
C-libraries that implemented the bots. Furthermore, there were a limited number of bots that generated such 
network packets, causing the model to generate a less dispersed number of packets compared to normal traffic. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which is adapted from the Stealthy Attack Model study (Adi et al., 2017, Sec. 5.2). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of attack (grey) and normal (black) feature values 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of two different feature values, in this example, the count_syn (the number of 
SYN packets in an instance) and the size_rstAck (the total size of RST ACK packets in an instance), for the stealthy 
attack dataset. The X-axis represents various ranges of feature values, while the Y-axis describes the number of 
instances in the dataset that encompass such range of values for a given feature. The grey bars represent attack 
traffic generated by bots, while the black bars represent normal traffic. Figure 1 shows that the normal traffic is 
more distributed than the attack traffic: the black bars span wider than the grey bars; while the black bars forms a 
distributed bell-curve, the grey bars are lower relative to the black bars, and plane relative to the X-axis. This 
illustrates that the attack traffic is less heterogeneous in terms of packet count and sizes, when compared to normal. 
The other parent (B) was defined as attacking bots attempting to mimic normal flows of normal data traffic. In the 
Stealthy Attack Model, two parameters were defined to mimic normal traffic: a stealthy factor and a delay between 
connections. The stealthy factor sf was defined as a flood of HTTP/2 packets launched with a probability of 1/sf. 
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A delay between connections of d was prescribed as d ms added between successive TCP connections of a given 
session. These parameters defined the bots capable of controlling the number of packets launched from a malicious 
client towards a target server. As the bot traffic was controlled (i.e., operated below the radar), the number of 
packets and their sizes are less heterogeneous than those of normal traffic (as Figure 1 shows). 
Henceforth, P and Q are sisters, since they both were derived from non-heterogeneous bots that attempted to mimic 
normal traffic. 
Step Sister Algorithm 
This study proposes the Step Sister technique to select a set of features based on inter-sister relationships, given 
two different datasets. The precondition of the algorithm is to have two sets of ranked features. In this study, the 
datasets Stealthy Attack-1 (S1) and Stealthy Attack-2 (S2) were ranked through application of the Information 
Gain technique (Kullback & Leibler, 1951).  
The output of the algorithm is to have a ChosenSet of features; this set is initially assigned to an empty set. While 
there is no definition of how many features is sufficient, a finite number of 5 features was considered in this study 
for demonstration.  
Two sets of ranked features were employed from the Stealthy Attack datasets (Adi et al., 2017). These are the 
Stealthy Attack-1 dataset and the Stealthy Attack-2 dataset. These features were ranked through application of the 
Information Gain technique, resulting in two ranked lists, S1 and S2, respectively. For the purpose of this study, 
the two features chosen to analyse HTTP/1.1 traffic, i.e. the count_app and the count_syn features (explained in 
the next subsection), were not selected as part of the ChosenSet. Furthermore, because this study observed that the 
count group has a sister association with the size group, this study disregarded the size_app and the size_syn 
features. These are shown on lines 5 - 7 of the algorithm. 
To define a sister relationship, the algorithm examines the feature groups and feature types. Feature groups are 
features that share the same characteristics such as “count” and “size”. Feature types signify the packet types where 
the features were extracted from. For example, rstAck is a feature type, which is extracted from a network packet 
carrying RST ACK flag. Hence, a feature named count_rstAck is obtained from the number of packets (i.e. count) 
carrying RST ACK flags, observed in an instance of time. The sister association is found to be true when a feature 
f from one of the ranked list S being examined belongs to the “count” group, and the same type of feature where 
its group is “size” is found in the ChosenSet. The converse situation where f belongs to the “size” group, also 
demonstrate a sister association when the same type of feature of group “count” is found in the ChosenSet. 
Henceforth, the Step Sister algorithm can be simplified as follows. The first step is to clean the two ranked list S1 
and S2, by eliminating a feature is its sister is already in the ChosenSet, starting from the highly ranked feature 
from each list. It selects a feature from the two lists S1 and S2 that is ranked higher. These steps iterate until there 
is a handful number of features in the ChosenSet with size n. 
Stealthy Attack Datasets 
The two attack models proposed in the Stealthy Attack Model were named Stealthy Attack-1 and Stealthy Attack-
2. The Stealthy Attack datasets described attack and normal HTTP/2 traffic classes: the attack data was generated 
out of two attack models; and the normal data was obtained from simulating 5,200 bots that mimicked human 
behaviour when online. 
The Stealthy Attack-2 dataset extended the Stealthy Attack-1 dataset through employing attacking bots that 
mimicked the distribution value of a highly relevant feature observed from the Stealthy Attack-1 data analysis. In 
both datasets, the features were ranked through employing both Information Gain and Gain Ratio algorithm. The 
result showed that 42 features could detect HTTP/2 flood-based attacks better, i.e. fewer False Alarms than when 
two HTTP/1.1 features were employed. The two HTTP/1.1 features used as a comparison were count_app, i.e. the 
number of Application Data packet observed in an instance, and count_syn, the number of TCP connection 
initiation observed in an instance. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The ChosenSet from the Step Sister algorithm yielded the following set of features: 
 size_rstAck, is the total size (in KB) of packets carrying RST-and-ACK TCP flags observed in one 
instance. 
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 size_tlsKey, is the total size (in KB) of TLS packets carrying key exchange observed in one instance 
 count_encryptedAlert, is the total number of TLS packets carrying Encrypted Alert flags observed in one 
instance. 
 lapse_rstAck max, is the maximum duration of time between packets carrying RST-and-ACK TCP flags 
within an observed instance, and a packet carrying SYN flag signifying its first connection initiation. 
 size_tlsHello, is the total size (in KB) of TLS packets carrying Hello packet type observed in one instance. 
The above set of features was employed to classify traffic described for both datasets, i.e. the Stealthy Attack-1 
and Stealthy Attack-2 datasets. The classification analysis employed Weka (University of Waikato, 1993–2016), 
software that provides a collection of machine learning techniques, to analyse the classification performance in 
terms of False Alarm. Four machine learning techniques were employed: Naïve Bayes (NB), Decision Tree J48 
(DT), JRip, and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Two other feature ranking algorithms that were employed in 
the Stealthy Attack Model, Information Gain (IG) and Gain Ratio (GR), serve as a comparison to analyse the 
classifier performance. 
The Step Sister algorithm did not aim to yield better performance than what the Stealthy Attack Model study 
yielded. This is shown in Table 2. The False Alarm yielded by the machine learning techniques was compared 
when the features were selected and ranked by the Step Sister (SS) algorithm, Information Gain (IG) and Gain 
Ratio (GR). The values obtained for the SS columns were the outcomes of this study, while the values shown for 
the IG and GR columns were the outcomes of the Stealthy Attack Model study. To compare the correct values, 
only the most relevant 5 features were selected from the list of ranked features by IG and GR. The table shows 
that the numbers in column SS are not consistently lower than the values on the other columns. Hence, the SS 
algorithm did not seek to optimise the performance obtained in the Stealthy Attack Model. 
Table 2. False Alarms produced (%) when different algorithms were employed 
 Stealthy Attack-1 Stealthy Attack-2 
IG GR SS IG GR SS 
NB 0.2892 0.2410 0.2410 0.0519 0.0519 0.0778 
DT 0.0482 0.0723 0.0482 0.0519 0.0519 0.0519 
JRip 0.0482 0 0.0723 0.0259 0.0259 0.0259 
SVM 0 0 0 0 0.0778 0 
Table 3. False Alarms produced (%) when different feature sets were employed 
 Stealthy Attack-1 Stealthy Attack-2 
HTTP/1.1 SS HTTP/1.1 SS 
NB 0.2651 0.2410 0.5189 0.0778 
DT 0.1687 0.0482 0.2335 0.0519 
JRip 0.1205 0.0723 0.2335 0.0259 
SVM 0 0 0.3373 0 
Consistent results can be seen when the machine learning performance was compared to those when the HTTP/1.1 
features were employed. This is illustrated in Table 3. All of the False Alarm yielded by the machine learning 
techniques were lower when the features were selected by the SS algorithm, compared to those when HTTP/1.1 
features were employed. Hence, the ChosenSet of five features consistently yielded better performance. 
The ChosenSet features are more consistent than the set of features employed in the Stealthy Attack Model study: 
first, the Step Sister algorithm selected the same ChosenSet of features to be employed by machine learning 
techniques. This is different to the methods employed by the Stealthy Attack Model study, where different sets of 
features {1 . . . n} must be selected. Second, in the Stealthy Attack Model study, observations were required to 
choose the size n of the set {1 . . . n}. In contrast, the same five features selected by the Step Sister algorithm in 
this study were employed by the machine learning techniques. This demonstrated the aim of the study: to yield the 
same set of features to analyse different datasets. 
CONCLUSION  
This study proposed a technique, namely, Step Sister, which yielded a set of features to aid in machine learning-
based classification of HTTP/2 flooding traffic. The analysis employed two datasets that described the 
characteristics of HTTP/2 flooding and legitimate traffic, respectively. Since the Step Sister technique yielded a 
consistent set of features for machine-learning based classification, intrusion-detection systems that employ this 
technique can operate without requiring human intervention to choose the size and members of the feature set. 
Furthermore, the proposed technique was tested on two varying datasets. The study demonstrated that the Step 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 61
Sister technique analysed both datasets to yield a chosen set of features. Machine learning techniques that 
employed these set of features yield lower False Alarms than when techniques known in literature were employed 
to analyse HTTP/2 traffic. 
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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to consider how hacking could impact a country that had historically experienced major 
cyber-attacks. The aim of the paper is to explore a cyber incident that occurred against the Sri Lankan president 
and how Sri Lankan authorities reacted to the incident. The paper will focus upon the motivations of the attack, 
the impact of the attack and how Sri Lankan authorities reacted to the situation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We have seen a rise in computer misuse at a global level; in many cases “Hackers” have been found responsible 
for these attacks. Hackers are often characterised as adolescent males in dark bedrooms that can cause damage to 
global IT systems through using their computers and computer skills. A more romantic perception portrays 
hackers as being determined cyber knights, who use personal codes of conduct to live by and are reminiscent of 
the great Arthurian knights (Warren and Hutchinson, 2003). Moreover, “hacker” is what computer-intruders 
choose to call themselves, not as a criminal pejorative, but as a noble title given to those “soaked through with 
heroic anti-bureaucratic sentiment” (Sterling, 1993). Hacking then, can describe the determination to make access 
to computers and information as free as possible. Hacking can involve the heartfelt conviction that beauty can be 
found in computers, that the fine aesthetic in a perfect program can liberate the mind and the spirit (Levy, 1984). 
Contrasting this romantic perception is the way Bruce Sterling (1993), portrays “Hacking” in his book titled ‘The 
Hacker Crackdown’. In Sterling’s (1993) book, “Hacking” is described as the act of intruding into computer 
systems by stealth and without permission. However, Sterling’s definition of “Hacking” is broader than the one 
used routinely by most enforcement officials with any professional interest in computer fraud and computer abuse. 
The enforcement officials’ focus on “Hacking” relates to crimes committed with, by, through, or against a 
computer (Warren and Hutchinson, 2003).  
But when happens when a country that has never experienced major cyber incidents becomes victim to a high 
profile cyber incident. In terms of the paper it reflects upon Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is an island located of the coast 
of India and has a population of 22 million people, of the Sri Lankan population 7.1 million (32%) are Internet 
users (CIA, ND). 
The paper intends to answer one key research question: 
What were the motives and impacts in relation to the Sri Lankan President’s Cyber incident. 
OVERVIEW OF SRI LANKA 
The Sri Lankan authorities in anticipation of increased cyber security incidents that Sri Lanka could face and the 
growing ICT infrastructure across Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka Computer Emergency Readiness Team | Coordination 
Centre (CERT|CC) was established as Sri Lanka’s National CERT, by the ICT Agency of Sri Lanka to protect 
against Sri Lanka’s future Cyber incidents, (Sri Lanka Cert, ND). 
The role of the Sri Lanka CERT|CC has developed over time, it has now become the national centre for cyber 
security in Sri Lanka, mandated to protect the nation’s information infrastructure and to coordinate protective 
measures against, and respond to cyber security threats and vulnerabilities (Sri Lanka Cert, ND). 
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Sri Lanka has had a history of cyber incidents, the following table depicts the distribution of various types of 
incidents reported to Sri Lanka CERT during 2016 (APCert, 2016). All the incidents reported to Sri Lanka CERT 
had been resolved satisfactorily.  
 
Table 1: Sri Lankan Cyber Security Profile Incidents (2016) (AP, 2016) 
 
 
The majority of issues that have been reported to the Sri Lankan CERT|CC related to social issues relating to 
social media and related issues such as cyber bullying, the “social media” type of cyber incidents represented 94% 
of the cases that Sri Lankan CERT|CC had to deal with and would relate to issues such as cyber bullying. 
CASE STUDY 
On the 25th August the official website of the Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena, (www.president.gov.lk) 
suffered two cyberattacks on two consecutive days by a group  who identified themselves as 'The Sri Lankan 
Youth' (BBC 2016, DNA 2016, Doole and Thomas 2016, Read Me News 2016, Yahoo, 2016). 
 
The first attack took place on the 25th August 2016, the existing site was removed and replaced with a message. 
The message that was posted on the home page is shown in Figure1. The president site was hacked on Friday, 
August 26 with a message being posted in in Sinhala (Wollerton 2016). In the first message, the hacking group 
made a number of demands to the Sri Lankan government. One of these demands being a request to reconsider 
the decision to hold the GCE A/Level examination in April rather than in August. In addition, it also commented 
to the Government to be more conscientious regarding the security of Sri Lankan websites. If no action were to 
be taken with that regard, the country will have to be face a “cyber war” (Molloy 2016, Read Me News, 2016). 
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Figure 1: The First Hacking Incident 
 
The English translation of the first message from the hacking incident posted in Sinhalese was: 
 
“Dear Mr. President, 
 
We are extremely displeased about the decision to hold GCE A/L in April since the Sinhala/Hindu New Year falls 
in between the exam dates. Therefore, reconsider that decision. Furthermore, take care of the security of Sri 
Lankan websites. Or else, we will have to face a cyber war. 
 
If you cannot control the situation hold a Presidential Election. 
 
Stop the Prime Minister's irresponsible work. 
Look more into the problems of the university students. 
 
The Sri Lankan Youth” 
 
The first message posted in Sinhalese was a political message which included the stopping of ‘irresponsible 
conduct’ by the Prime Minister and hold a presidential election if the president cannot control the situation. The 
message also directed the Government to pay more attention to the problems faced by university students. 
 
After the first attack, the site was taken offline for a few hours and then the Presidents site returned to normal 
operations. But on the 26th August the Presidents site as hacked again, this time a message in English was posted 
(see Figure 2). The message made no demand, just stating that the site was down for maintenance and the site was 
quickly restored. 
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Figure 2: The Second Hacking Incident 
WHO WAS RESPONISBLE 
A group or individual known as the “The Sri Lankan Youth” was suspected to be responsible for the initial attack. 
Following the incident, a 17-year school boy from Kandy was arrested by the CID (Criminal Investigation 
Department) for allegedly hacking the website. Further, the CID arrested another 27 year old and charged him 
with hacking the President’s website (Gossip News 2016). Under the Sri Lankan Computer Crimes Act, the 
unnamed boy who was arrested, and could face a possible fine of Rs. 300,000 (Sri Lankan rupee) and subsequent 
could face up to three years in jail (Doole and Thomas 2016, Read Me News, 2016).  
The Sri Lanka Computer Crimes Act was enacted by the Sri Lankan Parliament and certified by the Speaker as 
the Computer Crimes Law No. 24 of 2007 with the aim of the protecting Sri Lanka against Cyber Crimes and 
these was the first arrests in connection to this law (Guardian, 2016). 
According to CID, the arrested school boy had illegally accessed more than 37 websites and a Facebook account 
named ‘arrow.lk’ had been identified in connection with altering data and entering data (Doole and Thomas 2016). 
Further, the CID has informed that a group named ‘Yakadaya Forums’ on Facebook was involved in collecting 
and sharing information about security weaknesses links to certain hosting websites.(Doole and Thomas 2016).  
DISCUSSION 
The Sri Lankan President's web-site is a simple news website created for the purposes of disseminating 
information and news relating to President Sirisena and his activities and a way of connecting to the Sri Lankan 
public. 
The President website was hosted on WordPress, a free and open-source content management system which is a 
popular choice for people to host their blogs and personal websites (Doole and Thomas 2016, Metzger 2016). The 
security issue here related to the fact that the  WordPress site was not correctly configure and some blame poor 
security standards on the website as the cause of the problem (Metzger 2016). 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 67
 The President's website hack was linked to a manipulation of the original program code (script) of the website. 
The hackers themselves had limited experience who use existing computer scripts or code to hack into computers. 
They lack the expertise to write their own program code to hack others websites and obtained the information 
they needed for the hack through the Facebook forums they were linked to (Doole and Thomas 2016). It was also 
determined that the second hacking incident was also linked to the first hacking incident (Daily News, 2016). 
In terms of the paper’s research question: 
What were the motives and impacts in relation to the Sri Lankan President’s Cyber Incident. 
In terms of the motives of the hacking incident the hacker’s motivation was to highlight his displeasure that 
examinations had been scheduled for April, during the traditional Sinhala and Tamil New Year holidays. The 
motivations reflect that of a young person who was frustrated by the timing of a School exam and decided to hack 
the Presidents web-site to vent his frustration. 
From a forensic perspective, not much information has been shared by the Sri Lankan authorities regarding the 
situation but following was determined: 
1) After the first hacking incident, the Sri Lankan law enforcement agencies took over the operations of the 
Presidents web-site and very quickly reacted to the second hacking incident; 
2) Very quickly the two individuals involved in the incident were identified and arrested by Sri Lankan 
authorities; 
3) The security weakness on the President’s WordPress site was quickly identified and corrected; 
4) The Sri Lankan authorities used social media to collected information about the attackers and determine 
which Facebook groups where code exploits and other information had been exchanged. 
The damage caused by the incident was limited and only impacted the credibility of the Sri Lankan authorities to 
protect the Presidents web-site. 
The case just highlights a number of issues: 
1) The problem of hosting government web-sites on third party web-sites where limited security systems 
may be in place; 
2) The ability of unskilled attackers to use the Internet to download scripts to exploit security weaknesses, 
in this case being given the script via Facebook forums; 
3) The role of media in portraying the defacement of the Sri Lanka Presidents web-site as a major “Cyber 
incident” and escalating the situation; 
4) The capabilities of Sri Lanka authorities to quickly analyse the attacks and respond to the incident and 
arrest those connected. 
CONCLUSION 
The case is linked to a Sri Lankan teenager who hacked the president's website to try to reconsider the decision to 
hold the GCE A/Level examination in April rather than in August. In terms of this incident, it is a classic hacking 
incident based upon simple motivations of a single individual. The case does highlight the problem that 
governments have when using third party sites and services on behalf a national government official. 
 
The outcome was that the case against the people arrested was dropped and the teenager behind the incident had 
to meet the President in person. During the meeting with the Sri Lankan President, he stated “It's our duty to 
encourage our youngsters to use their talents ethically” (Daily News, 2016). 
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Abstract 
The Internet of Things (IoT) expands the global Internet-connected network to encompass device-to-device, 
device-to-server, and server-to-server connectivity for an ever-increasing variety of end-user devices. IoT remains 
a somewhat amorphous entity, with little in the way of coordinated development, and is undermined largely by a 
manufacturer-driven scramble to be first-to-market with the latest innovation. Communication between IoT 
devices/servers relies on underlying protocols, which must be efficient and effective to establish and maintain 
reliability and integrity of data transfer. However, the lack of coordination during IoT’s expansion has resulted 
in a variety of communications protocols being developed. AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing Protocol) 
originated from the financial sector’s requirement for an improved messaging system that was fast, reliable and 
independent of end-user platform configurations. AMQP is an open-source server-to-server communications 
protocol which allows the addition of user-specific extensions. The software coding of such end-user-developed 
modules can be insufficient regarding threat-mitigation and can make the end product vulnerable to cyber-attack. 
Through this paper, we present vulnerability and threat analysis for AMQP-based IoT systems. 
 
Keywords: AMQP (Advanced Message Queuing Protocol), AMQP Vulnerabilities, Application Layer Protocols, 
Internet of Things (IoT), IoT Architecture 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than a decade, the desire to have an increasing range of devices controllable via wired or wireless 
communications has seen an exponential rise in the number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices being available 
for the workplace and the home. No sector of our lives appears to be immune from the IoT invasion, whether it be 
military, medical, industrial, or domestic. The Internet-of-Everything (IoE) is rapidly becoming a reality. 
The term IoT is believed to have been originally coined in 1999 (Ashton, 2009), though in hindsight devices such 
as the wireless telegraph can be considered to be IoT devices dating back to the early to mid-19th century (Foote, 
2016). In the early 2000s, the first commercial domestic appliance IoT device, the Internet refrigerator, began 
being shipped by some manufacturers (Osisanwo, Kuyoro, & Awodele, 2015). During 2008, the number of devices 
connected to the Internet was considered to exceed the number of people on earth (Evans, 2011). In 2011, IPv6 
protocol became available which allowed an address space of 2128 unique IP addresses. This vast number prompted 
Steven Leibson of the Computer History Museum, Mountain View, CA at that time, to say “we could assign an 
IPv6 address to EVERY ATOM ON THE SURFACE OF THE EARTH, and still have enough addresses left to 
do another 100+ earths!” (Bhalla, 2012). By 2025, it is estimated that 75 billion IoT devices will make up a market 
worth between US$3.9 trillion to US$11.1 trillion (Jacobs, 2017). 
As with other fields of technological development, the security of such IoT devices has predominantly taken a 
backseat in a rush to be first to market with a new product (Arias, Wurm, Hoang, & Jin, 2015). For this reason, 
IoT has been considered as the future of the Internet (Gubbi, Buyya, Marusic, & Palaniswami, 2013) or as the 
death of the Internet (Vaughan-Nichols, 2016) depending on one’s point of view. As part of this research, we 
present IoT as an imminent reality which is making a positive impact on modern day living and hence the paper 
will discuss the following: 
1. Different protocols involved in enabling IoT concept. 
2. The history of the AMQP protocol, along with various features. 
3. The design architecture of AMQP. 
4. The known vulnerabilities of the protocol. 
5. Threats posed by these vulnerabilities. 
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BACKGROUND 
IoT consists of much more than just connected end-user devices. Underlying an IoT operation is a framework to 
allow data extraction from each device for analysis, and data insertion back to each device for control purposes. 
Such frameworks apply to all IoT deployments in use today, and will equally apply to future IoT deployments that 
have not yet been developed, even for so-called independent or autonomous devices. 
TechBeacon (2017) describes such an architecture as a four-stage process: 
1. Stage 1 – IoT devices consisting of wireless sensors and actuators. 
2. Stage 2 – Sensor data aggregation systems and analogue-to-digital conversion. 
3. Stage 3 – Edge IT systems for data pre-processing and transmission. 
4. Stage 4 – Back-end data systems for analysis, management, and storage. 
Bradicich (2015) clarifies these four stages graphically, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. IoT Architecture Stages (Bradicich, 2015) 
Overview of Application Layer Protocols in IoT 
AMQP (AMQP, 2017a) is an open-standard application protocol middleware which enables server-to-server 
message communication. It is independent of both the platform and language that each of the end-servers may be 
using. Flow-controlled communication enables delivery options, such as at-most-once, at-least-once, or exactly-
once. Delivery authentication is provided by SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer). Encryption is 
provided by TLS (Transport Layer Security), which is the successor to SSL (Secure Sockets Layer). 
CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) (CoAP, 2017) is an M2M (Machine to Machine) web transfer protocol 
for use with constrained nodes and constrained networks. It is based on the REST (Representational State Transfer) 
model. Since this is also true of HTTP, seamless connection to a web client interface is possible. CoAP uses 
minimal resources while providing encryption through DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) equivalent to 
3072-bit RSA. 
DDS (Data Distribution Service) (DDS, 2017) is a protocol designed to interconnect devices and has its origins in 
high-performance environments, such as the military, industry and embedded systems. Its rapid delivery of 
messages simultaneously to an array of receivers make it suitable for real-time analytics and sensor monitoring. 
IBM developed MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) (MQTT, 2017) in 1999 and since 2013 has 
become an OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) standard. It is an 
M2M IoT connection protocol, which uses publish/subscribe messaging transport methodology to connect a device 
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to a server. MQTT’s lightweight architecture makes it suitable for situations where communications bandwidth is 
limited, such as remote locations or via satellite links. 
RESTFUL (Service Architecture, 2017) provides a set of standards for communication between computer systems 
on the Internet. Its underlying HTTP-compliant architecture enables the communication and transfer of data 
between IoT devices using this protocol. It uses the same HTTP methods of GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE to 
conduct request/response interactions. 
SMQTT (Secure Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) (SMQTT, 2017) is an extension to MQTT which 
encrypts a message before publication by the broker. The encrypted message is sent to multiple subscriber nodes 
where the message is decrypted using the same master key. 
WebSocket protocol (WebSocket, 2017) provides full-duplex communication between clients and a remote server 
on a single TCP connection. WebSockets can be implemented in both web browsers, servers and indeed any 
application making use of the client/server paradigm. Apart from the initial handshake with HTTP servers, Web-
Socket is an independent protocol that maintains a two-way exchange between client and server using TCP port 
80 or TLS port 443 for encrypted traffic. 
XMPP (Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol) (XMPP, 2017) is one of four Instant Message (IM) protocols 
which has developed to satisfy the rapidly expanding information society’s need for short message services. 
XMPP’s use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) overcomes prior difficulties in connecting an IM system 
with a non-IM system. Several large public IM services, such as LJ Talk, Nimbuzz, and HipChat exclusively use 
XMPP. Other popular IM applications like WhatsApp, Gtalk and Facebook Chat use XMPP on their back-end 
servers. 
AMQP Protocol History and General Features 
AMQP was first proposed in 2003 by John O'Hara of JPMorgan Chase in London. In 2005 JPMorgan Chase 
commenced taking other firms on board to develop a working group for the project. These firms initially included 
the likes of Cisco Systems and Red Hat, but within a few years, the AMQP working group had expanded to include 
23 partners. 
In August 2011 the AMQP working group had attained OASIS membership, and two months later AMQP 1.0 was 
released at a conference in New York. Successful demonstrations of software running the protocol resulted in an 
OASIS Technical Committee being formed to develop the protocol into an international open standard. 
In April 2014 OASIS AMQP was granted ISO and IEC International Standard approval, under the designation 
ISO/IEC 19464. Despite its development predominantly within the financial sector, AMQP has seen wide adoption 
as a server-to-server communications protocol within the IoT environment. AMQP is one of the few highly used 
application layer protocols with its prominent implementation India's Aadhaar project, considered as one of the 
world’s largest biometric databases (Varma, 2010). AMQP is also being used in the Ocean Observatories Initiative 
infrastructure that uses sensor nets to bring readings ashore from ocean platforms and a global publisher-subscriber 
network to disseminate readings (Meisinger, 2010). Other notable implementations of AMQP include The 
Deutsche Börse, JPMorgan, NASA, AT&T (AMQP, 2017b). 
AMQP offers the following protocol features (Ross, 2012): 
 
Session Multiplexing 
 Multiple Sessions can be carried over a single connection 
 Sessions have independent message sequencing and flow control 
 Interleaving of large messages 
 
Full Duplex, Asynchronous Communication 
 Within a session, messages can flow independently in both directions 
 
Semantics of Message Hand-off 
 AMQP formally defines the semantics of message transfer and settlement/acknowledgement 
 Messages can be moved or copied 
 Delivery guarantees: 
o Best Effort (Fire and Forget) 
o At Least Once 
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o Exactly Once 
 Transactional Message Transfer 
o Local Transactions between Endpoints 
o Distributed Transactions 
 
Data Security 
 TLS/SSL 
o Encryption only, or 
o Encryption and authentication by x.509 certificates 
o Most APIs provide this option via the text of a URL: amqp://hostname vs amqps://hostname 
 Extensible Authentication/Security Mechanisms 
o SASL – Simple Authentication and Security Layer 
o Supports numerous mechanisms: 
 ANONYMOUS 
 PLAIN 
 DIGEST-MD5 
 GSSAPI 
 NTLM 
 
Flow Control 
 Limits the number of messages that a producer can transfer at a time 
 Greatly simplifies some difficult architectural problems 
o Many data sources sending to a data sink at the same time 
 
Serialisation of Structured Data 
 AMQP defines the wire-line format for data types 
 The application designer does not need to be concerned with 
o The Endian order of a peer system 
o The Word Size of a peer system 
 Rich API support is provided to access this feature 
o A Python program can send a message containing a Python Dictionary 
o A Java program can receive the message as a Hash Map (or a JMS Map Message) 
o A C++ program can receive the same message as an std::map 
 
Message Metadata 
 Like HTTP, AMQP allows messages to be annotated with headers 
 Any number of application-specific headers may be placed in a message 
 Headers are carried separately from the message body (which may be encrypted, encoded, and 
compressed) 
 
Transport Independence 
 Messages can be sent between services in many ways, all hidden from one’s business logic 
AMQP ARCHITECTURE 
AMQP Design 
The primary objective of AMQP was to replace existing proprietary and non-interoperable messaging systems that 
were considered to be hampering communications in the financial sector (Vermesan & Friess, 2014). It aimed to 
enable messaging at enterprise level between two platform systems of any configuration, provided that each of 
those platform systems, and the libraries that they are using, was AMQP-compliant (Indrasiri, 2016). 
In AMQP, a shared queue space or broker is provided, which all participating applications can access. A message 
is sent from a client via a publisher to an exchange within the broker. Each message contains a routing key, which 
will be used by the broker to either assign the message to a particular queue, distribute the message to several 
queues, duplicate every message to multiple queues or distribute multiple messages to chosen queues as defined 
by the routing key. 
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A subscriber then receives its authorised messages from queues for delivery to its end client. Since each message 
is assigned to one particular subscriber, even though the same message may have been duplicated for another 
subscriber, only one subscriber can receive a particular message from any of the queues present. 
Individual messages are tracked and accounted for to ensure that all messages are delivered as intended. For this 
to occur, all endpoints must acknowledge receipt of each message. 
Richardson (2008) graphically represents the methodology of the AMQP protocol, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. AMQP Methodology (Richardson, 2008) 
Key: Pub = Publisher, E = Exchange, Sub = Subscriber 
 
AMQP uses underlying TCP/IP-compatible protocols at the network and transport levels, which provides wire-
level interoperability and reliability. It is a messaging solution offering flexibility, which Richardson (2008) 
summaries as follows: 
1. any language (C, C++, C#, Python, Java, Javascript, Erlang, Lisp, Ruby, Tcl, PHP, …) 
2. any model (native, .NET WCF, JMS, Mule, can do Caching) 
3. any payload (binary, XML, SOAP, JSON, …) 
4. any transport (TCP, SCTP, UDP, HTTP, …) 
5. any scenario (desktop, router, wan, mobile, mesh, cloud) 
Figure 3 shows a comparison between same-platform and cross-platform server integration, the latter being the 
issue AMQP was developed to resolve. 
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 Figure 3. Same-Platform Integration via JMS vs Cross-Platform Integration via AMQP (Indrasiri, 2016) 
Known Vulnerabilities 
The research explored Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases for the known vulnerabilities of 
AMQP. While searching and examining the CVE database for the terms AMQP and IoT, 17 vulnerabilities were 
identified with a disclosure date within the past decade: 
 
Table 1. CVE Search Results for “AMQP IoT” (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, 2017) 
Date Created CVE ID Details 
18-Apr-2017 CVE-2017-7911 A Code Injection issue was discovered in CyberVision Kaa IoT 
Platform, Version 0.7.4. An insufficient-encapsulation vulnerability has 
been identified, which may allow remote code execution. 
23-Mar-2017 CVE-2017-7243 Eclipse tinydtls 0.8.2 for Eclipse IoT allows remote attackers to cause a 
denial of service (DTLS peer crash) by sending a "Change cipher spec" 
packet without pre-handshake. 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 75
Date Created CVE ID Details 
09-Mar-2017 CVE-2017-6780 A vulnerability in the TCP throttling process for Cisco IoT Field 
Network Director (IoT-FND) could allow an unauthenticated, remote 
attacker to cause the system to consume additional memory, eventually 
forcing the device to restart, aka Memory Exhaustion. The vulnerability 
is due to insufficient rate-limiting protection. An attacker could exploit 
this vulnerability by sending a high rate of TCP packets to a specific 
group of open listening ports on a targeted device. An exploit could 
allow the attacker to cause the system to consume additional memory. If 
enough available memory is consumed, the system will restart, creating 
a temporary denial of service (DoS) condition. The DoS condition will 
end after the device has finished the restart process. This vulnerability 
affects the following Cisco products: Connected Grid Network 
Management System, if running a software release prior to IoT-FND 
Release 4.0; IoT Field Network Director, if running a software release 
prior to IoT-FND Release 4.0. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvc77164. 
17-Jul-2017 CVE-2017-11408 In Wireshark 2.2.0 to 2.2.7 and 2.0.0 to 2.0.13, the AMQP dissector 
could crash. This was addressed in epan/dissectors/packet-amqp.c by 
checking for successful list dissection. 
24-May-2016 CVE-2016-4974 Apache Qpid AMQP 0-x JMS client before 6.0.4 and JMS (AMQP 1.0) 
before 0.10.0 does not restrict the use of classes available on the 
classpath, which might allow remote authenticated users with 
permission to send messages to deserialize arbitrary objects and execute 
arbitrary code by leveraging a crafted serialized object in a JMS 
ObjectMessage that is handled by the getObject function. 
02-May-2016 CVE-2016-4432 The AMQP 0-8, 0-9, 0-91, and 0-10 connection handling in Apache 
Qpid Java before 6.0.3 might allow remote attackers to bypass 
authentication and consequently perform actions via vectors related to 
connection state logging. 
29-Jan-2016 CVE-2016-2173 org.springframework.core.serializer.DefaultDeserializer in Spring 
AMQP before 1.5.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code. 
01-Jul-2015 CVE-2015-5240 Race condition in OpenStack Neutron before 2014.2.4 and 2015.1 
before 2015.1.2, when using the ML2 plugin or the security groups 
AMQP API, allows remote authenticated users to bypass IP anti-
spoofing controls by changing the device owner of a port to start with 
network: before the security group rules are applied. 
25-May-2015 CVE-2015-4080 The Kankun Smart Socket device and mobile application uses a 
hardcoded AES 256 bit key, which makes it easier for remote attackers 
to (1) obtain sensitive information by sniffing the network and (2) obtain 
access to the device by encrypting messages. 
09-May-2015 CVE-2015-2247 Unspecified vulnerability in Boosted Boards skateboards allows 
physically proximate attackers to modify skateboard movement, cause 
human injury, or cause physical damage via vectors related to an 
"injection attack" that blocks and hijacks a Bluetooth signal. 
07-Jan-2015 CVE-2015-0862 Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the management 
web UI in the RabbitMQ management plugin before 3.4.3 allow remote 
authenticated users to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) 
message details when a message is unqueued, such as headers or 
arguments; (2) policy names, which are not properly handled when 
viewing policies; (3) details for AMQP network clients, such as the 
version; allow remote authenticated administrators to inject arbitrary 
web script or HTML via (4) user names, (5) the cluster name; or allow 
RabbitMQ cluster administrators to (6) modify unspecified content. 
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Date Created CVE ID Details 
09-Nov-2014 CVE-2014-8711 Multiple integer overflows in epan/dissectors/packet-amqp.c in the 
AMQP dissector in Wireshark 1.10.x before 1.10.11 and 1.12.x before 
1.12.2 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application 
crash) via a crafted amqp_0_10 PDU in a packet. 
10-Apr-2014 CVE-2014-2814 Microsoft Service Bus 1.1 on Microsoft Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 
and Server 2012 Gold and R2 allows remote authenticated users to cause 
a denial of service (AMQP messaging outage) via crafted AMQP 
messages, aka "Service Bus Denial of Service Vulnerability." 
12-Oct-2010 CVE-2009-5005 The Cluster::deliveredEvent function in cluster/Cluster.cpp in Apache 
Qpid, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG before 1.3 and other products, 
allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash and 
cluster outage) via invalid AMQP data. 
21-Aug-2008 CVE-2012-4458 The AMQP type decoder in Apache Qpid 0.20 and earlier allows remote 
attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and server 
crash) via a large number of zero width elements in the client-properties 
map in a connection.start-ok message. 
21-Aug-2008 CVE-2012-4446 The default configuration for Apache Qpid 0.20 and earlier, when the 
federation_tag attribute is enabled, accepts AMQP connections without 
checking the source user ID, which allows remote attackers to bypass 
authentication and have other unspecified impact via an AMQP request. 
14-Jun-2006 CVE-2012-3467 Apache QPID 0.14, 0.16, and earlier uses a NullAuthenticator 
mechanism to authenticate catch-up shadow connections to AMQP 
brokers, which allows remote attackers to bypass authentication. 
 
The way the architecture of IoT has developed in recent years means that there are many protocol options available. 
The challenge, from the security aspect, is to ensure that the correct protocol is utilised in an appropriate 
environment. Often this will necessitate a solution which spans many protocols, and not just one (axway, 2015). 
As with other IoT protocol software, the security of AMQP often suffers from the code being poorly written by 
many developers (Braue, 2015). Due to the open-source nature of AMQP, which allows for industry-specific 
extensions to be added, this exacerbates the variety of vulnerabilities that may be introduced to a particular 
messaging system based on AMQP. 
Threats to AMQP Protocol 
As the Internet of Things expands to encompass billions of devices around the world, the cybersecurity CIA triad 
of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability becomes as significant as ever. With an exponential growth in the 
number of IoT devices, so too is there a corresponding exponential growth in the number of lines of communication 
and data transfer, be they via wired or wireless connections. Indeed, in a situation where every device is capable 
of communicating with every other device, the number of communications channels equals n(n-1)/2, where n is 
the number of devices involved. 
Every IoT communication channel is as vulnerable to potential man-in-the-middle cyber-attack as in a simple 
email communication between two end-users. The four types of such active attacks are: 
1. Replay – An attack entity replays data between communication sessions to impersonate a user to obtain 
information. 
2. Masquerade - An attack entity gains access to a system or performs a malicious act by posing as an 
authorised entity. 
3. Modification - An attack entity performs additions or deletions to the network communication content. 
4. Denial of Service – An attack that inhibits legitimate users from accessing computer services. 
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Despite AMQP using TLS/SSL-based encryption on an underlying TCP-based transmission protocol, resolute 
threat entities will still be able to intercept and decipher IoT communications, given sufficient time. Not only are 
we seeing IoT devices being introduced on the market with insufficient security measures (Arias et al., 2015), but 
we are also seeing IoT networks being compromised by the introduction of carefully-crafted botnets. An example 
of such an attack occurred at an unnamed University in the United States early this year (2017). 
Cybercriminals were able to crack default or poorly-configured passwords in one IoT device via a brute force 
attack taking advantage of the device’s inadequate security measures. Once this device was under their control, 
specially designed malware was able to be installed (Palmer, 2017). 
The malware then spread from IoT device to IoT device by a botnet which again brute-forced weak or defaults 
passwords. As the botnet spread, it locked administrators out and repeatedly changed the password on infected 
devices with each malware update (Moss, 2017). 
Within a short time frame, all 5,000+ devices were infected, and each device was making hundreds of DNS 
requests for seafood restaurants (Mezzofiore, 2017). The consequence of this DDoS attack was a severe slowing 
of the University’s Internet access resulting in a loss of availability of resources required by students and staff 
(Palmer, 2017). 
What makes this incident particularly interesting is that it is one of the few cases to date which has seen a botnet 
DDoS attack spread and then directed against the same network on which the infected devices are hosted. If such 
an attack is to involve the compromise of server-to-server communications hosting AMQP, then the potential 
would be for multiple IoT networks to be seeded with such internally-spreading infections; causing widespread 
compromise of AMQP-enabled IoT devices. 
Figure 4 is a theoretical graphical interpretation of how the botnet attack on the University above may have been 
initiated and spread. 
 
 
Figure 4. Hypothetical Interpretation of Attack Vector Methodology 
 
Other software developers have created more direct AMQP-specific attack vectors. Enteletaor is a Message Queue 
& Broker Injection tool that can be used to implement attacks to AMQP-compatible messaging providers, such as 
RabbitMQ. It is also effective on non-AMQP-compatible message systems such as Redis, and ZeroMQ (GitHub, 
2016). Features include: 
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1. Listing remote tasks. 
2. Read remote task content. 
3. Disconnect remote clients from Redis server (even the admin!) 
4. Inject tasks into remote processes. 
5. Make a scan to discover open brokers. 
6. Try to discover user/passwords in authentication-protected brokers 
CONCLUSIONS 
From its origins in the finance sector, AMQP has developed far beyond its original scope to become a widely 
accepted messaging protocol throughout the field of IT, including the Internet of Things. Through the use of 
binding/routing keys, AMQP provides a powerful and flexible mechanism for sending messages from publishers 
to subscribers via exchanges and queues. AMQP’s underlying TCP/IP-compatible framework adds to the diversity 
of its range of applications but also makes it vulnerable to an assortment of known weaknesses and methods of 
exploitation. Its usage as a server-to-server messaging protocol leads to the potential that its inherent TCP/IP-
based vulnerabilities could be leveraged to propagate malware infections between networks. This research has 
reported various vulnerabilities that exist in AMQP protocol and how various threats can be used to exploit these 
weaknesses to make AMQP a susceptible protocol in IoTs list which otherwise has a very strong architecture. 
Therefore, the need for having an IoT device using AMQP protocol in a network must be carefully evaluated 
before AMQP becomes part of the system. 
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Abstract 
It is timely to raise cyber security awareness while attacks on maritime infrastructure have not yet gained 
critical momentum. This paper analyses vulnerabilities in existing shipborne systems and a range of measures 
to protect them. It discusses Information Technology network flaws, describes issues with Industrial Control 
Systems, and lays out major weaknesses in the Automated Identification System, Electronic Chart Display 
Information System and Very Small Aperture Terminals. The countermeasures relate to the concept of 
“Defence-in-depth”, and describe procedural and technical solutions. The maritime sector is interconnected 
and exposed to cyber threats. Internet satellite connections are feasible and omnipresent on vessels, offshore 
platforms and even submarines. It enables services that are critical for safety and rescue operations, navigation 
and communication in a physically remote environment. Remote control of processes and machinery brings 
benefits for safety and efficiency and commercial pressure drives the development and adaptation of new 
technologies. These advancements include sensor fusion, augmented reality and artificial intelligence and will 
lead the way to the paradigm of “smart” shipping. Forecasts suggest unmanned, autonomous ships in 
international waters by 2035. This paper is the starting point for future research, to help mapping out the risks 
and protect the maritime community from cyber threats. 
Keywords: maritime cyber security, smart shipping, autonomous shipping, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures 
INTRODUCTION 
Geographical isolation exposes mariners to a set of unique challenges such as navigating through rough weather 
and evading pirate attacks. Technology on ships plays a significant role to help manoeuvring through those 
conditions and it enables communication in situations of emergency and distress. Unfortunately, any type of 
technology has the potential to be used for malicious purposes. Cyber security awareness and culture is new on 
the agenda of the maritime community, but it must be taken seriously to avoid catastrophic consequences. 
Universal satellite and data connectivity is one of the major advancements in seafaring, but this brings along a 
myriad of new risks. For instance, many critical systems on board rely on the Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) for safe navigation, communication, emergency response, and traffic control. However, 
disrupted or manipulated Global Positioning System (GPS) signals can send ships off their course and cause 
collisions, groundings, and environmental disasters. In 2016, multiple ships outbound from the United States 
(U.S.) reported GPS interferences which prompted the US Coast Guard to issue “Safety Alert 01-16 – GNSS – 
Trust, but Verify. Report Disruptions Immediately” (United States Coast Guard, 2016). In 2017, reports 
emerged of more than 20 vessels which noticed spoofed GPS signals that placed them about 25 nautical miles 
inland (Hambling, 2017). The source of the attack was attributed to tests performed by a nation-state. 
Adversaries are “testing the waters” but they already have the knowledge, tools, and motivation to launch 
attacks with potentially devastating outcomes. It is very alarming when we consider that this applies to naval 
vessels carrying advanced weaponry as well as the commercial shipping sector, which is part of the critical 
infrastructure and accounts for more than 90% of cargo transported globally (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2017).  
A host of weak spots in ship- and shore-based cyber systems has already been exposed by research conducted in 
the field. Unawareness or ignorance of these flaws leads many organisations to taking shortcuts in regard to 
applying and policing appropriate security measures. Additionally, rapid cycles of product development, 
implementation, maintenance, and decommissioning are overwhelming for the majority of maritime 
stakeholders.  
The following section outlines critical vulnerabilities in common IT systems and Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) on board. It explains the risks related to the heavy reliance on navigation and communication systems 
such as the Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS), the Automated Identification System (AIS), 
and Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSATs). The section Countermeasures lays out current procedural and 
technological strategies to protect maritime infrastructure from malicious attacks and it describes the concept of 
Defence in Depth. 
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VULNERABILITIES  
Vulnerabilities are flaws in a system that have the potential to be exploited by malicious parties. This section 
outlines vulnerabilities of several technologies used in IT networks, industrial control systems, navigation, and 
communication systems. 
The purpose of critical services in the maritime community is to ensure the safety of people, equipment, and the 
environment. For example, the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is a set of standards and 
components to aid search and rescue operations for vessels in emergency situations. Each component of the 
GMDSS (e.g. VSAT terminals, AIS transponders) comes with a set of potential vulnerabilities. Other services 
include voice communications, crew welfare and entertainment systems, guest Wi-Fi, and video monitoring. 
These systems are perceived to be less critical to safety and operations and thus routinely left unpatched and 
exposed to attacks. Figure 1 summarises critical on-board systems which could be vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
The weaknesses of each of these systems are explained in the sections below. 
 
 
Figure 1   On-board systems where vulnerabilities could exist. 
IT Networks 
An Information Technology (IT) network is the fabric that integrates core business and operation systems on 
board and leverages shared databases and other systems. These systems can be used for accounting, cargo 
management, customs and shipping, human resource planning, and administration (Hudson Analytix Inc, 2017).  
A malware outbreak in June 2017 paralysed IT networks across the world and caused significant business 
disruptions and loss of revenue. The worm “NotPetya” initially infected computers through a malicious update 
in an accounting software product. It then spread to attached systems, wiping or encrypting files and demanding 
ransom payments (Symantec Security Response, 2017).  The Danish shipping company A.P. Moller-Maersk 
was one of the organisations that were hit the hardest and it reported a loss of $300M due to the significant 
system shutdowns and restoration efforts across its critical systems (Mimoso, 2017).  
The event underlines that many organisations still lack a coherent approach to managing the cyber security of 
their systems. Business-critical software may be not updated or replaced because it is only compatible with other 
legacy systems or protocols. Some organisations do not have a regular patching or update regime and thus their 
antivirus software is outdated, or important application security updates are not patched. Networks are often 
inadequately segmented to manage access control, especially for third parties. IT systems should be scrutinised 
carefully as they provide a wide attack surface and many entry points for adversaries. All systems and endpoints 
must be secured, which in most cases does not happen. Third party access (e.g. for implementation, support and 
maintenance of equipment) further exposes vulnerable systems to the open world.  
Critical control networks should be in a secured zone, isolated from the corporate IT network and the internet. 
However, economic pressure, regulations, and requirements for remote monitoring and control increase the need 
for a connection into the IT network. The design and configuration of the links between IT networks rarely 
consider authentication and encryption methods, thus exposing potential vulnerable and legacy system to the 
internet. IT systems on vessels are often connected with onshore facilities and this further increases the exposure 
to systemic and persistent threats (Baltic and International Maritime Council, 2017). 
ICS – Industrial Control Systems 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) on ships assist to reduce human errors, increase resource efficiency, prolong 
equipment life, and ensure economic advantages (Wang & Zhang, 2000). ICS control and monitor parameters 
on board, including temperature, pressure, level, viscosity, flow control, speed, torque, voltage, current, 
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machinery and equipment status (Zaghloul, 2014).  An array of devices and protocols from different vendors 
and technological eras and are often “bolted together” to provide interoperability. Most of these components 
were designed and programmed without any security in mind and data is transferred in plaintext.  The onus of 
securing the components should be shared between the vendor, who follows a secure development framework, 
and the operator, who configures the components in line with industry standards and recommendations. The 
reality is often that either party assumes that the other party is responsible and no-one does it at all, leaving 
many critical weaknesses for attackers to exploit (Shoultz, 2017). It is crucial for integrators, implementers, and 
operators of ICS to understand the system’s limitations and vulnerabilities of its components and protocols. 
Primary control systems (hydraulic, electrical, automatic control) are vital to the ship’s safe voyage. They are 
exposed to difficult environmental challenges, such as pressure, vibration, and humidity. These control systems 
are integrated via the ship’s distributed IT network. A continuous link between IT networks and on-shore 
facilities enables remote access for monitoring, fault-finding, and troubleshooting, reduces site travel costs, and 
streamlines the collection and analysis of field data (Moxa Inc., 2017; Orbcomm, 2017). A major concern is that 
operators and engineers routinely bypass security for convenience and efficiency, which could have a cascading 
effect on the entire organisation (Zurich, 2014). This behaviour is attributed to the lack of awareness and skills, 
the commercial pressure to save time, and the plain non-adherence to security policies. 
AIS – Automatic Identification System 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a ship- and shore-based Very High Frequency (VHF) radio 
broadcasting system. It is used for Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), search and rescue operations, accident 
investigation, and weather forecast (Australian Maritime Safety Authority). Reliance on the transmitted 
information is critical to situational awareness and collision avoidance at sea. AIS transponders communicate 
over the air without any authentication or integrity checks. Attackers can inject signals via a Software Defined 
Radio (SDR) and place fake “man-in-water” beacons, render the ship invisible and inject false weather reports 
(Balduzzi, Wihoit, & Pasta, 2013). Relying on the potentially incorrect information can lead to wrong decisions 
and catastrophic outcomes. 
AIS data is publicly available via websites such as “Vesselfinder” (VesselFinder Ltd, 2017) and “Marinetraffic” 
(MarineTraffic, 2017). The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has “condemned the regrettable 
publication on the world-wide web, or elsewhere” as it reveals a wealth of information on the vessel and its 
route which can be invaluable for a targeted attack (International Maritime Organisation, 2004). 
ECDIS – Electronic Chart Display Information System 
The Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) is mandated by the IMO for all commercial vessels 
and usually is installed on the bridge. ECDIS software implementations have an extensive list of weaknesses. 
Often the system runs on legacy computers (e.g. Windows XP desktops) for which no security updates are 
available. The maps are loaded onto the system either via the internet, or manually via USB or DVD. Sensor 
feeds comes from a multitude of other onboard systems such as Radar, Navigation Telex (Navtex), ICS, and 
satellite terminals. This provides a wide surface for a compromise. Dyryavyy (2014) audited commercial ECDIS 
software and highlighted some significant security risks that would allow an attacker to replace or delete files on 
the system or inject malicious content. Thus, tampered sensor data could be sent to ECDIS, which would 
influence decisions for navigation, and may cause collision or grounding. 
VSAT – Very Small Aperture Terminal 
A Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is a communications station used to send and receive data via a 
satellite network. The transceiver is installed above deck in line of sight of the satellite and a control unit below 
deck provides the interface to a PC. VSATs enable a range of communication and safety services including 
GMDSS, ECDIS, AIS, phone, internet, cargo management, vessel routing, radio integration, telemedicine, crew 
welfare, tele-training, and weather forecast. Santamarta (2014) tested a range of VSATs from multiple 
manufacturers and concluded that all the audited devices are vulnerable at the protocol and implementation 
level. They transmit in plain text without authentication, encryption, or integrity checks. This can allow an 
attacker to inject fake signals or malicious code to cause device to shut down or corrupt the system, disabling 
the ship from navigating safely. 
A ship’s geolocation is publicly available via AIS aggregators, but the real risk is that VSAT network interfaces 
can be identified on the internet, e.g. via the “Shodan Ship Tracker” (Matherly, 2017)). This can reveal 
manufacturer names, product codes, and other data which is useful for a potential attack. Vendors generally 
publish default credentials on their websites and many terminals run with unchanged default factory settings, 
including administrator usernames and passwords. Once an attacker found an open VSAT interface, they can 
change GPS coordinates, settings, and upload malicious software. This allows for further compromise of the 
network and may give up an entry point to critical control systems (Morse, 2017).   
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It is concerning that these systems are widely used by NATO and across critical infrastructure, as their 
exploitation could lead to catastrophic consequences.  
COUNTERMEASURES 
The concept of cyber security is novel to many maritime stakeholders and it is timely to raise awareness about 
the existing countermeasures. It is essential to create a common understanding that includes the shared 
responsibility amongst maritime stakeholders. The following section outlines a strategic direction to securing 
cyber technology on ships.  
Defence-in-depth  
Security is neither a product that can be bought off the shelf, nor a procedural blueprint that every organisation 
can apply in the same way. Securing maritime IT environments “in depth” creates an all-encompassing 
protection mantle and builds resilience to external and internal threats. This layered approach is depicted in 
Figure 2 and includes procedural and technical countermeasures on each layer (outlined thereafter). 
 
 
Policy: Defence begins with the organisation’s 
leadership, where strategies are formed, and 
policies are made. 
Physical security: Physical measures to prevent 
intruders from entering the vessel by using 
guards, locks, alarms, and technical access 
control.  
Perimeter security refers to measures which 
block attacks from entering the network 
through external communication connections.  
Network security is concerned with the design, 
configuration and implementation of security 
zones, network segments, and other network 
based defences.  
The layer of Host security protects computers 
and other endpoints with measures such as 
antivirus software and host based firewalls.  
Application security prevents attackers from 
exploiting software flaws and entails secure 
software development, authentication, access 
control, and application vulnerability 
management.  
Finally, the Data security layer addresses how 
to protect the information itself, whether it is in 
use, in transit, or at rest. Each layer plays a 
significant role in the overall security of 
maritime critical infrastructure. 
 
Figure 2  A systematic approach to defend the smart ship in depth 
Security policies and procedures 
The most important security asset on board is a vigilant employee. Policies and procedures give staff the 
necessary tools and guidance for their critical role within the organisation. Training and awareness programs 
enable staff to understand why and how each individual can help. Policy and procedural documents should be 
clearly communicated, published, and acknowledged. Policies must address how the content will be enforced 
and what the consequences are if ignored. The documents must be reviewed regularly to ensure they 
appropriately cover the organisation in a world of continuous technological advancements. 
The policies should address and explain at least the following: 
 Data recovery capability, backups, redundancy, business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
 Administrator privileges, concepts of least privilege and the separation of duties 
 Remote access control, use of encryption and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
 Physical access, removable media controls, “Bring your own device” (BYOD) 
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 Acceptable personal use of IT systems  
 Email, phishing, passwords rules 
 Software upgrade, patch, and maintenance schedules 
 Anti-virus/-malware software and signature updates 
 White- or blacklisting and the use of third party software 
 Onshore support and contingency planning 
 Equipment disposal, and data destruction 
(Baltic and International Maritime Council, 2017; International Maritime Organisation, 2016) 
Technical security solutions 
Policies require a physical or technical implementation to be monitored and enforced. Guards, locks, and 
security cameras protect equipment like the ECDIS and VSATs from unauthorised use. Secure network design 
and configuration should segment the network to prevent the direct exposure of devices and ICS to the internet. 
For example, a VSAT hub can act as an intermediate hop for remote connections to the terminal. Firewalls and 
intrusion prevention systems monitor and block the data traffic as it leaves and enters the ship’s IT network. The 
dataflow between all nodes on the network, including ICS traffic and satellite and radio communications, should 
be mapped out and encrypted, e.g. by using a VPN. This way, even if signals were intercepted, the adversary 
could not easily read the message. 
Network hardening refers to the secure configuration of hardware and software and the deactivation of unused 
features and accounts. It applies to firewalls, routers, switches, servers, voice communication equipment, and 
any other device on the network. Hardening includes disabling unused ports and services but also managing and 
installing updates, patches and bugfixes. Default usernames and passwords must be changed where possible. 
The use of complex passwords protects against automated port-scan and dictionary based login attempts, for 
example on the VSAT terminal. Access control systems should be configured and audited regularly to only 
allow users the access rights they need to perform their job.  
X.509 certificate based authentication can secure the access to the ship’s wireless network for authorised crew 
members and guests. It is recommended to create a separate wireless network (Virtual Local Area Network – 
VLAN) for guests to allow only minimal access to resources on the network. The usage of secure 
communications protocols like ssh, https, and sftp should be implemented and enforced where it is possible. 
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) can provide an additional layer of access security to sensitive systems and 
applications. Application whitelisting prevents staff from installing unapproved and potentially malicious 
programs. The threat of intentional or accidental data leakage can be mitigated with data-loss-prevention 
software (Mertens, 2014; Shoultz, 2017; Soullie, 2014). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper analysed the current cyber security vulnerabilities and countermeasures in smart ship systems. It 
demonstrated that malicious attacks and incidents with devastating consequences are not only possible, but 
imminent. The maritime domain leverages cyber technologies to assure the safety and efficiency of operations at 
sea but vessels, platforms, satellites, and onshore facilities are increasingly interconnected, exposing them to an 
abundance of systemic and technology based threats.  
The paper outlined the flaws in existing information technology networks on board and concluded that the high 
level of complexity and shared resources create a wide attack surface which should be segmented and secured 
systematically. Industrial Control Systems are often built on legacy infrastructure and implemented without 
security in consideration. Networking capabilities supplement these systems to allow remote control and 
troubleshooting but at the same time expose them to the IT network and its inherent vulnerabilities.  
Vessel operators depend on the Automated Identification System for traffic and emergency services. Flaws 
discovered in the underlying hardware, software, and protocols would allow an adversary to manipulate the 
transmitted data and this could lead to navigational decisions with devastating outcomes. The Electronic Chart 
Display Information System equipment is equally unsecure and susceptible to malicious tampering. It often runs 
on legacy systems with well published vulnerabilities and the software itself can be misused to manipulate maps 
and sensor data which can compromise the safe navigation at sea. 
Very Small Aperture Terminals provide geospatial capabilities for many critical services on board. The data 
flow between satellites and terminals is unencrypted and provides no integrity checks. Terminals can be tracked 
over the public internet and many interfaces are not locked down. An attacker could remotely log in to the 
exposed device and change critical information as well as using it as an entry point to pivot through the 
connected ship network. 
The presented countermeasures were explained in the context of the multi-layered “Defence-in-depth” approach. 
Further recommendations were based on the implementation of security related policies and procedures. It was 
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suggested that technical security solutions are needed to implement and enforce said policies, and examples 
were presented relating to each layer of the “Defence-in-depth” approach. 
The maritime domain is moving fast towards the paradigm of “smart” transportation with more innovative 
technologies and AI driven decision-making. While this implies a wealth of benefits for economy, critical 
infrastructure, and military, it also increases the complexity of the threats to the maritime community before we 
have discovered and mitigated the flaws in existing systems and legacy technology. The current coverage of 
research in the field of maritime cyber security is sporadic and fragmented, leaving many stakeholders unaware 
of the risks and unprepared to treat them.  
The cyber security community has the urgent obligation to support the shipping industry with research, tools, 
security assessments, and education programs. In doing so, we will enable organisations to make informed 
strategic decisions and effectively allocate resources to protect each member and the maritime community as a 
whole.  
Future work based on the present paper will aim to map all identifiable risks and to establish a status quo of the 
cyber security posture of the maritime sector.  
REFERENCES 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Automatic Identification System (AIS). Retrieved 01/09/2017 from  
https://www.amsa.gov.au/navigation/services/ais/.  
Balduzzi, M., Wihoit, K., & Pasta, A. (2013). Hey captain, where’s your ship? attacking vessel tracking systems 
for fun and profit. Paper presented at the The Eleventh Annual Hack in the Box (HITB) Security 
Conference in Asia. http://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2013kul/materials/D1T1%20-
%20Marco%20Balduzzi,%20Kyle%20Wilhoit%20Alessandro%20Pasta%20-
%20Attacking%20Vessel%20Tracking%20Systems%20for%20Fun%20and%20Profit.pdf  
Baltic and International Maritime Council. (2017). The Guidelines on Cyber Security Onboard Ships. Retrieved 
from https://www.bimco.org/-/media/bimco/news-and-trends/news/security/cyber-
security/2017/industry-guidelines-cyber-security---june-2017.ashx 
Dyryavyy, Y. (2014). Preparing for Cyber Battleships – Electronic Chart Display and Information System 
Security. Retrieved from https://www.nccgroup.trust/au/our-research/preparing-for-cyber-battleships-
electronic-chart-display-and-information-system-security/ 
Hambling, D. (2017). Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon. Retrieved 28/08/2017 
from  https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-
russian-cyberweapon/#.WZy1mN2_kyQ.linkedin.  
Hudson Analytix Inc. (2017). Global Threats: Cybersecurity in Ports (Donald Duck, Daughters & Dollars). 
Paper presented at the Hemispheric Conference on Port Competitiveness & Security: Finding the Right 
Balance, University of Miami, Center for International; Business Education & Research. 
http://portalcip.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Max-Bobys.pdf 
International Maritime Organisation. (2004). MSC 79/23 - Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its 
Seventy-Ninth Session. Retrieved from 
http://www.crs.hr/Portals/0/docs/eng/imo_iacs_eu/imo/msc_reports/MSC79-23.pdf?ver=2010-11-03-
143734-000 
International Maritime Organisation. (2016). Measures to enhance Maritime Security: Report of the Working 
Group (MSC 96/WP.9). Retrieved from http://12zc4845uhr73vbfjp3ubgkz.wpengine.netdna-
cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Cyber-guidelines.pdf 
MarineTraffic. (2017). marinetraffic.com. Retrieved 15/10/2017 from  
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/p/contact-us.  
Matherly, J. (2017). Shodan Ship Tracker. Retrieved 15/10/2017 from  https://shiptracker.shodan.io/.  
Mertens, M. (2014). Securing VSAT Terminals. newtec.eu. Retrieved 13/09/2017 from  
http://www.newtec.eu/article/article/securing-vsat-terminals.  
Mimoso, M. (2017). Maersk Shipping Reports $300M Loss Stemming from NotPetya Attack. Retrieved 
16/10/2017 from  https://threatpost.com/maersk-shipping-reports-300m-loss-stemming-from-notpetya-
attack/127477/.  
Morse, J. (2017). Remotely hacking ships shouldn't be this easy, and yet ... mashable.com. Retrieved 12/09/2017 
from  http://mashable.com/2017/07/18/hacking-boats-is-fun-and-easy/#mjW1KLCj6aqb.  
Moxa Inc. (2017). Industrial Ethernet for In-ship Communication. Retrieved from  
https://www.moxa.com/event/Net/2010/Maritime_microsite/In-ship_solution.htm.  
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 86
National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2017). Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity Draft Version 1.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf 
Orbcomm. (2017). SCADA System Monitoring. Retrieved 05/09/2017 from  
https://www.orbcomm.com/en/industries/natural-resources/scada-system-monitoring.  
Santamarta, R. (2014). SATCOM terminals: Hacking by air, sea, and land. Retrieved 08/09/2017 from  
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Santamarta-SATCOM-Terminals-Hacking-By-
Air-Sea-And-Land-WP.pdf.  
Shoultz, D. (2017). Securely Connected Vessels: Vessel Communications and Maritime Cybersecurity. 
maritimeprofessional.com. Retrieved 07/09/2017 from  
https://www.maritimeprofessional.com/blogs/post/securely-connected-vessels-vessel-communications-
and-maritime-15176.  
Soullie, A. (2014). Pentesting PLCs 101. Paper presented at the Blackhat Europe 2014. 
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-14/materials/eu-14-Soullie-Industrial-Control-Systems-Pentesting-
PLCs-101.pdf 
Symantec Security Response. (2017). Petya ransomware outbreak: Here’s what you need to know. Retrieved 
from  https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/petya-ransomware-outbreak-here-s-what-you-need-
know.  
United States Coast Guard. (2016). Safety Alert 01-16 - Global Navigation Satellite Systems - Trust, but Verify. 
Retrieved 06/10/2017 from  http://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-
5PC/INV/Alerts/0116.pdf.  
VesselFinder Ltd. (2017). Vessel Finder. Retrieved 15/10/2017 from  https://www.vesselfinder.com/contact.  
Wang, J., & Zhang, S. M. (2000). Management of human error in shipping operations. Professional Safety, 
45(10), 23-28.  
Zaghloul, M. S. (2014). Online Ship Control System Using Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA). International Journal of Computer Science and Application.  
Zurich. (2014). Beyond data breaches: global interconnections of cyber risk. Retrieved from 
https://www.jasadvisors.com/custom/uploads/2014/04/Risk-After-Next-Whitepaper.pdf 
 
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 87
THE 2017 HOMOGRAPH BROWSER ATTACK MITIGATION SURVEY  
 
 
Tyson McElroy1,2, Peter Hannay1,2, Greg Baatard2 
1Security Research Institute, 2 School of Science, Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia 
tjmcelro@our.ecu.edu.au, p.hannay@ecu.edu.au, g.baatard@ecu.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
Since their inception, International Domain Names (IDN) have allowed for non-Latin characters to be entered 
into domain names. This feature has led to attackers forging malicious domains which appear identical to the 
Latin counterpart. This is achieved through using non-Latin characters which appear identical to their Latin 
counterpart. This attack is referred to as a Homograph attack. This research continues the work of Hannay and 
Bolan (2009), and Hannay and Baatard (2012), which assessed the mitigation methods incorporated by web 
browsers in mitigating IDN homograph attacks. Since these works, time IDN mitigation algorithms have been 
altered, such as the one used in Mozilla Firefox (Gerv, 2017). This study evaluates browser homograph attack 
mitigation strategies in browsers released post-2011. In this study, we find a high level of effective multi-script 
mitigation across the browser families surveyed. Notable exceptions to this include a single version of Firefox in 
which the mitigation features were not present and ongoing omission of mitigation against single script attacks.  
Keywords:  IDN, homograph, homoglyph, internationalised domain names, browser security, phishing 
BACKGROUND  
Domain name resolution is a technology which allows for IP addresses to be encoded as a string of characters. In 
the early days of Domain Names, the technology only accepted a string of alphanumeric ASCII characters as input 
for domain names (Mockapetris, 1987). This limitation prevented international users from accessing certain 
domains in their respective languages. The introduction of IDNs allowed for specific domain names to be 
accessible to multiple languages through encoding domain names in the Unicode format ("Introduction to IDNs," 
2016). 
The proposed IDN solution made use of UTF-8 character encoding to allow for non-latin characters to be 
displayed. In order to enable existing DNS infrastructure to handle UTF-8 domains a system known as Punycode 
was developed. Punycode provides facility to represent IDNs as regular ASCII domain names, as such no changes 
are required for the majority of infrastructure (Costello, 2003). An example of an IDN would be the  domain name  
☃.com,  which  would  be  represented  as xn--n3h.com when converted to punycode. 
IDN’s have allowed for domains to be accessible from many global users. However, the use of Unicode characters 
has also allowed for phishing attacks to be possible against domain names (Spaulding, Upadhyaya, & Mohaisen, 
2016). The use of non-Latin characters in the domain names allowed users to enter Unicode characters which 
appeared identical to the Latin counterpart, an example of this concept is shown in Figure 1 (Krammer, 2006). As 
a method to counteract these threats, Domains adopted a system known as Punycode to translate any Unicode 
characters into their ASCII representation ("Introduction to IDNs," 2016). Many browsers have adopted this 
technology, allowing users to see when a non-ASCII character is entered into a domain name.  
ɡ g 
U+0047 
Latin Small  Letter G 
U+0261 
Latin Small Letter Script G 
Figure 1 - Example of Homoglyph for "g" 
 
IDN’s have continued to see considerable growth and development in recent years ("Key Numbers," 2016), 
reported that from 2010 to 2015, the total number of registered IDN’s had doubled to 6.8 million. Despite browsers 
incorporating mitigation actions against IDN phishing attacks, they still pose a significant threat. In 2017 browsers 
such as Firefox, Google, Chrome and Opera were found to be vulnerable to a Punycode exploit (Kumar, 2017). 
This attack was possible due to a domain registration exploit, which allows the user to register a domain name in 
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Punycode format with foreign ASCII characters which appear identical to legitimate domains (Tseng, Ku, Lu, 
Wang, & Geng, 2013).  
In the Wild Phishing Attacks using IDN Homographs 
There have been numerous websites aiming to educate the public about the dangers of IDN homograph attacks, 
including еріс.com, аррӏе.com, and gooɡle.com (Hannay, 2012; Maunder, 2017; Zheng, 2017). However, the 
occurrence of homograph usage in confirmed phishing campaigns has been relatively minor with only a single 
confirmed major incident. In August the domain adoḅe.com was registered, subsequently the domain was used to 
distribute the Beta Bot malware, disguised as an update to the Adobe Flash Player software (Mimoso, 2017). 
Links to the website were distributed via email and Skype messages, requesting that the user install the fabricated 
update. Post infection the malware disables security software, then steals financial data and user credentials 
(Kaspersky Lab, 2017).  
PREVIOUS WORK 
Since the introduction of IDN’s, many attacks have been possible due to the use of non-ASCII characters. The 
following literature review gives a brief overview of the types of attacks due to the introduction of IDNs. Table 1 
provides an overview of of the types of attacks, covering single script, mixed-script, and whole script spoofing 
attacks which can take place through character substitution. 
Table 1 – Examples of Single Script, Mixed Script, and Whole Script Spoofing 
Script Type String Punycode Comments 
Single Script EPlC.com EPlC.com Lowercase L used as replacement for 
uppercase I 
Mixed Script еpic.com xn--pic-qdd.com Cryllic replacement used for ‘e’ 
Whole Script еріс.com xn--e1awd7f.com Cryllic replacements used for ‘epic’ 
Mixed-Script Spoofing  
One of the most prevalent attacks which have been proven possible by IDN domains is mixed-script spoofing. 
Mixed-script spoofing generates domain names using visually indistinguishable characters form different script 
groups (Krammer, 2006). These characters appear almost the same to the end user but contain different Unicode 
values. These characters exist within Unicode due to the writing system being used, letter and number encodings, 
and legacy encoding values (Davis & Suignard, 2006). These visually indistinguishable characters are known as 
Homoglyphs. Due to the indistinguishable nature of certain Unicode characters, attackers can easily forge domain 
names which appear to be visually indistinguishable from other legitimate domain names. These domain names 
are referred to as holographs, as they are comprised of various characters from separate scripts. Homographs can 
be used to trick users into going to a malicious domain and as such have been used in various phishing schemes. 
Whole-Script Spoofing & Single-Script Spoofing  
Whole script spoofing and single script spoofing differ from the mixed-script spoofing approach. Due to the 
introduction of IDNs, entire domain names can be spoofed through substituting each character in a domain with 
one of a different script (Krammer, 2006). This attack relies on each character in a domain name having an 
indistinguishable counterpart in another script. Attackers can utilise this coincidence to generate a fully 
indistinguishable domain name. Another attack possible is single script spoofing. This attack uses characters from 
the same script to visually trick users into going to the domain (Gelernter & Herzberg, 2016). These attacks are 
more recognisable to end users, as attackers are not substituting Unicode character from different scripts 
(Krammer, 2006). Instead, domain names are constructed using characters which appear somewhat identical to 
their counterparts. An example of this is Latin ‘o’ and ‘0’, which can be used to forge the domain 
‘www.g00gle.com’.  
DEFENCE TECHNIQUES 
Various defence mechanisms were adopted to address the security issues arising from the introduction of IDNs. 
The most prevalent defence against homograph attacks is displaying Unicode characters in a Punycode format. 
Punycode is used to encode a Unicode string into its appropriate ASCII string representation (Costello, 2003). 
Punycode values are prefixed with xn-- to represent the Unicode string. Values which contain ASCII characters 
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are interpreted as literal strings; however Unicode characters are transformed into their ASCII interpretation 
(Costello, 2003). 
Web Browser Defence  
As a means of defence against homograph threats, web browsers have begun implementing defence measures to 
notify users of potential issues with the domain name. One mitigation technique employed by Internet Explorer 7 
is to display Punycode when mixed-script characters are detected in the domain name (Al Helou & Tilley, 2010). 
Another defensive technique which browsers incorporate is colour coding particular scripts. This technique shows 
characters in different colours based on the script to which they belong.  
Another technique incorporated by Mozilla and Safari is to use a whitelisting approach. This security measure 
displays all IDNs in Punycode unless the domain is registered under a Top Level Domain (TLD) which has 
policies in place to prevent spoofing of the domain. As a requirement for this registering the domain with 
Homoglyphs, the owner must already own the western equivalent of the domain name. Mozilla Firefox still retains 
this whitelisting approach for handling IDNs but has since updated how the Punycode display works in 2012 
(Gerv, 2017). The new algorithm employed determines if the entered domain name contains characters belonging 
the same script or if the characters are being pulled from one of the allowed predefined script combinations (Gerv, 
2017). If the entered domain name is not within the pre-established whitelist for TLDs or if the domain name is 
using characters from illegal script combinations, a Punycode sample is displayed to the user. The previous 
whitelisting approach only remains for compatibility purposes with the domains registered with it but is no longer 
the primary method used for Homograph mitigation (Gerv, 2017). Some browsers such as Opera still retain the 
previous whitelisting approach which Firefox has since abandoned, but remains active for compatibility purposes 
with the registered domains.  
In the Hannay and Baatard (2012) survey, various browsers were assessed to determine their effectiveness in 
mitigating Homograph attacks. In this previous study, numerous versions of the web browsers Mozilla Firefox, 
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Opera, and Safari were assessed regarding the mitigation techniques used 
against homograph attacks. The results from the previous study demonstrated that later versions certain browsers 
such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox were highly effective in mitigating homograph attacks, while the 
latest versions of Internet Explorer and Safari were still vulnerable to some attacks at the time of the study. 
In recent versions of browsers such as Firefox, the algorithm used to display Punycode has been altered. This 
modification indicates that later versions may not have the same homograph mitigation methods applied. This 
research updates the results seen in the Hannay and Baatard (2012) study by analysing the mitigation techniques 
adopted by browser versions released between 2011 and 2017. Through performing this investigation, the author 
answers the question of if mitigation techniques have been applied to browser versions post-2011 and if changes 
to the mitigation functions resulted in further vulnerabilities with certain versions.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
The testbed used for this investigation consists of a virtual machine running Windows 7 and an Ubuntu 14.04 
Desktop virtual machine hosting sites containing single and mixed-script domain name. Various versions of the 
web browsers Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, Internet Explorer, and Opera were installed on the Windows 7 virtual 
machine. The versions which are tested consist of various versions from 2011 to 2017, which were not covered 
in the 2012 study. Due to issues obtaining previous versions of Google Chrome, the Chromium browser is used 
for this research. Given the total quantity of browser versions released per year, the versions covered in this 
research consist of those releases mid-year and at the end of the year. As a means of managing the browser versions 
installed on the tested, a snapshot is taken before any browser is installed on the environment. After each browser 
version is tested, the virtual environment is rolled back to the base install to prepare for the next iteration of testing.  
 
Table 2: Test Domain Names 
Domain Name Character Set Domain Name 
Single-Script n0tasecuresite.com 
Mixed-Script nоtasecuresite.com 
 
To perform this test in a controlled environment, two distinct websites were created, these were hosted on an 
Apache web server. The domain names of these sites were configured to use single-script and mixed-script 
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characters. The domain names used in the test are shown in Table 2. The single-script domain uses the Latin 
character ‘0’ in place of an ‘o’, while the mixed-script site uses the U1086 Cryllic ‘о’ character. These sites are 
also using self-signed Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates which also correspond to the single-script and 
mixed-script characters used in the domain names. Finally, both the sites are configured to use Geolocation 
services which prompt the user to share their current location with the given domain. Through hosting websites 
using single-script and mixed-script character sets, It is possible to assess the mitigation techniques applied to the 
two domains securely.  
To test the effectiveness of the mitigation methods applied to each browser version, four common attack vectors 
were identified corresponding to browser locations where the output is either the standard Unicode format or 
Punycode. This mitigation tactic is used to convey information to the user, regarding if any non-standard ASCII 
characters are detected. Through assessing various browser features, the research demonstrates how effective each 
browser is in conveying this information to the end user. These attack vectors used in this investigation are:  
 
 The text shown in the browser’s address bar, after the “Go” (or equivalent) button has been pressed.  
 The text shown in the browser’s status bar while the mouse is hovering over a hyperlink.  
 The text shown when viewing prominent information about the website’s SSL certificate.  
 The text shown when the user is prompted to share their location using geolocation services. 
 
As a means to assess how effective each browser version is with mitigating homograph attacks, a revised 
mitigation rating table similar to those presented in the 2012 study is provided. A value of zero was assigned 
should the browser not support a particular attack vector, for example, geolocation services. A value of negative 
one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector, but is still open to homograph attacks. A value of 
positive one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector and mitigated homograph attacks. Should the 
browser support or not support mitigation methods when displaying text in the browsers address bar, a value of 
positive two or negative two is given for this value. This value is due to this vector being the most prominent 
location for displaying Punycode. The browsers will receive two distinct ratings for single script and mixed-script 
mitigation.  An example of the table used can be viewed in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Mitigation Table Structure 
Address Bar Status Bar SSL Certificate Location Request 
-2 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) 
0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 
+2 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) 
RESULTS  
The post-2011 versions of Internet Explorer, as shown in Table 4, demonstrated improvements to mitigating 
Homograph attacks. Following the introduction of geolocation services in version 9, version 10 incorporated a 
Punycode mitigation method for mixed-script attacks. Internet Explorer has yet to implement a method of 
displaying Punycode for the SSL certificate, therefore not all mitigation methods have been implemented in the 
browser as of yet. Internet Explorer provides no method of mitigating against single script attacks, as no 
notification was given when supplementing a Latin ‘o’ and a ‘0’.  
As with Internet Explorer, single-script mitigation techniques are not present in any version of Firefox shown in 
Table 5. Version 17 of Firefox was not capable of displaying any form of Punycode in the address bar, SSL 
certificate, or geolocation request. This finding was likely a bug with versions from that time span, as this issue 
was later fixed. The only other issue with later Firefox versions was a lack of geolocation support present in 
version 26.  
These results of Table 6 show that the Opera browser is highly effective in detecting mixed-script IDNs and 
implementing appropriate mitigation methods to notify the users. As with the other browsers, no support for 
mitigating single script spoofing has been implemented yet.  
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Table 4: Internet Explorer Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location 
Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
10 (2012 - 09) 
11 (2013 - 10) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+3 
 
Table 5: Firefox Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation  
Status Bar 
Mitigation  
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation  
Location 
Request 
Mitigation  
Mitigation 
Rating  
13 (2012 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
17 (2012 – 11) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
-3 
22 (2013 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+5 
26 (2013 – 12) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
No support* -4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support* +4 
30 (2014 – 06) 
34 (2014 – 12) 
38 (2015 – 05) 
43 (2015 – 12) 
47 (2016 – 06) 
50 (2016 – 11) 
55 (2017 – 08) 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+5 
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Table 6: Opera Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location 
Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
12 (2012 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
15 (2013 – 07) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode  
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support -4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support +4 
18 (2013 – 11) 
22 (2014 – 06) 
26 (2014 – 12) 
30 (2015 – 06) 
34 (2015 – 12) 
38 (2016 – 06) 
42 (2016 – 12) 
47 (2017 – 08) 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
 
 
Table 7: Chromium Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation  
Status Bar 
Mitigation  
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation  
Location 
Request 
Mitigation  
Mitigation 
Rating  
20.0.1123 
(2012 – 05) 
25.0.1323.1 
(2012 – 11) 
29.0.1541.0 
(2013 – 06) 
32.0.1700.6 
(2013 – 11) 
37.0.2017.2 
(2014 – 05) 
41.0.2243.0 
(2014 – 12) 
45.0.2431.0 
(2015 – 06) 
49.0.2593.0 
(2015 – 12) 
53.0.2763.0 
(2016 – 05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
56.0.2902.0 
(2016 – 10) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Support 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Support 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+4 
61.0.3153.0 
(2017 – 09) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Support 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Support 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+4 
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The results from Table 7 show that Chromium is highly effective in mitigating against IDN homograph attacks. 
Like the other browsers analysed, no support for single-script mitigation has been added to any version. Chromium 
was shown to be highly consistent with the mitigation functions applied to each browser version. However, the 
most recent version of the browser does not accurately convey SSL certificate information to the user. This 
limitation results in the browser being unable to display Punycode for the domain name used in the SSL certificate. 
The results from single-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 1. Given the lack of mitigation functions, 
each browser received a negative mitigation rating. The most consistent rating across all browsers was a -5. The 
versions which achieved a -4 rating were as a result of a lack of support for a given for that version.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Single-Script Mitigation Results 
 
 
 
Figure 3- Mixed-Script Mitigation Results 
 
The results from mixed-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 2. The majority of browser versions 
demonstrate consistent mitigation ratings across different releases. The drops in mitigation ratings appear to be 
from certain versions not supporting for a particular feature. However, the 2012 version of Firefox is shown to 
have the greatest drop in mitigation rating. This finding is a result of the version only displaying Punycode for the 
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hover feature of Hyperlinks. The issues discovered in this version were later amended in later versions, with the 
only other drop being the lack of geolocation support in the 2013 version. Internet Explorer has demonstrated a 
greater mitigation rating in later versions by implementing geolocation services. Opera was shown to be the most 
effective in implementing mitigation features for IDN homograph attacks, as it received the rating of +5 more 
consistently than the other browsers tested.  
The uptake rate of new browser versions plays a significant role in determining the potential exposure of any 
particular browser version to hostile actors. A study conducted by Ion, Reeder, and Consolvo (2015) compared 
the cyber security practices of expert and non-expert users. One major finding of the study was that largest point 
of difference between the groups, was the importance placed on installing software updates in a timely fashion 
(Ion et al., 2015). Examining W3Counter data on browser usage shows us that as of August 2017, that 25.84% of 
users were running web browsers more than three months old (W3Counter, 2017). As such we can see that the 
potential exposure for vulnerabilities in specific browser versions, such as those seen in Firefox in 2012, may span 
many months from release of the software. 
CONCLUSION   
The results discovered in this research are representative of how IDN mitigation techniques have been 
implemented in various browsers in recent years. In extending the results of the previous study by Hannay and 
Baatard (2012), the results found in this study appear to indicate that mixed-script homograph attack mitigation 
has become a standard feature for most browsers. The majority of browsers analysed in this study demonstrated 
to implement appropriate mitigation techniques for IDN homograph attacks. The only degree of variance in the 
mixed-script results appears to be with different versions of particular browsers, which could be a result of bugs 
or changes in the algorithm. The results for single-script mitigation demonstrate that this is not a feature commonly 
implemented in browsers. Of the browsers analysed, none provided any support to notify the end user about a 
non-standard character being used in the domain name. This research suggests that mitigation against mixed-script 
homograph attacks has become a common feature for most browsers, while implementation of mitigation 
functionality for single-script spoofing attacks has not been undertaken. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of what information can be found on laptops that may or may not have 
connections to an organisation of some form, the statistics of the number of laptops stolen or otherwise 
misplaced in 2015 and 2016, and the number of potentially affected people from each of the cases. As seen in 
many news articles, laptops are often stolen or otherwise misplaced by employees or contractors in an 
organisational environment. As discovered in this research, many laptops are stolen from vehicles or homes of 
employees rather than organisation’s buildings, but not all. The majority of stolen or otherwise misplaced 
laptops have very little information security on them, and this increases the risk of a data breach once a third 
party has physical access to the device. The research finds that, with available information, only one laptop had 
used encryption for the personal, private and confidential information that was stored on the internal storage 
device. In total, this paper finds that 33 laptops were stolen or otherwise misplaced in 2015 and 2016. The 
healthcare industry had the largest number of potentially affected people, with 5,352,792 people, and an 
average of 334,350 across the 16 laptops. The government sector had the second highest impact, with a total of 
1,000,865 potentially affected people. Out of the 33 laptops, the total number of potentially affected people was 
6,598,995 affected people, with an average of 83,702 potentially affected people with each of the 33 laptops. 
Keywords: Laptop; Stolen; Misplaced; Data Breach; 2015; 2016 
BACKGROUND 
What information can be stored on laptops? 
A computer device can contain a large amount of information, which with the correct software and hardware 
tools can be forensically analysed to find information of interest. This information can include: 
 Temporary files: 
o Application data. 
o Web browser data. 
 Active directory (AD) user account on organisational devices with an active directory server. 
 Offline files from network drives, including drives configured with active directory. 
 Network configurations: 
o Wireless credentials. 
o IP address configurations. 
 User credentials 
o Organisational systems 
o Banking system 
o Social media 
o Session data 
 Intellectual property 
 Other personal information 
o Black mail potential 
Temporary files can include data that is stored on a local system by an application. For example, a database 
application may store information that was retrieved or worked on from a database in the temporary files on the 
system. By analysing this data, it is possible that personal and private information may be available on the 
system in the temporarily stored files from the database system. 
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Web browser data can include session data for emails, databases or other systems that require authentication. 
This information, which is stored in cookies, could allow an attacker to bypass the authentication on a system by 
restoring a previously open session before the server times out the session. Research finds that some versions of 
Firefox are known to store cookies and other session data in a SQLite database (Pereira, 2009), which can easily 
be recovered with the correct tools. 
An active directory (AD) system in an organisation copies a user’s account files to the system that is used to log 
onto the domain (Microsoft, 2016). This account data can include any private and confidential documents that a 
user may have stored in their personal account. By analysing this data, an attacker could potentially gain access 
to confidential information from an organisation and gain access to temporary internet files for internal web 
pages in the organisation. The attacker could then view these pages to find any vulnerabilities in the services, 
and view the data from the active directory user account to see if there is any confidential information stored by 
the user in their account or their temporary files folders. 
A computer device may be configured to store files offline from network drives or other shared folders 
(Microsoft, 2017a) in an organisation, either with or without an active directory server. This data can be analysed 
for confidential information that is stored on the organisation’s internal servers that has been copied to the 
laptop’s internal storage device. 
A computer device may also contain network configurations for corporate networks, which attackers could use 
to determine how to continue gaining further access to the information systems at their target organisation. This 
network information can include wireless credentials that can allow attackers to connect other devices to the 
organisation’s network and gain further access to information, as Windows allows users to view the wireless pre-
shared key in plain text (Microsoft, 2017c) when they have physical access to the device. 
Issues involved in the theft of laptops 
All the information described above shows how much information could potentially be stored on a single device. 
If these devices are stolen or otherwise misplaced, a third-party individual or group could have access to a large 
amount of information. This could potentially allow them to leak more information than that found on the stolen 
device, as they could use configuration data to gain further access to the information systems on personal or 
organizational networks and gain access to more data. 
With access to this device, the individual or group in possession of the device could leak any information they 
find on the device, and with the amount of information that could be stored on a single device, this has the 
potential to destroy the security reputation of an organization. 
Furthermore, an attacker could install malicious code to a device, then attempt to anonymously return the device 
to the organization to attempt to back-door their way into the organization. If a re-obtained device is not 
thoroughly examined for additional code or applications running on the device, it could cause potential leaks of 
more confidential information from the organization. 
Following the loss or integrity breach of this information and data, there are a number of potential outcomes, 
including: 
 Data loss 
o Data being deleted and no longer being accessible or useable to the user. 
 Data misuse 
o Data being used for purposes other than the intended use. 
 Fraud 
 Unlawful or unethical releases of private information 
 Black mail 
 Data damage 
o Data being either corrupted or encrypted making it inaccessible while it still exists on the 
storage device. 
 Reputation loss 
o Loss of data integrity reputation to the organisation or individual that was the subject of the 
data breach. 
 Commercial advantage to a third party engaging in information warfare 
o The potential for another organisation to possess the research and other intellectual property 
created and stored by the user of the laptop. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
The statistics for this paper were gathered by using an advanced search in Google News specifying news articles 
only, dated from 01/01/2015 to 31/12/2015 with the keywords “laptop data breach”. Google then returns news 
articles from laptops that were reported stolen or misplaced in 2015 with the potential information that may have 
been stored on them and how much data could have been breached. The search can also be limited to “Australia 
Only” to get news results for data breaches in Australia instead of worldwide. However, this does not yield 
enough results for this paper, and so this search limitation can be removed for further results. 
These same search queries were run, but the dates were changed to starting at 01/01/2016 and ending at 
31/12/2016 to obtain the statistics for laptops that were stolen or otherwise misplaced in 2016. 
Only news articles that specify that a data breach occurred due to a laptop being stolen or otherwise misplaced 
are in the scope of this paper, other forms of data breaches, including network attacks, are not in the scope of this 
paper and will be ignored in the search results of news reports or articles. 
To get the information to be compared, each article was examined, and the industry section, information about 
how many people are affected by the data breach, and if the device was secured and how will be entered into a 
table that will be used to compare the statistics from all newspaper articles found, with references. 
From this gathered information, comparisons and discussions can be made about: 
 The total number of data breaches from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in 2015. 
 The total number of data breaches from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in 2016. 
 The total number of people affected by the breaches in both 2015 and 2016. 
 The average number of people per breach. 
 The security in place on each of the stolen devices, and the security of the data on each of the devices. 
 The average security setup for the laptops. 
If any of the above information is unavailable, average calculations can be made for the total number of 
available statistics for each data type, or it will be assumed that zero people were affected by the unspecified 
breaches. 
For the general information in this paper, other papers and technology webpages will be reviewed and cited for 
their information regarding the potential data that can be stored on laptops, based on their possible 
configurations and uses within or external to an organization. 
DISCUSSION 
What information can be retrieved from a stolen laptop and how? 
When an attacker or another third party has physical access to a storage device from a laptop computer, they can 
easily gain access to the data that is stored on the disk. Utilizing many freely available forensic acquisition tools 
and utilizing the correct hardware, attackers or other unauthorized individuals or groups can view all of the data 
that is stored on the laptop in their possession, including data that has been deleted but the sectors have not yet 
been over-written. One method often used to retrieve this data is called file carving (Gladyshev & James, 2017). 
Active Directory and other locally stored files 
For example, if a laptop is connected to an Active Directory server, it will contain all of the information that the 
user has on any other system connected to that network. Assuming the device does not have encryption setup for 
the entire storage device, all of the information that has been downloaded from the Active Directory server will 
be visible in plain text. This can allow analyzers to easily scan for particular file types of interest or temporary 
database files. If an analyzer finds that files could have been deleted from the internal storage device on the 
laptop, with the correct hardware and software, the analyzer would be “able to recover the deleted files” 
(Hanson, 2005). 
A laptop may also contain offline files from a network drive at an organization. The type of data that would be 
stored here would depend on the information that is stored on the network drive in the organization. However, 
this data can range from personal information to freely available data such as application installers. 
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A laptop may also have credentials stored on it, such as wireless network credentials or usernames and 
passwords for internal or external websites and systems in the organization. Even if these are not stored in plain 
text, they can be dictionary or brute-force attacked by a powerful system or rainbow table to find the original 
passwords. This task can be easily performed on another system once the storage device from the stolen or 
misplaced laptop is obtained, and there are a number of open source, free to use tools that can achieve this 
(Eston, 2010). 
Web Browsers 
Modern web browsers store a large amount of temporary data on a system. If a laptop is acquired, there may be 
open session data stored in the browser’s temporary files and cookies, even if the user has attempted to delete 
them through their web browser (Pereira, 2009). This issue can allow an attacker to bypass the authentication 
systems on a web-based service and use the currently authenticated session on the device. With this session, an 
attacker could access more information stored on the network than just the information that was stored on the 
obtained device, and the attacker could potentially use this network access to launch more internal network 
attacks on the storage systems at the organization. 
Many users also choose to allow their web browsers to save their login information to many web pages and 
services. This information can be harvested in order to obtain and dictionary or brute force attack the credentials 
utilizing tools such as John The Ripper (Taiabul Haque, Wright, & Scielzo, 2014), to re-use them to obtain more 
information from the network. 
Web history data from web browsers can be used to determine what research was conducted on the laptop, or, 
what sites may have stored temporary information on the laptop. As temporary files are not often deleted, even if 
the user requests it (Pereira, 2009), there may be information of interest that can be obtained from recently 
viewed web pages that are in the browsing history of the device. Also, forensic tools can be used to view any 
temporary information that may have been deleted on the device. 
User Directory 
As discussed above, Active Directory servers will send a connected laptop a large amount of data or information 
from the storage systems from the network (Microsoft, 2016). However, if the system is not part of an Active 
Directory server, there may still be a large amount of information that is stored on the system while the user was 
working either on or off-site with data and information. 
While the device is either at an organization or connected to the network with a Virtual Private Network (VPN), 
any documents or other information/data that are accessed on the remote storage servers may be temporarily 
stored on the local storage device in the laptop. This data can be harvested for any temporary data that might 
contain confidential information. 
If an organization has a web-based document management system, such as Microsoft’s SharePoint, there may be 
temporary downloaded documents stored in the user directory folder on the laptop’s storage device. These files 
may contain completed forms or other records potentially containing confidential data or information. 
Temporary internet files that are stored on the system from accessing the websites on the internal networks could 
be analyzed to find and potentially exploit any vulnerabilities that are present on the web server(s). 
System Configurations 
System configurations could be analyzed to determine the network structure of the organization and how it is 
configured. This data could be helpful for further network attacks that could be used to obtain more information 
than the information that is present on the laptop’s internal storage device. 
If the system is configured to access the internet through a proxy server, these credentials and connection 
information can be used to determine where the proxy server is on the network, and how to connect to it, which 
could be used by an attacker to redirect traffic to a different location. If an automatic configuration script is 
available on the system, it can contain this information (Microsoft, 2017d). 
Wireless network credentials can also be stored on a laptop, and these can be retrieved from the laptop’s internal 
storage device (Microsoft, 2017c). These credentials can be used to easily gain access to any wireless networks 
that the laptop has been connected to, including home networks and networks at organizations. 
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Laptops that have been connected to an organization may have network drives configured in the operating 
system (Microsoft, 2017b). The configuration information for these network drives can be used to determine the 
network and storage structure of the organization, as the network paths show up in the file browser. Also, some 
of these network drives may have been configured to store some information and data offline, and this 
information and data will be stored on the laptop’s internal storage device. 
STATISTICS OF STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 2015 
Table 1:  of all cases in 2015 
Industry Number of 
potentially 
affected 
people 
Was the device 
password protected? 
Was the device 
encrypted? 
 
Background 
Screening 
100,000 Password protected Unencrypted (Greenberg, 2015c) 
Healthcare 39,090   (Snell, 2015a) 
Education 9,300 Password protected Not encrypted (Leventhal, 2015) 
Healthcare 8,000   (Muckenfuss, 2015) 
Healthcare 3,000  Not encrypted (Lewis, 2015) 
Healthcare 2,800  Encrypted (WISN, 2015) 
Healthcare 1,359 Password protected Not encrypted (Cantu, 2015) 
Education 941 Password protected Not encrypted (Gallagher, 2015) 
Financial  Password protected Not encrypted (Ilascu, 2015) 
Healthcare    (Snell, 2015b) 
Healthcare   “All of the personal 
information 
contained on the 
laptop was deleted” 
(Greenberg, 2015d) 
Law    (Greenberg, 2015b) 
Military   Encrypted (Shropshire-Star, 
2015) 
Security   Encrypted (Greenberg, 2015a) 
Table 2: Data analysis of cases in 2015 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Background Screening 1 100,000 100,000 
Healthcare 7 7,750 54,249 
Education 2 5,121 10,241 
Financial 1 0 0 
Law 1 0 0 
Military 1 0 0 
Security 1 0 0 
Total 14 16,124 164,490 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
STATISTICS OF STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 2016 
Table 3: Total of all cases in 2016 
Industry Number of 
potentially 
affected people 
Was the device 
password protected? 
Was the device 
encrypted? 
 
Healthcare 5,000,000   (Barth, 2016) 
Government >1,000,000^   (Press Herald, 2016) 
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Military 130,000   (Bevan, 2016) 
Healthcare 52,076 The device’s 
networking and 
employee’s 
credentials were 
disabled. 
 (Belliveau, 2016b) 
Healthcare <25,000# Password protected  (Devlin, 2016) 
Healthcare 12,000 Password protected  (Martin, 2016) 
Education 4,022   (Monegain, 2016) 
Healthcare 3,119   (Snell, 2016) 
Sport >1,000*   (Clarke, 2016) 
Healthcare 600  “Patient information 
on the hard drive was 
encrypted” 
(Belliveau, 2016a) 
Aged care 75  The device was 
unencrypted 
(Belfast Telegraph, 
2016) 
Education  Password protected.  (Whitbourn, 2016) 
     
Healthcare  Password protected Not encrypted (Masters, 2016b) 
Healthcare   Unencrypted (Olenick, 2016b) 
Prison  Password protected Not encrypted (Jayanthi, 2016) 
Security  Password protected  (Olenick, 2016a) 
     
Vacation 
Properties 
   (Masters, 2016a) 
* Article only specified “thousands of players”. 
^ Article only specified “millions”. 
# Article only specified “up to 25,000”. 
Table 4: Data analysis of cases in 2016 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Healthcare 9 588,727 5,298,543 
Government 2 500,432 1,000,865 
Military 1 130,000 130,000 
Education 2 2,011 4,022 
Sport 1 1,000 1,000 
Aged care 1 75 75 
Prison 1   
Security 1   
Vacation Properties 1   
Total 19 135,805 6,434,505 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
DATA ANALYSIS OF ALL STOLEN OR OTHERWISE MISPLACED LAPTOPS IN 
2015 AND 2016 
Table 5 
Industry Sector Total number of 
breaches 
Average number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Total number of 
potentially affected 
people 
Healthcare 16 334,350 5,352,792 
Government 2 500,432 1,000,865 
Military 2 65,000 130,000 
Background Screening 1 100,000 100,000 
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Education 4 3,566 14,263 
Sport 1 1,000 1,000 
Aged care 1 75 75 
Security 2 0 0 
Financial 1 0 0 
Law 1 0 0 
Prison 1 0 0 
Vacation Properties 1 0 0 
Total 33 83,702 6,598,995 
 
As some of the articles or sources did not specify the number of potentially affected people, the calculations of 
total numbers in this table assumes that 0 people were affected on the cases with no data on the number of 
affected people for calculating the averages. 
SUMMARY OF STATISTICS 
An analysis of 33 different cases of laptops being stolen or otherwise misplaced found that a total of 16 of these 
were from the healthcare industry. The largest total number of potentially affected people with 5,000,000 
potentially affected people in one data breach was from the healthcare industry. In these cases, the system was 
either protected with just a password or no security information was available. No encryption was used on the 
majority of the laptops in the cases. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of devices stolen from each sector. As shown in the diagram, 49% of cases 
occurred in the healthcare industry. The second largest industry was the education industry, with 12% of the 
cases. 
 
Figure 1: Number of cases 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of people potentially affected in total by each industry sector. Healthcare had a 
total of 81% of the total number of potentially affected people, with the government sector following at 15% of 
the total number of potentially affected people. 
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 Figure 2: Number of potentially affected people 
An analysis of available security information finds that there was no encryption used on the majority of laptops, 
and that they were simply protected with passwords in their operating systems. This means that all the 
information discussed in previous sections of this paper would be accessible in plain text, and an attacker can 
simply connect the storage device to another system or boot a live operating system on the stolen or misplaced 
laptop to gain access to the information on the system, allowing them to breach the integrity of the data of the 
potential number of affected people for each stolen or misplaced system. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, this paper finds that very little security is used on laptops that contain personal information of 
employees or customers of businesses or other organisations. In some cases, the laptops belonged to the 
employees, rather than belonging to an organisation. 
In total, the statistics of this paper finds that across the total of 33 analysed cases, an average of 83,702 people 
were potentially affected per stolen or otherwise misplaced laptop, with the total number of people potentially 
affected by stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops was 6,598,995 people. 
The information in this paper can be used as a reference point for determining the security protocols that should 
be used on mobile devices, including but not limited to, laptops, phones, tablets and more. This paper’s 
information is an example of the potential losses and breaches of integrity from a single stolen or otherwise 
misplaced unencrypted device from either an organisation or an employee’s personal possessions. 
Further research should be conducted yearly to monitor the statistics of stolen laptops, to check if data breaches 
from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops continues to increase over time. If the statistics and information in 
this paper are used effectively in education and training, further research in this area should show a decline in the 
number of data breaches and potentially affected users from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the future. 
Further research over the past ten years should also be conducted to provide an accurate representation of the 
changes to the number of data breaches and people affected by stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the past, 
compared to the amount in 2015-2016 and the future. The data collected by all the research can be graphed and 
tabled for statistical and educational purposes with the intent to reduce the number of data breaches that occur 
from stolen or otherwise misplaced laptops in the future. 
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Abstract 
The two-dimensional (2D) Delaunay triangulation-based structure, i.e., Delaunay triangle, has been widely used 
in fingerprint authentication. However, we also notice the existence of three-dimensional (3D) Delaunay 
triangulation, which has not been extensively explored. Inspired by this, in this paper, the features of both 2D and 
3D Delaunay triangulation-based structures are investigated and the findings show that a 3D Delaunay 
structure, e.g., Delaunay tetrahedron, can provide more feature types and a larger number of elements than a 2D 
Delaunay structure, which was expected to provide a higher discriminative capability. However, higher 
discrimination does not necessarily lead to better performance, especially in biometric applications, when 
biometric uncertainty is unavoidable. Experimental results show that the biometric uncertainty such as missing 
or spurious minutiae causes more negative influence on the 3D Delaunay triangulation than that on the 2D 
Delaunay triangulation in three out of four experimental data sets. 
Keywords: Biometrics, Fingerprint, Delaunay triangulation, Delaunay tetrahedron 
INTRODUCTION 
In computer security, personal authentication properties are derived from knowledge, ownership of an object or 
some physical property of the self, commonly expressed as something you know (e.g., a password), something 
you have (e.g., a smart card) or something you are (e.g., a fingerprint).  It is the last of these properties that is of 
interest here.  Biometrics, derived from the Greek for life (βιο) and to measure (μετρικός) is especially attractive 
as the other methods of authentication tend to be less secure.  People choose poor passwords or misplace access 
cards.  Fortunately, people do not need to remember their fingerprint and cannot lose it (except under somewhat 
extreme circumstances). 
The fingerprint is a complex set of segments formed by ridges and valleys that are unique to each person. 
Fingerprint matching is a process used to classify and match the fingerprint based on a group of features that are 
extracted from fingerprint images and used during the comparison process to minimise the effects of biometric 
uncertainty or error. Biometric uncertainty, which is generated during the fingerprint image acquisition process 
by image distortion, translation, and rotation, is undesirable in fingerprint matching due to the fact that it can 
generate unreliable results as noted by Yang et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2017).  In other words, two 
fingerprint images never look exactly the same even if they are scanned one after another which can affect the 
reliability of the fingerprint extraction and comparison process. 
To mitigate the negative influence of biometric uncertainty, especially non-linear distortion, many local 
structures have been explored.  Examples include tree-based structures (Moayer and Fu, 1986), n-nearest 
minutiae based structures (Liu et al., 2011) and minutia-pair based structures (Ahmad et al., 2011).  From these 
examples, Delaunay triangulation has shown to be an effective structure which has been subsequently widely 
applied in fingerprint-based authentication systems, as it is able to provide some favorable local and global 
features (Yang et al., 2014). For example, in a Delaunay triangulation, each minutia will form a stable structure 
with its neighbors. Even if there is a certain degree of non-linear distortion, the local structure is still invariant. 
Moreover, missing or spurious minutiae only influence the local triangles that contain those missing or spurious 
minutiae, thus the error is localised. 
There is considerable literature using Delaunay triangulation to achieve promising matching performance and 
security. For instance, in Parziale and Niel (2004), a Delaunay triangulation net is formed by a set of minutia 
points. Several invariant features such as rotation and translation are extracted from each Delaunay triangle and 
utilised to conduct matching. In the method of Deng and Huo (2005), some edge pairs are considered as best-
matching pairs in a first round of matching. Then a second round is conducted, with matching based on global 
features and a matching score is computed under the guidance of the best-matching edge pairs obtained in the 
first round. In Yin et al. (2005), some similar minutiae pairs are chosen from both template and query fingerprint 
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images and considered as references for alignment. Then the aligned feature sets based on the references are 
used for fingerprint matching. There are other Delaunay triangulation-based fingerprint matching methods which 
can be found in Liang et al., (2006), Wang and Gavrilova (2006), Liang et al. (2007), Zhang and Yan (2007),  
Yang et al. (2012), Yang et al. (2014), and Yang et al. (2013). 
All of the abovementioned Delaunay triangulation-based methods use only the 2D pattern of a Delaunay 
triangulation (as shown in Figure 1.a). However, the 3D Delaunay Triangulation (as shown in Figure 1.b) also 
exists as shown by Maur (2002), but it has not been extensively explored, suggesting that it might be a fruitful 
avenue to traverse as a research challenge and solution for application to real-world problems, e.g., fingerprint 
matching. Each unit, e.g., tetrahedron (a tetrahedron is called a 3D triangle in this paper), of 3D Delaunay 
triangulation, would be expected to have better discriminative ability than a unit, e.g., Delaunay triangle, of a 2D 
Delaunay triangulation, as the former have more properties. A tetrahedron can provide more feature elements 
than a triangle. For example, a 3D triangle has six edges, whilst a Delaunay triangle has only three edges (Frey et 
al., 1998) as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. 
In this paper, the feature differences between 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulation-based structures are 
investigated. Also, through experiments, the effect of spurious and missing minutiae on both 2D and 3D 
Delaunay triangulation is studied, which lays a basis for further application of 3D Delaunay triangulation in 
fingerprint matching. 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of (a) a 2D Delaunay triangulation, and (b) a 3D Delaunay triangulation 
 
FEATURE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A 2D TRIANGLE AND A 3D TRIANGLE 
Definition of a 2D triangle and its features 
 
In mathematics, a triangle is defined as a three-sided polygon which has a sum of 180 degrees for all its internal 
angles, as shown in Figure 2. A triangle is the simplest form of a polygon and has been studied and applied in 
areas such as construction due to its strength and precision. Any triangle belongs to one of three types, 
Equilateral, Isosceles or Scalene. Specifically, the Equilateral triangle has three sides of equal length and three 
equal angles, the Isosceles triangle has two sides of equal length and two equal angles, and the Scalene has no 
equal sides of equal length and no equal angles. Trigonometry studies the relationship between angles and sides 
of these shapes and there are many features that can be extracted from them as listed in Table 1. 
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Figure 2. An example of a 2D triangle 
 
Table 1. Features that can be extracted from a 2D triangle 
Feature type Definition # Elements 
Edge A line connects two points, e.g., Eab 3 
Angle The curvature of a combination of two lines with a common endpoint, 
e.g., Aa  
3  
Radius of the 
inscribed circle 
A straight line from the centre of the inscribed circle to the 
circumference, e.g., R2 
1 
Radius of the 
circumscribed circle 
A straight line from the centre of the circumscribed circle to the 
circumference, e.g., R1 
1 
Altitude (Height) The length of a line segment through a vertex and perpendicular to the 
opposite edge, e.g., Hce 
3 
 
Definition of a 3D triangle and its features 
A 3D triangle defined in this paper is a tetrahedron as shown in Figure 3. It is formed by the four triangular faces 
which will form a group of four vertices and six edges. Table 2 shows features that can be extracted from a 3D 
triangle. 
 
A
B
D
C
O
  
Figure 3. An example of a 3D triangle 
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Table 2. Features that can be extracted from a 3D triangle 
Feature type Definition # Elements 
Edge As per a 2D triangle in Table 1 6 
Angle As per a 2D triangle in Table 1 12  
Radius of the 
inscribed circle 
As per a 2D triangle in Table 1 1 
Radius of the 
circumscribed 
circle 
As per a 2D triangle in Table 1 1 
Altitude (Height) 
of a face 
As per a 2D triangle in Table 1 12 
Faces A triangular shape, e.g. 
ABC  4 
Altitude (Height) The length of a line segment through a vertex and the perpendicular 
to a line containing the base shape, e.g., HDO 
4 
 
From a comparison of tables 1 and 2, it can be seen that a 3D triangle can provide more features than a 2D 
triangle, in terms of feature type and number of elements, which means the former may be able to provide higher 
discrimination and lead to potential better matching performance in a 3D triangle based fingerprint 
authentication system than a system that uses 2D triangles. 
EFFECT OF BIOMETRIC UNCERTAINTY IN 2D AND 3D DELAUNAY 
TRIANGULATION 
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how missing and spurious minutiae can affect the Delaunay 
triangulation, a well-known issue of fingerprint matching. The number of missing or spurious minutiae depends 
on the quality of the fingerprint image that is used during the minutiae extraction process and this factor will 
likely influence the matching performance.  
In experiments, the fingerprint image “1_1.tif” from the public database FVC2002 DB2 was chosen as the 
experimental subject and a set of minutiae Mp were extracted from it using the software Verifinger 4.0 SDK  
from Neurotechnology (Verfinger, 2010). A specific percentage of minutiae based on Mp are randomly removed 
or added to simulate biometric uncertainty. 
Effect of missing minutiae to 2D and 3D triangle Delaunay triangulations 
In this test, a certain number of points (10% and 20% of Mp) are randomly chosen and removed from the 
minutiae set Mp, the new minutiae sets are used to generate 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulations. Thus, four cases 
are generated: 
 
Case 1: 10% of points are removed from minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 2D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT2D-M10. 
 
Case 2: 20% of points are removed from minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 2D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT2D-M20. 
 
Case 3: 10% of points are removed from minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 3D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT3D-M10. 
 
Case 4: 20% of points are removed from minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 3D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT3D-M20. 
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The generated 2D Delaunay triangulations, e.g., DT2D-M10 and DT2D-M20, and 3D Delaunay triangulations, e.g., 
DT3D-M10 and DT3D-M20, in Cases 1 to 4, are shown in Figure 4, where the small yellow circles represent the 
points (10% of Mp) that are removed from the original set Mp and the green ones represent the points (20% of 
Mp) that are removed from the original set Mp. 
 
 
Figure 4. The generated 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulations in Cases 1 to 4 
 
Effect of spurious minutiae in 2D and 3D triangle Delaunay triangulations 
In this test, a certain number of points (10% and 20% of Mp) are randomly generated and added into the minutiae 
set Mp, the new minutia sets are used to generate 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulations. As before, there are four 
cases generated: 
 
Case 5: 10% of points are added into minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 2D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT2D-S10. 
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 Case 6: 20% of points are added into minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 2D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT2D-S20. 
 
Case 7: 10% of points are added into minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 3D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT3D-S10. 
 
Case 8: 20% of points are added into minutiae set Mp and the new minutia set is used to generate 3D 
Delaunay triangulation, DT3D-S20. 
 
The generated 2D Delaunay triangulations, e.g., DT2D-S10 and DT2D-S20, and 3D Delaunay triangulations, e.g., 
DT3D-S10 and DT3D-S20, in Cases 5 to 8, are shown in Figure 5, where the small yellow circles represent the points 
(10% of Mp) that are added into the original set Mp and the green ones represent the points (20% of Mp) that are 
added into the original set Mp. 
 
Figure 5. The generated 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulations in Cases 5 to 8 
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The effects of missing and spurious minutiae to 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulations are listed and compared in 
Table 3, from which it can be seen that when 10% of total minutiae are missing, compared with original number 
of units, 10.81% is reduced in 2D triangulation, while 13.37% is reduced in 3D triangulation, which means that 
missing minutiae have more negative influence on 3D triangulation than that on 2D triangulation. However, a 
contrary result is reported when 20% is missing. In the cases of spurious minutiae, it can be seen that spurious 
minutiae create more negative influence on 3D Delaunay triangulation with 11.05% and 24.42% of original 
number of units is increased (compared with only 10.81% and 21.62% in 2D Delaunay triangulation), when 10% 
and 20% spurious minutiae are added, respectively. 
 
Table 3- Comparison between 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulation under biometric uncertainty 
Structure 
type 
Units created 
with minutiae 
set Mp 
Units created with 
10% points missing 
from Mp 
Units created with 
20% points missing 
from Mp 
Units created with 
10% points added 
into Mp 
Units created with 
20% points added 
into Mp 
2D 
triangles 
74  
100% 
66  
89.19% 
(-10.81%) 
57  
72.03% 
(-27.97%) 
82  
110.81% 
(+10.81%) 
90  
121.62% 
(+21.62%) 
3D 
triangles 
172  
100% 
149  
86.63% 
(-13.37%) 
133  
77.33% 
(-22.67%) 
191 3D triangles 
111.05% 
(+11.05%) 
214  
124.42% 
(+24.42%) 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper the feature differences between 2D and 3D Delaunay triangulation-based structures are investigated 
and it is demonstrated that a 3D triangle has more feature types and a larger number of elements, thus it may 
possess higher discriminative ability than a 2D triangle. However, the use of 3D Delaunay triangulation does not 
mean absolute better matching performance, especially under the presence of biometric uncertainty, e.g., missing 
or spurious minutiae. Biometric uncertainty is simulated by randomly adding or removing points from a 
generated minutiae set.  The experimental results show that 3D Delaunay triangulation is more sensitive to the 
missing and spurious minutiae than a 2D Delaunay triangulation in three cases out of four. In future research, to 
explore and potentially reduce the negative influence of biometric uncertainty on the 3D Delaunay triangulation 
is needed. 
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Abstract  
This paper presents an analysis that arose from a comprehensive review of the academic and professional 
literature of two areas – information security management systems (ISMS) and information resources – and 
their relationship with information security. It analyzes the role of ISMS in protecting an organization’s 
information environment and infrastructure. It has identified four key areas that strongly influence the safety of 
information resources: cloud computing; social media/networking; mobility; and information management/big 
data. Commonly referred to as ‘new forces’, these four aspects are all growing exponentially and are not easily 
controlled by IT. Another key finding of the paper is that organizations aiming to protect their information 
resources need to adapt their ISMS in an environment where these new forces have exposed them to a range of 
external entities and influences. 
 Keywords:  accountability, cloud computing, service provision, information security, information resources  
INTRODUCTION 
Gartner identified a range of emerging technologies that strongly influence information resources, which have 
been referred to as ‘new forces’ (Gartner 2013). These new forces – cloud computing, social 
media/networking, mobility, and information management/big data – cannot be controlled by IT groups 
(internal or external) and have been predicted as a high priority for IT spending in the next decade (Smith 
2013). They are all growing at a fast pace (Gartner 2013), and the traditional controls (firewalls, malware 
detection, etc.) that IT groups have used to protect an organization’s information resources are generally 
unable to cope with their rapid evolution on a daily basis (Crompton 2015). The following are examples of 
how these new forces are impacting on the frameworks that IT groups have installed to protect organizations’ 
information resources: 
 Cloud computing: The new service delivery styles and options offered by the cloud computing trend 
shift responsibility for security to external providers, where IT groups retain only partial 
responsibility for security and service delivery (Scholtz 2013).  
 Social media/networking: This is creating different, more extensive aspects of collaboration, and 
there has been a change in users’ behavior and in the communities in which they work (Kim 2012). 
Again, this technology has opened up the organization’s information resources to external influences. 
 Mobility: A wide range of new access has been directed at different applications and data, and end 
users have been offered a broad variety of device options (Markelj & Bernik 2012) – the 
heterogeneity of location and device.  
 Information management/big data: This has altered the relationship of technology to information 
consumption, as the data now flows from different federated sources in either structured or 
unstructured forms (Marchand 1985). This revealed data is analyzed using new methodologies 
foreign to various IT groups (Gartner 2013).  
These examples show that these new forces have exposed organizations’ information resources to a wide 
range of external entities and influences, which has significant implications for the design, management and 
use of the organization’s information security management systems (ISMS). IT groups need to respond to this 
exposure by considering the information security aspects against access and exchange of information. This 
proves challenging as they also need to continue to meet the individual’s expectations – those that are now 
more knowledgeable about the use of technology and are clearly requiring the capabilities these new forces are 
providing. The existence of the new forces encourages and demands IT groups to work toward reformation of 
their information security practices. 
This paper presents a conceptual framework for understanding the impact of the emergence of these new 
forces on ISMS. According to Von Solms (2005)), ISMS are the processes and procedures used within an 
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organization to secure the information environment through information security, operational management and 
information security compliance management. A perfect ISMS is a complete and systematic management 
system that involves “management of humans, processes, and technologies” (Suhaimi, Goto & Cheng 2013, p. 
31), in order to establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and optimize security to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.  
In summary, the main motivation of this paper is to provide an in-depth understanding of the conceptual 
factors that comprise ISMS when used in the context of organizations’ information security and information 
resources, to ensure their commitment to the security of business practices and compliance to address the rapid 
growth of the new forces (Siponen & Willison 2009). 
BACKGROUND 
There are two key concepts which need to be examined in the context of this paper: (1) ISMS; and (2) the 
concept of information resources.  
Information security management systems (ISMS) 
Hong et al. (2003) defined ISMS as technical methods, along with managerial processes, practically applied to 
information resources such as hardware, software and data, to ensure that organizational assets and personal 
privacy are protected. Research on ISMS has produced a considerable amount of definitions, embodying the 
different spheres of ISMS research. Both academics and practitioners have differing views and interpretations 
of the ISMS concept. For example, Eloff and Eloff (2003) argued that an ISMS can be defined as a 
management system employed to secure an information environment within an organization, with a good 
establishment and maintenance process and procedure to manage information technology security. The 
management and execution of ISMS requires some necessary actions: (1) identify the information security 
requirements; (2) ensure the right strategies are in place to meet these requirements; (3) verify the continuous 
evaluation and measurement of achieved objectives/results; and (4) ensure the compatibility and usability of 
both protection strategies and the ISMS by reviewing and improving them over time (Yeniman Yildirim et al. 
2011).  
Based on the above varying definitions of ISMS, it is clear that ISMS entails a number of components that 
form the information environment within an organization: (1) information system technology resources 
(hardware); (2) information system human resources (IT skilled people); (3) information system software 
resources (software); and (4) information system data resources (data). In this context, this study has used the 
ISMS definition offered by Hong et al. (2003)), because it covers the most important aspects of technology 
used in any organization, and is considered the most valuable asset to an organization in today’s world.  
Information resources 
Information resources comprise hardware, software, data and IT human resources in an organization, and 
represent the main source for information (Bharadwaj 2000). The effective use of information resources is 
often a key indicator of an organization’s ability to achieve a high level of information security and 
organizational privacy; although such a high investment in IT can also be a key indicator of failure, if not 
properly adjusted and controlled (Nolan 1994).  
What is the relationship between information resources and ISMS? 
Most organizations today are heavily dependent on the use of IT and information resources – the foundation of 
an organization, representing a key element of its growth and survival (Bharadwaj 2000).  
Thus, there are escalating organizational concerns about information security including privacy and protection, 
risk management, and the management of information resources, which is ever-increasing. A proper solution 
therefore needs to be implemented to secure information resources. Some information resources are sensitive; 
meaning that a cost-optimal solution for secure access to information located across different servers or 
databases is needed, along with guidelines to ensure that the security and privacy of sensitive, unclassified 
information is not leaked. A combination of the latest technologies and strong human IT skills would 
strengthen organizational capability to safeguard information. Similarly, successful organizations should use 
technology and human IT skills to ensure the protection of organizational information resources and personal 
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privacy. ISMS is commonly considered a socio-technical system that encourages a combination of both 
technical and human elements (Siponen & Willison 2009). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A systematic literature review of ISMS, information resources, the new forces and their relationship with an 
organization’s information security was conducted using an adapted version of the methodology of Okoli and 
Schabram (2010). The key steps in the methodology are: 
1. Purpose of the Review – As described in the introduction of this paper 
2. Protocol and Training – As only one reviewer was used, training did not have to be done and the 
protocol focused on the intersection between the four new forces and ISMS. 
3. Searching for the Literature  - via two sources: (1) papers published in academic and professional 
literature; and (2) industrial reports published by well-known organizations such as Gartner, 
Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, and Business News Daily. When accessing the literature, the following 
keywords were used to search IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, the ACM Digital Library, ProQuest, and 
Google Scholar: cloud computing; cloud computing security; information security; ISMS; 
information systems; information resources; vulnerability; risk assessment and risk management; 
threats and information security breaches; auditability and trust; confidence; social 
media/networking; information security for cloud computing; information systems security; 
information technology security; information security management; cyber security; information 
resources; the new forces of information resources; information assurance; and information security 
practices and standards. The preliminary results were sourced from 500+ scholarly articles, industry 
standards and technical reports; 
4. Practical Screen and Quality Appraisal – A review of the abstracts eliminated many of these papers 
and those remaining were then appraised as to their relevance to the purpose of the review. In total, 
over 350 papers were eliminated, leaving 150 papers were left remaining as suited to the literature 
review. 
5. Data Extraction – The remaining papers were then examined thoroughly and relevant data was 
extracted. 
6. Synthesis of Studies – A thematic analysis was performed based on the extracted data. 
7. Writing the review – a summarized form of the review is presented in this paper. 
 CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEW FORCES  
The main outcomes of this review were that the scope of information resources has changed dramatically and 
is not really limited to one single source. That is extensive exchange of data across the Internet between 
different organizations has become common practice; it is not a choice anymore, but rather a mandatory task, 
an organization is forced to undertake. Such data exchange is represented by a variety of ways/media, made up 
of cloud computing, mobility, social media/networking, and information management/big data. These are a 
group of new technologies which are strongly interacting with information resources, which is why they are 
referred to as the ‘new technology forces’ or ‘new forces’.  
This review also revealed that traditional IT security methods are often unable to cope with information 
security issues that arise from the new forces of technology. ISMS can and needs to be frequently adjusted to 
deal with the evolving information security aspects revealed across the various information resources 
including cloud computing, mobility, social media/networking, and big data.  
In addition, there are some internal characteristics that are likely to influence to what extent organizations 
apply ISMS, such as the business model, data holdings, technologies and applications, and the privacy risks 
they may raise for clients. For example, organizations managing highly sensitive data would need to 
implement the largest amount of ISMS components. Thus, each organization needs to customize its ISMS to 
accommodate the new forces. 
Due to this vast and sophisticated technology (Prensky 2011), information resources are rapidly growing 
(Webster 2014). The scope of information resources (Kazan et al. 2012) has dramatically shifted from internal 
to external management (Lawrence et al. 2013), including the exchange of information Lacity and Hirschheim 
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(1993). Such changes are driven by different aspects of technology, based on the new forces – cloud 
computing (Xu 2012), social media/networking (Kim 2012), mobility (Tokuyoshi 2013), and information 
management/big data – which are all growing strongly and are not easily controlled by IT (Smith 2013). The 
organizational approach towards ISMS is therefore transforming, based on the new requirements of these new 
forces (Scholtz 2013). Figure 1 below presents a conceptual framework arising from the analysis that shows 
the overall interactions between the four new forces , information resources and ISMS. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of the interaction of the New Forces with ISMS and Information Resources 
Social media/networking 
Social media/networking is the emergence of a new paradigm on the internet which allows communication 
and collaboration between online users and family, friends, social groups and other communities via social 
media channels and tools including Twitter, Facebook, MySpace and YouTube (Kim 2012).  
Founded on the above definition, social media networks are considered one of the most influential factors for 
information resources (Xiang & Gretzel 2010), as a lot of information is gathered and exchanged (Kaplan & 
Haenlein 2010) among different internet users. Today, online communications via social networking 
applications is growing strongly and is used both personally and professionally (Jansen et al. 2009). Millions 
of users (Ellison 2007) are being attracted by social network sites (SNSs) such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube. These social media networks are receiving considerable attention from today’s business 
executives, decision-makers and leaders, who are trying to introduce new ways of increasing their profits 
(Xiang & Gretzel 2010) by using social media applications such as Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, Second 
Life, and Twitter, which means lots of information (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010) is going to be exchanged and 
transferred.  
The social networking sites (SNSs) are being integrated with user’s daily practices (Hathi 2009) through 
mobile connectivity, blogging, photo sharing and video sharing as new communication tools (Ellison 2007). 
This indicates  that the of sensitive information will be transferred and exchanged with different interests (Kim 
2012). For example, Facebook (Edosomwan et al. 2011) is one of the most popular and strongest growing web 
applications in social networking services, where more than 500 million users all over the world use it either 
for work (Duggan & Brenner 2013) or pleasure, like playing games (Foster, Francescucci & West 2010). The 
emergence of social media and online social networking applications created real revolution to the working 
environment (Sturdevant 2011) in large enterprises. For example, IBM reported that (Hathi 2009) more than 
40% of their employees preferred to work from customer location or home rather than attending IBM 
premises. Similarly, Cisco (Cisco 2010) reported that over 60% of their employees believe that productivity 
no longer means to work from the office, but rather productivity depends on knowledge and the ability to 
share that knowledge. Thus, lots of enterprises allow their employees to access online social networking sites; 
however this brought many security breaches to business and organisations (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010). For 
example, the usernames and passwords of Facebook and MySpace being sold to underground networks where 
sensitive information was stolen by cybercriminals (Shulman 2010), meanwhile their accounts were being 
hijacked (Kim 2012) and the stolen accounts used by hackers for phishing scams (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010).  
Therefore, information security is a new and increasing challenge in the field of cyber security brought along 
by the use of social networks and the integration of ISMS within organisation to closely and properly monitor 
the use of different aspects of social media became a mandatory practice to eliminate the breach of 
information that would occur through this new rapidly-growing force.(Edosomwan et al. 2011). 
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Mobility 
The use of mobile devices such as laptops, smartphones and PDAs to access data has become far more 
frequent in recent times (Markelj & Bernik, 2012). This increase in the use of mobility raises questions about 
corporate data security and privacy (Miller, Voas & Hurlburt 2012), which should not be exposed or 
compromised (Rose 2013). The future of cyber risk prevention is an area that needs to be urgently addressed 
by researchers, technology experts and policymakers (Kenny 2014). Most mobile device users are not 
proactive in dealing with information stored in their mobile by taking proper protection actions (Tokuyoshi 
2013). Therefore, losing the mobile device could result in exposure of sensitive information, which is 
sometimes much more important and valuable than the mobile itself (Markelj & Bernik 2012). Thus, 
corporations’ information security policies and risk management procedures and should be constantly 
reviewed and upgraded (Markelj & Bernik 2012). 
There are many studies (Escherich 2014; Miller, Voas & Hurlburt 2012; Morrow 2012; Rose 2013; Tokuyoshi 
2013) that have focused on mobility, especially the use of mobile devices in the workplace. According to a 
recent survey conducted by Gartner Inc. in 2013 which measured the use of personal devices for business use, 
or bring your own devices (BYODs) (Escherich 2014), almost one-quarter acknowledged they had 
experienced a security issue with their private device; yet only 27% of those users who contributed to the 
survey reported the issue to their employer. In summary, it would appear that mobility raises many problems 
for an organization’s ISMS, and most will need to accelerate an introduction of “the right mix of mobile 
security defences to balance protection, governance and user flexibility” (Escherich 2014, p. 1).  
Information management/big data  
Information management in a business and organizational context means a collection of data from different 
departments, made ready for processing, with decisions made at the higher levels of the organization – mostly 
strategic rather than tactical – and external information becoming more relevant than information sourced 
internally (Marchand 1985). Information management is now considered a critical resource to ensure privacy 
(Bélanger & Crossler 2011) due to the advanced use of IT and information systems like intranets (Curry & 
Stancich 2000).  
Dhillon (1999)) contended that one of the main issues in regards to current information management is 
information security – that is, the protection of information assets of the body corporate, due to the massive 
use of IT and growth dependent on electronic network resources.  
In the past five years, the media/entertainment industry has shifted to digital recording, production and 
delivery, and as a result large amounts of rich content including user viewing behaviors are collected. 
Furthermore, significant amounts of data are now collected within the transportation, logistics, retail, utilities 
and telecommunications sectors via various media/technology such as GPS transceivers, RFID tag readers, 
smart meters and cell phones; call data records CDRs and all collected data are used to optimize operations 
and drive operational business intelligence (BI) to realize immediate business opportunities (Kaisler et al. 
2013). 
This literature review indicates that a huge amount of organizational information is being shared among users 
and organizations, within the provision of information management. Thus, the security of information 
management is deemed one of the key factors for measuring the quality of service by organizations or service 
providers. The implementation of ISMS would eliminate many of these information management security 
issues.  
Cloud computing 
Cloud computing relates to the use of online computing services, and is considered an on-demand IT service 
or product based on a business model. This is where users can access software and hardware via cloud 
services including SaaS, Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), which are 
managed remotely by third parties (Sreenivas et al. 2013). It can therefore be perceived as significantly 
opening an organization’s information resources to the external world. 
Cloud computing has expanded into one of the fastest-growing portions of the IT industry (Chung & Chun 
2014), and has become a promising business concept where a huge amount of information for both individuals 
and enterprises is now placed. However, transformation of data distribution and storage in the cloud has 
generated a real concern towards data privacy and data protection, and a rise in questioning about how safe the 
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cloud environment is. Such questioning should be considered by organizations before making the decision to 
deploy their business into the cloud (Subashini & Kavitha 2011).  
Securing information that has been transferred to the cloud is a critical issue for the success of information 
systems, communications and information security (Zissis & Lekkas 2012). As can be seen, there is a clear 
need for organizations to adapt ISMS to this new, fast-growing force. 
ADAPTING ISMS TO THE NEW FORCES 
The new forces – mobility, social media/networking, cloud computing, and information management/big data 
– are rapidly changing the information resources of organizations. Consequently, the ISMS with its core 
mission of protecting the information resources of the organization must adapt. In particular, increased 
external openness of information resources must be considered when adapting an organization’s ISMS to these 
new forces. The following section details the adaptions that were identified from the literature analysis to 
allow organizations to adapt their ISMS to the impacts of the four new forces. Of course, this analysis is 
limited to adaptions that have already been identified in the existing literature in this area. 
Organizations need to move from applying traditional information security controls such as firewalls and 
malware detection, and pay more attention to users behavior or internal staff that are using their own devices. 
This is achievable by ensuring a solid and acceptable change in the security infrastructure, design and 
implementation of controls to minimize preventative measures and balance the use of policies, controls, rights 
and responsibilities. Such balance would maximize human potential by increasing trust and independent 
decision-making (Scholtz 2013).     
One way that organizations need to adapt is by moving from static to dynamic defences. Gartner (2013) has 
predicted that one of the likely scenarios of the information security changes caused by these new forces is 
that by 2020 the allocated budget of enterprise information security will rise to 60%, up from less than 10% in 
2013, for rapid detection and response approaches. 
Another key adaption is the development of ISMS policy that allows for these new forces. For example, in 
terms of mobility, it has been recognized that “security policies are still incomplete in many organizations, and 
contain gaps and other inconsistencies that don't measure up to business obligations” (Escherich 2014, p. 1). 
Such policy gaps need to be addressed.  
Another significant adaption aspect is the strategic consideration of the new forces. First, how they will impact 
on the potential for interruption/disruption to IT within the business, including evaluating the risk associated 
with enterprise information security. Second, the organization needs to strategically determine the required 
investment in ISMS when adopting the new forces, and how much needs to be allocated to adapt it to an 
acceptable level of risk. 
In addition, it should also be highlighted that these new forces are not a comprehensive list of every 
technology that is ready for adoption or incorporation into the strategic planning process. Enterprises should 
use them as a starting point and customize them based on their industry, unique business needs, technology 
adoption model, and which category their business is classified, and then customize their ISMS accordingly. 
Table 1 summarises the impacts of the new forces on Information Resources and ISMS 
New Force Impact on Information Resources Impact on ISMS 
Social Media/Networking 
 Significantly increased 
information is gathered and 
exchanged  
 Interaction between personal 
and professional data and 
integration with user’s daily 
practices 
 Use of social media as a 
business tool 
 Many security breaches to 
business and 
organisations due to the 
extensive use of 
information brought along 
by the use of social 
networks (Edosomwan et 
al. 2011). 
Mobility 
 Increased usage and generation 
of information due to the very 
rapid uptake of mobile 
technology 
 The rapid advancement in 
 Increased vectors for 
cyber attack, including 
much easier physical loss 
and theft 
 The addition of personal 
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functionality of mobiles is also 
causing increased information 
resources 
devices to the business 
environment due to 
BYOD 
 Poor security practices in 
many mobile devices 
Information 
Management/Big Data 
 The control of information 
physically became more 
complex. 
 The uncoordinated and 
fragmented nature of much big 
data 
 The need for much better 
understanding of the 
information resources to allow 
knowledge management and 
machine learning 
 Privacy becoming a much 
more important issue 
 Coping with information 
overload 
Cloud Computing 
 Made storage of information 
resources much more 
affordable and manageable 
 Management of the 3rd 
party outsourcing 
relationship with regards 
to the ISMS 
 Ensuring compatibility 
with external ISMS 
Table 1 Impact of New Forces on Information Resources and ISMS 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This study has conducted an extensive analysis of literature relating to ISMS, including the various aspects of 
information resources for information security to develop a model of how the new forces influence an 
organization’s ISMS. It has been recommended here that organizations adapt their ISMS to accommodate the 
changes these new forces have on information resources, with a number of suggestions made on how the 
ISMS should be adapted; although this is far from exhaustive. This research is part of an ongoing research 
program in this area.  
This study is expected to have several important implications for practitioners and researchers. The findings 
will likely contribute to the growing awareness of the importance of the proper implementation of ISMS; 
resulting in a better understanding of the importance of information security factors that motivate 
policymakers to adopt ISMS projects prior to, during and after their implementation. It will also assist 
information security decision-makers to evaluate what has happened and why in terms of any security issues. 
This study also provides a holistic and heuristic ISMS framework that enables a theoretical-based description 
and analysis of the gap that exists between the ideal and the actuality of the institutional and technical 
environments of ISMS implementation in regards to the protection of information resources.  
 
Finally, this study is expected to contribute to the body of knowledge of information systems and information 
security as part of the development of new theory. It provides a practical contribution, where new insights for 
ISMS implementers and investors will help improve their services. Developing this model will be achieved by 
conducting a series of case studies to examine the real-life experiences of organizations in ensuring 
information security when adopting ISMS, including analyzing the four conceptual factors that underlie the 
new forces.  
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Abstract 
This paper proposes 9 core elements of information security accountability in the area of cloud computing. The 
core elements were determined via a series of 18 case studies with Omani government organisations that were 
actively using and/or providing cloud computing. 36 interviews were conducted and then analysed using a 
grounded theory methodology As a result of the analysis, responsibility, transparency, assurance, remediation, 
accountability support environment, flexible change process, collaboration, mechanisms and commitment to 
external criteria. The research also found that the emphasis on specific core elements is context-dependent and 
that there was considerable variation in emphasis amongst the case study organisations. 
Keywords: Accountability, Cloud Computing, Information Security, Case Study, Grounded Theory 
INTRODUCTION  
Cloud computing is growing at a dramatic rate (Weins 2017). Such rapid growth over the past decade, combined 
with the changes cloud computing can cause in the structure and operations of an organisation means 
information security needs to be more closely examined. Accountability is a core concern for information 
security in cloud computing, representing most importantly the trust in service relationships between clients and 
cloud service providers (CSPs). Without evidence of accountability, there will be a lack of trust and confidence 
in cloud computing by decision makers and it will be considered as an added level of risk, since a client’s 
essential services will be controlled and managed by a third party. The combination of the two factors of 
significantly increased usage of cloud computing in the last decade and that this involves an outsourcing 
arrangement raises the need for improved understanding by organisations of many aspects of the cloud 
computing relationship. Accountability in information security is an important aspect that needs to be examined 
in a serious manner. Research in this area of information security for the cloud  has also been largely technical in 
nature and management issues such as accountability have not been examined extensively. 
When information security accountability is not present, a lack of trust and confidence in cloud computing often 
develops among business management (Ko et al. 2011; Muppala, Shukla & Patil 2012; Pearson 2013; Rashidi & 
Movahhedinia 2012), which is then considered an added level of risk (Cayirci 2013; Gellman 2012; Guitart et al. 
2013; Morin, Aubert & Gateau 2012; Rajani, Nagasindhu & Saikrishna 2013). Cloud outsourcing renders the 
process of maintaining data security and privacy, supporting data and service availability, and demonstrating 
compliance far less transparent (Rajani, Nagasindhu & Saikrishna 2013).  
This paper presents a model of the core conceptual elements that determine information security accountability 
in cloud computing – a primary concern that represents the trust in service relationships between clients and 
cloud service providers (CSPs) (Pearson & Wainwright 2013). 
BACKGROUND 
Past research on cloud computing accountability has produced various definitions, embodying different spheres 
of accountability research. There is a wide variety of views of accountability among academics and practitioners. 
Accountability in computer science has been referred to as a limited and imprecise requirement met by reporting 
and auditing mechanisms (Cederquist et al. 2005; Pearson 2011). Yao et al. (2010) considered accountability the 
way of making the system accountable and trustworthy via the combination of mechanisms. Muppala, Shukla 
and Patil (2012) defined accountability as accepting ownership and responsibility towards all actions in a 
standardized manner, regulated by an acknowledged organisation such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) which published privacy guidelines in 1980. In addition, Rush (2010) 
defined accountability as the reporting and auditing mechanisms that obligate an organisation to be answerable 
for its actions.  
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Ko et al. (2011) considered accountability only one component of trust in cloud computing; the others are 
security mechanisms (e.g. encryption), privacy (protection of confidential data), and auditability. Similarly, the 
Galway project on privacy regulators and professionals defined accountability as the safeguarding of personal 
information, acting as a responsible steward and taking responsibility for protecting, managing and appropriately 
using that information beyond legal requirements, including being held accountable for any misuse (The Centre 
for Information Policy Leadership 2009). 
The Centre for Information Policy Leadership (2011) also identified accountability in relation to privacy as “the 
acceptance of responsibility for personal information protection. An accountable organisation must have in place 
appropriate policies and procedures that promote good practices which, taken as a whole, constitute a privacy 
management program. The outcome is a demonstrable capacity to comply, at a minimum, with applicable 
privacy laws. Done properly, it should promote trust and confidence on the part of consumers, and thereby 
enhance competitive and reputational advantages for organisations” (The Centre for Information Policy 
Leadership 2011, p. 1).  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research builds on earlier work (Al-Rashdi, Dick & Storey 2015), that detailed a comprehensive review of 
accountability in relation to cloud computing, via two primary literature sources: academic and professional 
literature; and industrial reports published by high-profile organisations (e.g. Gartner and Microsoft). More than 
450 articles, standards and reports were examined, with the literature revealing four core, interrelated elements 
of accountability: transparency; responsibility; assurance; and remediation. Accountability is not a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach, as each organisation has separate needs, such as those with highly sensitive data.  
That research was extended using an interpretive qualitative case study approach. This approach was chosen 
based on the maturity of this research area, as it was felt that a qualitative approach could be used here to obtain 
an in-depth understanding or ‘very rich’ picture of information security accountability in cloud computing – a 
phenomenon common to the qualitative approach (Kvale 1989). Grounded Theory was the chosen research 
methodology with case studies used for data collection (Eisenhardt 1989). It should be noted that the extended 
research was carried out independently from the initial research and that only after both research projects had 
been completed were comparisons of the results made. 
This study was conducted via 18 case studies within Omani government organisations that both use and provide 
cloud computing. 36 staff (senior and middle managers, information security specialists, regulators, and cloud 
service providers) with over two years of experience in cloud computing were interviewed via open-ended 
questions. The interviews were conducted during official working hours in the interviewee’s offices, with each 
session lasting about an hour and half. Over 120,000 words were obtained, with all interview transcripts 
analysed via an inductive and interpretivist qualitative approach. The specific approach was a Grounded Theory 
(Strauss & Corbin 1998) methodology that was based on Eisenhardt’s approach (Eisenhardt 1989) to using 
Grounded Theory in case studies. This is a highly accepted variant in the area of grounded theory with over 
43,000 citations to the relevant paper on Google Scholar. It adapts grounded theory by focusing specifically on 
case studies and by also incorporating theory in a compatible way. Analysis was conducted using standard 
grounded theory methods such as open coding, axial coding and constant comparison. This analysis then led to 
the coding that has been formalised and presented in this paper. NVivo 11 software (QSR_International 2016) 
was used as the tool for coding the themes that arose. 
CORE ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION SECURITY ACCOUNTABILITY  
The goal of this research was to understand what an organisation needs to do to achieve information security 
accountability in a cloud computing context. It should be noted that this is different from achieving information 
security, as an organisation considered accountable for information security may still have corresponding 
breaches. Indeed some aspects of information security accountability such as remediation may never come into 
play if such a breach does not occur.  
In order to determine if an organisation is accountable for its information security, the first step is to determine 
and define the core elements of information security accountability. Previous research (Al-Rashdi, Dick & 
Storey 2015) used literature analysis to determine the following four core elements of information security 
accountability – Assurance, Remediation, Responsibility, and Transparency. The case study research undertaken 
here, independently found that these four elements were considered by respondents to be core elements in 
achieving information security accountability. The four elements are defined as follows: 
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 Assurance - a well-founded belief that all relevant actors are complying with governance and ethical 
measurements, and promoting the implementation of practical mechanisms that support them (The 
Centre for Information Policy Leadership 2010). 
 Remediation - “the method by which an organisation provides remedies for those whose privacy has 
been put at risk” (The Centre for Information Policy Leadership 2010, p. 1). 
 Responsibility - the acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility by relevant actors  that they 
have introduced or have in place appropriate policies and procedures (Ko, Lee & Pearson 2011). 
 Transparency – the availability and provision of relevant information in a clear and timely manner to 
the relevant actors (Pearson & Charlesworth 2009). 
Figure1 shows the nine core elements and any sub-elements that make up the element. This model arose out of 
the analysis of the data collected in the 18 case studies. 
 
 
Figure 1: The core elements of information security accountability 
 
As the four core elements of responsibility, transparency, assurance and remediation have been documented 
individually in the related literature and brought out and described in our earlier work (Al-Rashdi, Dick & Storey 
2015) the following sections provide further detail on each of the five new core elements and their sub-elements.  
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Accountability Support Environment 
An Accountability Support Environment in the context of cloud computing is the level of support provided by 
the organisation in regards to the implementation of accountability and that by providing an environment which 
supports accounrtability, that the overall level of accountability is increased. The study found that there were two 
main sub-elements that influenced the level of support of accountability.  
 Executive engagment is how direct the engagement and follow-up by executives in the development of 
information security policies. “The executive oversight shows a high level of engagement towards 
reviewing and re-issuing the implemented policies to match the national or international accepted 
criteria and country law. This boosts our effort, of information security towards accountability ….” 
Respondents emphasized that fulfilling all of these aspects of compliance, engagement in developing 
the processes and procedures, and regularly reviewing those policies enhances confidence between 
CSPs and clients. More confidence then leads to better accountability and minimizes risks. 
 Documentation is all processes and procedures in information security as a reference for future work, 
which provides evidence of accountability. A failure to provide documentation leads to significantly 
reduced accountability according to respondents  “It is vital to document all processes and procedures 
in information security as a reference for future work, which also provides evidence of accountability. 
Such documentation should keep an up-to-date record of all information security aspects implemented 
in organizations, with a proper means of implemented solution..”. 
Flexible Change Process 
The respondents were clearly of the opinion that the change process in the context of accountability for cloud 
computing requires flexibility in relation to altering ICT policies, plans, processes and procedures. The case 
studies show that the Information Technology Authority supervises the adoption and use of cloud computing by 
Omani government organisations, but it has worked with them 
“I can say this terms and conditions applied to change in process, plans and Information 
Technology Authority policies in the negotiation face within government clients. So overall, that is 
all based on the outcome revealed from the continued risk assessment used on the customer's site.” 
Many respondents emphasized that although ITA policies are comprehensive, plans still need to be tailored to fit 
specific business needs. Similarly, they pointed out that process changes offered by ITA can allow clients to 
integrate new protocols that are not addressed by existing ITA policy, e.g. one ministry needing to include 
health-related security policies into their information security arrangements. An inflexible change policy was 
considered to not allow organisations to be properly accountable to all their requirements. 
A flexible change policy is not without its associated challenges. A typical comment was “From my 
experience, there would be some challenges, maybe because of the flexibility in the change process, and 
there is always conflict between flexibility and security efficiency." 
Collaboration 
The third new core element uncovered by the analysis was Collaboration. In the context of accountability for 
information security in the cloud this is primarily about cooperation between the CSP and the organisation. 
Collaboration ensures that every one of the partners are responsible for their actions and held accountable 
breaches of regulations. Everything will be transparent and instantly hold a discussion about the non-compliance 
or breached policies and figure out how to overtake the issue immediately and in cooperation with the client. 
This ensures the client that the CSP is doing what has been agreed too in the contractual part or assigned SLA. A 
secondary level of collaboration to achieve accountability is between the organisation and two other entities: 
regulators and data subjects/and data subjects/individuals.  
“Compliance and collaboration processes between individuals, business partners and regulators 
are touching the surface of accountability. In fact, this is part of the selection process that ITA, G-
Cloud division is following to filter the government entity according to the list of criteria and 
standards (local and international) along with applicable law are part of this process.” 
By enhancing collaboration, respondents felt that achieving accountability was noticeably easier than situations 
where collaboration was minimal or non-existent asit built trust between the business partners. 
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Mechanisms 
Mechanisms in the context of information security accountability for cloud computing is the way that cloud 
service providers assured the clients on how SLA terms and conditions executed in the real world. The assurance 
on how do the clients trace any breach or non-compliance aspects by ITA as Government Service Provider in 
Oman. A list of mechanisms has to be established by the organisation and performed in a way that ensures the 
information security policies and privacy effectively practised and appropriately implemented. The mechanisms 
might include tools, training and education. The recommended tools might be used to facilitate decision making 
about appropriate data use and protection, whereas training along with education sessions can be used to identify 
how to use those tools, and processes. An example of the type of mechanism that needs to be implemented to 
achieve information security accountability was described by one of the respondents 
“We do provide the customers with shared service portal. It is a dashboard of the statistics of 
basically the SLAs and the business process. So it gives the customer that kind of credibility, it 
tells you very transparently if your SLA and information security policies are right or not. All staff 
involved in collecting and managing the personal and migrated data is mandatory to commence in 
training and education session about the use of the portal.” 
A failure to put these mechanisms in place undermines information security accountability in the cloud 
computing context. 
Commitment to External Criteria 
Commitment to External Criteria in the context of information security accountability for cloud computing is a 
willingness and capacity to adopt and use organisation-external policies and practices. Such external criteria 
include local policies (e.g. ITA policies in Oman), industry standards and best practices (e.g. ISO27001, ITIL, 
CCSK, HIPAA etc. ) and government law and regulation (e.g. Oman Electronic Government Architecture 
Framework (OeGAF) Standard, E-transaction law, privacy law etc.). In the context of information security, 
failure to commit to these standards indicates a lack of knowledge of the complexity of information security and 
the inability of any one organisation to be able to deal with the wide and varied threats in the area. As one 
respondent indicated: 
“organisations must implement policies connected to appropriate external criteria that can be 
found in the country law, or industry best practices to protect the information migrated to cloud  
and privacy of individuals and business partners.” 
An organisation that does not adopt and use these external criteria as a reference point is not seen by the 
respondents as being accountable for information security. Compliance with these external criteria was 
seen as very important - "We are not tolerant with vendors/suppliers and individual users for non-
compliance." 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 
Achieving information security accountability is a complex task for any organisation. The first step is to 
understand what are the elements that make up information security accountability. It is important to realize that 
though there are nine elements, the level at which any specific element needs to be driven to is highly context 
dependent. A level of transparency for one organisation that provides an acceptable level of accountability, may 
be totally inadequate for another organisation.  
It should be noted that the types of organisation that were in the case studies have many similarities. They are all 
Omani government departments with a high need for data security to protect highly sensitive government data, 
large complex business processes, and significant infrastructure. This will to some extent hide the requirements 
for variation in the level of emphasis on specific elements of information security accountability that a more 
diverse set of case studies might have discovered. But even within this set of case studies, the elements have 
significant variation. As an example, some of the case studies use private cloud to ensure accountability due to 
the nature of their requirements, others are able to use private cloud providers while others are satisfied with the 
government cloud provider. 
Overall, it needs to be understood, that the nine element model is not prescriptive and that it must be used in a 
context-sensitive way that is dependent on the needs of the specific organisation that is attempting to achieve 
information security accountability. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has sought to understand how accountability in cloud computing can be conceptualised. The wide 
range of existing research into accountability in cloud computing has used a technical approach and has been 
quantitative, and has generally not addressed the conceptual issues. The enormous growth in moving businesses 
to cloud computing, mainly due to its flexibility, cost-effectiveness and scalability, and the corresponding 
absence of a specific cloud computing accountability framework, highlights the growing need for research in this 
area. Previous research used an extensive analysis of the literature relating to cloud computing and 
accountability for information security to develop a model of the key conceptual elements (transparency, 
responsibility, assurance and remediation) relating to this issue. A set of 18 interpretive qualitative case studies 
were then conducted to examine the situation independently of the literature. A series of interviews were 
conducted within 38 interviewees from different government entities. Five more key elements were identified 
from the conducted case studies that are necessary to achieve information security accountability. These were 
found to be: accountability support environment, flexible change process, mechanisms, collaboration, and 
commitment to external criteria. 
The findings of this research contribute to the growing awareness of the importance of accountability.It provides  
an understanding of the importance of the accountability elements that policymakers need to address in cloud 
computing projects if they wish to be accountable in terms of information security. In future this research is 
aiming to produce a holistic and heuristic accountability framework that enables a theoretical-based description 
and analysis of the gap that exists between the ideal and the actuality of the institutional and technical 
environments of cloud computing implementation in regards to accountability. Finally, this research is seeking 
to find ways to strengthen the trust and confidence between organisations that have adopted the cloud and CSPs, 
which in turn strengthen the accountability, which also helps to reduce risks connected to the adoption of cloud 
computing services. 
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Abstract 
The convergence of Operational Technology and Information Technology is driving integration of the Internet of 
Things and Industrial Control Systems to form the Industrial Internet of Things. Due to the influence of 
Information Technology, security has become a high priority particularly when implementations expand into 
critical infrastructure. At present there appears to be minimal research addressing security considerations for 
industrial systems which implement application layer IoT messaging protocols such as Data Distribution 
Services (DDS). Simulated IoT devices in a virtual environment using the DDSI-RTPS protocol were used to 
demonstrate that enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client in both active and passive 
mode. Further, modified sequence numbers were found to be a potential denial of service attack, and malicious 
heartbeat messages were fashioned to be effective at denying receipt of legitimate messages. 
 
Keywords: Data Distribution Services, DDS, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-physical systems, Internet of Things, 
Network Security 
INTRODUCTION  
The Internet of Things (IoT) refers to the multitude of interconnected computers, sensors, controllers, and other 
devices which interact with the physical world. Ubiquitous computing devices are the driving force behind 
technologies such as smart electrical grids, autonomous cars, wearable health devices and home automation. 
Evans (2011) made the frequently cited prediction that the number of connected devices would surpass 50 
billion by the year 2020, however, revised predictions have forecast the number of devices to be significantly 
fewer, with Gartner, Inc. (2017) forecasting 20.8 million devices by 2020. Even with a revised prediction this is 
still a significant number of devices reinforcing the need for robust security considerations. 
Potential vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols could have serious repercussions if exploited. Whilst in 
theory industrial networks should be robust, this is not always the case, and the impact of unauthorised access or 
data modification within these networks could be quite severe. Interruptions or compromise of a power grid by 
exploiting OPC UA information transfer, intercepting personal health data through a poorly-secured CoAP-
based health tracker, or attacking a DDS-based tactical control system in a military vessel are examples of 
potential attacks which, if successful, could have serious consequences for critical infrastructure. 
Physical damage is major concern for industrial cyber-physical systems, but cyber-attacks in general are also 
creating a significant cost for organisations. IBM and the Ponemon Institute (2016) have stated in their Cost of 
Data Breach study that the average data breach in Australia comes at a cost to the breached organisation of $2.64 
million, at an average cost of $142 per stolen record. Analysing and understanding vulnerabilities in IoT 
protocols can assist organisations in evaluating how their risk appetite may influence protocol choice when 
making architectural design decisions. 
This research aims to test if identified vulnerabilities that appear to be present in parts of the DDS protocol are 
realisable. The remainder of the paper describes the security landscape for Industrial IoT systems, defines the 
experimental methodology used and discusses the findings of the research. 
SECURITY ISSUES IN IOT SYSTEMS 
Historically, protocol security has been an avenue for exploitation. For example, DNS, FTP, ICMP and EAP are 
protocols which have had vulnerabilities in their design, rather than programming errors in implementations of 
the protocols. Even recently ratified protocols such as HTTP/2 have been found to contain vulnerabilities 
(Imperva, 2016). In addition to common protocols in use on the Internet, continued research has revealed 
vulnerabilities in control systems protocols, for example BACnet (Peacock & Johnstone, 2014) and DNP3 
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(Crain & Bratus, 2015) demonstrating that continuing analysis of these protocols can reveal further weaknesses 
and reinforcing that control systems are a continued focus for security vulnerability analysis.  
The security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) has been viewed as a cause for concern in recent times (Harp & 
Gregory-Brown, 2016). Many legacy control systems run on standards, protocols and software designed and 
implemented at a time when the threat landscape was primarily physical based, due to less interconnection 
between devices. However, in an interconnected world, ICS are gaining attention from cyber adversaries. For 
example, in 2015 Ukraine's power grid was attacked (Lee, Assante & Conway, 2016) and availability severely 
compromised after attackers gained access to SCADA systems and shut down parts of the grid. This was one of 
the first known successful cyber-attacks on power infrastructure, highlighting the growing threat of sophisticated 
attack operations against cyber-physical infrastructure.  
Data Distribution Services or DDS (Object Management Group, 2015) is an open standard primarily intended 
for peer-to-peer inter-device communications. This protocol defines a data-centric publish/subscribe model and 
is focussed on low latency communications between devices, rather than between a device and a server or 
between two servers. The specification defines DDS as: 
“… a Data-Centric Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) model for distributed application communication and 
integration. This specification defines both the Application Interfaces (APIs) and the Communication Semantics 
(behaviour and quality of service) that enable the efficient delivery of information from information producers to 
matching consumers.” (Object Management Group, 2015, p. 1) 
DDS has found uses in many critical environments, such as amongst the energy and aerospace industries, as well 
as the military. Wang et al. (2008) explored the use of DDS in network-centric operations and warfare systems, 
demonstrating the increased use of these protocols in environments where security is essential. This is 
unsurprising as the DDS protocol has broad usage in military applications, having originally been developed by 
Thales (2015) for use in their TACTICOS Combat Management System. This usage has been one of the primary 
drivers for the high performance and resilient design requirements of DDS. DDS defers to TLS to provide the 
bulk of security rather than providing security at the application layer. However, reliance on TLS is clearly not 
sufficient, given the creation of a standardised post-protocol ratification security specification (aptly named DDS 
Security). This additional specification provides “authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, confidentiality 
and integrity” (Object Management Group, 2016) to DDS implementations. He & Liang (2015) have analysed 
the DDS specification for security issues and put forward a scenario where unauthorised publishers or 
subscribers may be able to inject data into the DDS network or receive data not intended for the legitimate 
recipient. They present a high-level overview of theoretical attacks on DDS and it is these types of attacks that 
DDS Security has been designed to mitigate. Unfortunately, at this point there appears to be limited research on 
the effectiveness of the DDS Security specification in mitigating the defined theoretical attacks. 
Given the range of vulnerable network protocols in use in the IoT, and the associated cost of data breaches; 
further research is necessary to reduce the attack surface of critical infrastructure installations. The following 
section describes a series of laboratory experiments undertaken which aims to test a subset of vulnerabilities 
specific to the DDS protocol. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The research was designed as a number of laboratory experiments. A combination of appropriate hardware and 
software resources were used to attempt to detect, capture, and then analyse specific communication used by a 
selection of devices using an implementation of the DDS protocol (DDSI-RTPS). The specific research 
questions were: 
1. What risks do vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols introduce to IIoT networks and critical 
infrastructure? 
a. Are there theoretical vulnerabilities present in the Real-Time Publish Subscribe DDS 
Interoperability Standard protocol specification? 
b. If so, can these vulnerabilities be tested with simulated IoT devices in an isolated 
environment? 
 
The hypotheses supporting the research questions and experiments designed to test the hypotheses are listed in 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses derived from research questions 
 Hypotheses 
H1: Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client. 
H2: Sequence number and heartbeat messages can be formulated to deny receipt of 
messages in a DataReader. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Experiments designed to test hypotheses 
Experiment Description Hypothesis 
E1: Participant Enumeration 
(Passive) 
To identify and enumerate RTPS participants on a network 
 
H1 
E2: Participant Enumeration 
(Active) 
To identify and enumerate RTPS participants on a network 
 
H1 
E3: Heartbeat Spoofing To deny receipt of messages to RTPS participants on a 
network 
 
H2 
Materials: 
 
The virtual lab consisted of four virtual machines, representing devices in the scenario connected by a virtual 
switch representing a DDS bus. The network topology is shown as Figure 1. All simulation and data collection 
occurred within an isolated, controlled laboratory environment, therefore the risk of unauthorised access to 
systems when testing for vulnerabilities was minimised. 
 
 
Figure 1: Scenario Network Topology 
 
 
The virtual machines are listed in Table 3. Note that RTPS participants may generally contain both DataWriters 
and DataReaders, which is the case for the attacker virtual machine in research. 
 
Table 3: Virtual machines used in experiments 
Hostname IPAddress Operating System Purpose 
DDS-client1 192.168.3.11 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Publisher) 
DDS-client2 192.168.3.12 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Subscriber) 
DDS-client3 192.168.3.13 Ubuntu 17.04 RTPS Participant (Example Subscriber) 
DDS-attacker 192.168.3.14 Kali 2017.1 Testing remote experiments (Attacker) 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Enumeration  
Information gathering is crucial for any attacker when attempting to penetrate a network, and no less so in 
industrial systems. DDSI-RTPS is reasonably verbose by default, providing reliably identifiable traffic. Figure 2 
shows the output of a Python script executed from the attacker, which successfully detects multicast RTPS SPDP 
packets transmitted on the local network segment as part of E1. The information that can be obtained from a 
single SPDP message include: Host IP address, RTPS GUID Prefix, RTPS Version, vendor ID, Time 
synchronisation information and the Contents of Submessages. 
 
Figure 2: Passive Network Scan and Enumeration Output 
In Figure 2 the Source Address, GUID prefix and overall Submessages are displayed. The result of E1 provides 
support for H1 (Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client). 
The packet capture reconstruction in 4 demonstrates the DDSI-RTPS Discovery announcement from the attacker 
(192.168.3.14) to each scanned address and the associated response. For clarity, only a small range of the 
network address space was scanned in this simulation (192.168.3.10 - 192.168.3.15). 
The packet capture has been colour coded as: 
 Yellow indicates legitimate communication between the 3 RTPS participants; 
 Red indicates traffic from the attacker; and 
 Blue indicates a response to the attacker’s discovery message. 
 
Table 4: Active Network Scan and Response Capture 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
46 12.11818 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
47 12.11818 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
49 14.00157 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
50 14.00157 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
51 14.11858 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
52 14.11859 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
53 14.16125 192.168.3.14 192.168.3.10 RTPS 206 DATA(p) 
54 14.1615 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.14 RTPS 270 INFO_TS, DATA(p) 
55 14.1615 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.14 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
 
Table 4 shows the result of an active scanning and response experiment (E2) which provides further support for 
H1 (Enumeration of devices is possible by a non-authenticated client). Thus H1 is accepted, given that DDSI-
RTPS can provide reliable communications over an unreliable communication medium or best-effort protocols. 
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Denial of Service 
DDSI-RTPS uses HEARTBEAT messages sent from a DataWriter to a DataReader to indicate available 
sequence numbers on the writer so that the reader can synchronise and determine if any messages are missing. 
The reader may respond with an ACKNACK to indicate to the writer any messages which may be missing, or if 
the writer has specifically requested a mandatory ACKNACK from the reader by setting the FINAL flag in the 
HEARTBEAT message. 
 
It was theorised that advancing the sequence number state on the reader may cause the reader to miss legitimate 
messages if the reader transitioned to a state where it is expecting a higher sequence number than the writer is 
currently using. 
Initial experimentation was conducted through extracting the appropriate DDSI-RTPS HEARTBEAT message 
from a packet capture and modifying the GUID Prefix, entity ID and sequence number fields. With the altered 
GUID Prefix reference implementation, test programs stopped processing once the ‘malicious’ HEARTBEAT 
messages were sent. The experiment was repeated with varying sequence numbers. Once the legitimate 
DataWriter reached the sequence number provided by the attacker, the subscriber would recommence 
processing messages from the attacker provided sequence number, messages between the last real and attacker 
provided sequence number are not transmitted. 
 
The specification defines certain conditions in which a DataReader must treat a sequence number as invalid and 
thus the entire HEARTBEAT submessage as invalid. These conditions include: 
 Negative sequence numbers (The SequenceNumber data structure is signed, however negative sequence 
numbers are invalid); and 
 Last sequence number < first sequence number. 
In the conducted experiments, sending a negative sequence number, or sending a sequence number which is 
lower than the sequence number most recently allocated by the legitimate DataWriters had no effect on the 
processing of messages by the DataReaders. 
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Table 5 shows an extract of the packet capture taken during E3. Once the attacker (192.168.3.14) sends a 
malicious HEARTBEAT Submessage (packet 504), the DDS-client2 acknowledges the new sequence number 
(packet 505), then stops responding to the HEARTBEAT Submessages from the legitimate DataWriter 
(192.168.3.11). This result supports H2 (Sequence number and heartbeat messages can be formulated to deny 
receipt of messages in a DataReader). 
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Table 5: Network Packet Capture of HEARTBEAT Experiment 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
490 59.89478 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
491 59.89478 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
493 59.94067 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
494 59.94067 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
495 60.01186 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
496 60.01186 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
504 60.82424 192.168.3.14 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
505 60.94139 192.168.3.12 192.168.3.11 RTPS 110 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
508 61.89489 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
509 61.89489 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 154 INFO_TS, DATA, HEARTBEAT 
510 61.98716 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.13 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
511 61.98717 192.168.3.11 192.168.3.12 RTPS 94 HEARTBEAT 
512 62.01184 192.168.3.13 192.168.3.11 RTPS 106 INFO_DST, ACKNACK 
 
Research question one posited, “What risks do vulnerabilities in IoT messaging protocols introduce to IIoT 
networks and critical infrastructure?” In relation to DDSI-RTPS, the vulnerabilities introduced could cause 
significant risk in an industrial control network. Reconnaissance is often the first task undertaken by a cyber 
adversary, results from E1 and E2 show that an attack can passively and actively survey the DDSI-RTPS network 
to discover all devices running on the bus. Modification of the sequence numbers can result in loss of message 
transmission between devices on the DDSI-RTPS network. Given the ability to forge malicious HEARTBEAT 
messages, H2 can be accepted, as a device which has received the malicious packet is prevented from processing 
further messages. Given that industrial control systems often do not directly employ network-monitoring 
software, but rather gain system insight via system specific data collection such as Trending or Polling, this type 
of attack may go unnoticed, or not identified as a cyber-attack for a duration longer than is typical of IoT based 
networks. With the acceptance of both H1 and H2, this paper argues that the introduction of vulnerable IoT 
messaging protocols into IIoT networks increases the ability of cyber adversaries to undertake reconnaissance of 
industrial control system networks, and impede the availability of critical systems operating in the network. 
CONCLUSION 
This research set out to examine security flaws in the DDS protocol (specifically, the Real-Time Publish 
Subscribe extension). There was theoretical evidence that the protocol could be suborned. The experiments 
undertaken suggest that the identified theoretical vulnerabilities are present in the Real-Time Publish Subscribe 
DDS Interoperability Standard protocol specification, answering Research Question 1a. The vulnerabilities were 
tested with simulated IoT devices in an isolated environment, with acceptance of both H1 and H2, answering 
Research Question 1b affirmatively. The experiments undertaken suggest that enumeration of IIoT devices 
communicating with DDSI-RTPS is possible by a non-authenticated client in both passive and active mode, 
respectively. Additionally, modified sequence numbers were found to be largely ineffective at preventing 
messages from reaching DataReaders. However, if a large enough sequence number is provided, in relation to 
the current sequence number, a denial of service attack is effectively achieved. Additionally, malicious heartbeat 
messages sent from an attacker device can be crafted to deny receipt of messages between a DataWriter and 
DataReader. Given these results, incorporating vulnerable IoT protocols such as DDSI-RTPS into IIoT, which 
manage critical infrastructure without mitigating the vulnerable protocol increases the risk of cyber adversaries 
conducting reconnaissance and impeding the availability of critical device-to-device network communication. 
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Abstract 
Passwords are broken. Multi-factor Authentication overcomes password insecurities, but its potentials are often 
not realised. This article presents InSight, a system to actively identify perpetrators by deceitful adaptation of the 
accessible system resources using Multi-factor Authentication profiles. This approach improves authentication 
reliability and attributes users by computing trust scores against profiles. Based on this score, certain 
functionality is locked, unlocked, buffered, or redirected to a deceptive honeypot, which is used for attribution. 
The novelty of this approach is twofold; a profile-based multi-factor authentication approach that is combined 
with a gradient, deceptive honeypot. 
Keywords: Authentication, Multi-Factor, Deceptive Security, Trust, Honeypot 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses an aspect of multi-factor-authentication in combining a number of behavioural indicators to 
provide more trust in the identity of the user. Multi-factor authentication, especially when based on behavioural 
metrics such as key-stroke recognition provide a level of trust in the identity of the user. Typically such systems 
use a threshold to either authenticate or deny access to a user. The novelty of the approach is that instead of only 
authenticating a user, the system is dynamically configuring a deceptive honeypot to include additional 
attribution techniques to ascertain the identity of the actual user.  The result is the InSight system that adjusts 
dynamically the deployment of deceptive features and attribution techniques based on the trust-level established 
through the user’s interaction with the system. 
Weaknesses have long been identified in traditional authentication systems based on username and password 
(Adams 1999) (Ives 2004) (Schaffer 2011). A typical person is capable of remembering 4 to 5 passwords, 
however, research by (Sasse 2011) shows that at work a person is likely to need in the region of 15 to 16 
different passwords. This creates bad practices, such as writing passwords on post-it notes and reusing the same 
password between systems. When one system is cracked, all others topple over like a line of dominoes (Ives 
2004). 
Worse still, people often choose memorable personal passwords, such as their date of birth or the name of their 
first pet. This information is often shared on social networking websites or can be obtained through social 
engineering. On the other hand, when people do choose complex passwords, they often are difficult to remember 
and are consequently recorded in notebooks or on yellow stickers. Even complex passwords remain in many 
cases trivial to brute force attacks. 
Security breaches at large organisations have, in the past, led to password credentials being posted publicly to 
websites such as pastebin.com or through bittorrent sharing websites. An analysis of these credentials often 
shows easy to crack login credentials. For example, in one corpus of 32 million credentials, it was found that the 
average password length was between 6 and 9 characters. Further analysis of the data set showed that the most 
popular password was ``123456'' with 290731 unique occurrences1.  
Adversaries typically use three well known methods to compromise passwords; dictionary attacks, brute force 
attacks and rainbow tables. Simple passwords such as 'Password' and 'princess' can be compromised by an 
adversary using a dictionary based attack. A dictionary file contains a list of words which is used to sequentially 
attempt authentication. Dictionary attacks are fast; using a typical home desktop computer, dictionary words are 
trivially compromised in a matter of seconds. Dictionaries even exist that replace characters with common 
substituted character variations (e.g. p4s\$w0rd). 
1 http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_Consumer_Password_Worst_Practices.pdf 
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Alternatively an adversary may perform a brute force attack to compromise a password by using all possible 
permutations of available characters. This is a slower attack, but has the potential to crack any password. If an 
adversary knows something about the password (e.g. it is greater than 8 characters and it ends with a number) 
then this can be incorporated into the brute force attempt to reduce the effective search space and time required 
to compromise the password. This is also known as a mask attack. 
Adversaries can use rainbow tables, a pre-computed file containing all possible one-way hashes for a given 
dictionary. However, it is considered unrealistic to generate rainbow tables for all possible salt + password 
combinations. Recent advancements in graphical processing units (GPU) shows us that passwords can be 
cracked at a rate of 3.3 billion passwords per second.  A common practice in the security of user passwords 
stored in databases is to use a cryptographic salt. This should be a complex, difficult to guess, string that is added 
to the user’s password before it is encrypted. Therefore a standard dictionary attack or use of rainbow tables is 
likely to fail since the encrypted one-way hash is a representation of the salt + the password. However, if the 
adversary knows the salt then they can generate a rainbow table which includes the salt. 
A solution to this problem that is in widespread use is multi-factor authentication, which combines the username 
and password with an additional authentication metric such as a biometric fingerprint scan. The three widely 
accepted authentication principles for the identification of a user are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Widely accepted Authentication Principles 
Authentication Principle Example 
i) Something the User has Authentication Token, RFID Card 
ii) Something the User knows Password, PIN, Passphrase 
iii) Something the User is Fingerprint, Iris Scan, Voice Pattern 
Multi-Factor Authentication  
Multi-factor authentication typically uses a combination of authentication principles to establish a user's identity 
(Nag 2015). For example, the credit card payment system (Kumar 2008) with biometric authentication employs 
fingerprint verification with a credit card, combining principles i) the card and iii) the fingerprint. Such an 
approach requires the installation of additional equipment, increasing the cost of the approach and preventing a 
more widespread adoption. The use of additional devices such as fingerprint readers typically adds to the time 
taken for authentication which also affects the user acceptance of the technology. Depending on the technology 
used, fingerprints can also be spoofed (Ihmaidi 2006). Worse, usable fingerprints may readily be available on the 
credit card itself. Most current approaches to multi-factor authentication are expensive, difficult to deploy and 
directly affect the usability of the system as they prolong the authentication process (Naji 2011). 
A well recognised alternative to fingerprints are keystroke dynamics which can be used as behavioural 
biometrics for users. It is an analysis technique in which the typing behaviour of users whilst inputting through a 
keyboard input is monitored (Oppliger 2011). However, if a keystroke is not combined with particular keystroke 
keys such as the password, it is insufficient to be an objective authentication factor (Teh 2010). Another 
challenge in this area is that the way users type is very much dependent on the devices they use to enter their 
credentials. This led to problems in accuracy with this authentication approach when users are able to use a 
variety of hardware configurations, such as laptops, tablet PCs or smart-phones for data entry. Indeed the use of 
hardware for authentication has been used since the 1980s. The idea was that users register their devices, e.g. 
based on their MAC address, so that the devices are authenticated rather than their users. 
The authentication module of InSight combines hardware authentication with keystroke recognition to overcome 
some of their respective problems. To be compatible with traditional authentication approaches InSight extends a 
simple password mechanism with additional profiling techniques to create a form of multi-factor authentication 
that is based on hardware and behaviour profiles. Both of these additional factors do not require the user to 
memorise or otherwise keep any additional secret information. 
This also means that InSight does not require special devices to be deployed to end-users, avoiding the impact of 
additional authentication procedures on usability. InSight integrates profiling information with the established 
username/password authentication thus discriminating the valid use of password credentials against misuse by 
establishing a level of trust in the authenticity of the user. This level of trust is then used to drive a deceptive 
back-end for attribution purposes that adapts the level of deception corresponding to the trust in the authenticity 
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of the user. The authentication in InSight is based on the trust in the multi-factor assessment, whereas other 
approaches (Koved 2015) take a risk-based approach. 
InSight determines the user behaviour with respect to entering usernames and passwords in correlation with 
users’ hardware. First InSight determines the assumed identity of the user through normal password 
authentication, gathering in additional information about the hardware configuration and the keystroke behaviour 
of the user when typing the username and password. The username is then matched against the hardware 
configurations stored in an associated hardware profile. This compares the ownership and usage patterns of the 
hardware. Based on the hardware profile the login procedure discriminates between keystroke profiles against 
which the current login request is evaluated. 
Deceptive Security with Honeypots  
Honeypots are specially crafted systems that lure adversaries by imitating vulnerable systems, services and 
software. Honeypots monitor the interaction between the adversary and the system so that the collected data can 
be analysed by an investigator or automated process. Honeypots are capable of misleading adversaries into 
revealing information about themselves, by e.g. inadvertently revealing their preferred tools and techniques, 
coding mistakes and hours of operation. Honeypots are often classified by their fidelity; low or high. Low 
interaction honeypots, such as Dionaea or Nepenthes, generally simulate a single service and are effective when 
facing automated scripts such as worms. They are easy to deploy and manage, however they are quickly 
identified as honeypots by human adversaries, since they offer only limited interactivity. High interaction 
honeypots are fully fledged operating systems hosted on physical equipment or in a virtual environment. They 
require high levels of human monitoring and there is an increased risk that they may be compromised and used 
by an adversary e.g. as a node in a botnet of machines. However, they offer much higher levels of fidelity, such 
that there is less chance of them being identified as a honeypot. Tools such as Sebek2 are used to monitor high 
interaction honeypots and use rootkit techniques to hide deep inside the operating system to avoid detection. 
A recent trend in honeypot research has been to combine honeypots with other security technologies. Honeypots 
have been stitched together with intrusion detection systems, firewalls and host-based security technologies such 
as anti-virus. While network-based services were once the only strand of honeypot research; a wider variety in 
the form of wireless, USB, bluetooth, client-based honeypots and honeypots in non-IP networks such as 
industrial control systems characterise this area of research. 
InSight uses the level of trust that is established by the authentication module, to adapt the underlying system’s 
functionality. This approach has the result that the user, or adversary, cannot distinguish the real system 
functionality from the one that is provided by InSight’s adaptive honeypot. The novelty here is to not simply to 
redirect the user to a honeypot, but to have a continuous gradient between the real system and functions that are 
not influencing the system with direct and immediate effect. 
InSight's Honeypot Trust Model  
Deceptive technologies are an unusual but suitable partner to multi-factor authentication systems. This 
partnership can be justified by challengeing one of the primary principles of authentication: Upon failing any 
part of an authentication challenge, a user should be denied access to the system. 
Traditionally, when failing one or more checks in a multi-factor authentication, the actor is not authenticated and 
consequently denied access to the resources. InSight relaxes this authentication principle using indicators of 
malice (IOM) to determine a trust­level in the actor’s authenticity using a weighted average of the IOMs derived 
from the Hardware and the Behaviour profile. When an actor attempts to login using a legitimate 
username/password combination but the device signature and/or the behavioural biometric does not match the 
profile in the database, then these are considered IOM. Currently InSight only supports Hardware Profiles and 
Keystroke Recognition as a biometric, but this can easily be extended to include other IOMs as indicated in 
Figure 1. 
As a result of the computed trust score, the actor is placed within a system that employs a gradient from high 
trust, in which all system functionality is enabled, and with few characteristics of a honeypot, to low trust, in 
which actions are buffered, and can be rolled-back as well as profiling, traceback and other deceptions enabled.  
Figure 1 shows how the honeypot functionality increases as trust is decreased. Trust is decreased as users trigger 
IOMs indicating that they are potential adversaries that succeeded in obtaining username/password pairs, but 
2 https://projects.honeynet.org/sebek/ 
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without matching the behaviour profiles adequately. To equal proportions, access to the functionality of the real 
system is minimised as trust is decreased. The partnering of multi-factor authentication with deceptive security 
in InSight, results in the authentication matrix shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Honeypot Trust Model 
 
 
Table 2: Multi-factor Authentication with and without InSight 
 
 
Experiments  
Our experiment is based on an online (e-)banking system. E-banking allows for customers to conduct online 
financial matters, such as transactions and mortgage applications through the Internet. The mid-90s saw the birth 
of online banking; now its use is widespread. Recent studies identified that 30% of the UK population use online 
banking. Banks benefit from cost savings as their branches and telephone call centres receive less interaction, 
customers benefit from convenient and fast access to key financial actions such as transferring funds and paying 
bills. However, financial fraud is a pressing issue and solutions have been proposed by security researchers 
(Oppliger 2011). The IC3 reported losses of hundreds of millions of dollars due to online account takeovers and 
unauthorised funds transfers between 2005-2009.3 
User authentication plays a critical role as customers typically login using a web or smartphone application. 
Banks have adopted multi-factor authentication on a widespread scale. One-time PIN hardware devices have 
been sent to millions of customers free of charge by major UK banks. 
In the experiments described in this paper the login server belongs to a fictional high street bank that employs 
numerous security methods to identify cybercriminals. The experiment is based on synthetic datasets, that were 
obtained through a 12 student volunteers logging into the system and processing pre-defined tasks. In subsequent 
experiments this will be expanded to use field data and a real-world application. The prototype experiment s 
3 http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/100312.aspx 
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Our experiment is bas d on an online (e­)banking system. E­banking allows for customers to                         
conduct online financial matters, such as transactions and mortgage applications through the                     
Internet. The mid­nineties saw the birth of online banking; now its use is widespread. Recent                           
studies identified that 30% of the UK population use online banking. Banks benefit from cost                           
savings as their branches and telephone call centres receive less interaction, customers benefit                       
from convenient and fast access to key financial actions such as transferring funds and paying                           
bills. However, financial fraud is a pressing issue and solutions have been proposed by security                           
researchers [11]. The IC3 reported losses of hundreds of millions of dollar due to online                           
account takeovers and unauthorised funds transfers between 2005­2009             
(http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/100312.aspx).
User authentication plays a critical role as customers typically login using a web or smartphone                           
application. Banks have adopted multi­factor authentication on a widespread scale. One time                     
PIN hardware devices have been sent to millions of customers free of charge by major UK                             
banks.
In our experiment the login server belongs to a fictional high street bank that employs numerous                             
security methods to identify cyber criminals. The experiment is based on synthetic datasets, in                         
subsequent xperiments we plan to use field data. We assume that both legitimate and                         
illegitimate users have access to valid username and password credentials. The illegitimate                     
users are assumed to have acquired the credentials via, e.g. compromised machines, by                       
installing a keylogger or rootkit.
InSight grants access to the banking resources provided that they have correctly entered the                         
username and password credentials. Unlike traditional multi­factor authentication, the user is                   
also granted access when the hardware and behavioural profiles are not matched. This results                         
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assume that both legitimate and illegitimate users have access to valid username and password credentials. The 
illegitimate users are assumed to have acquired the credentials via, e.g. compromised machines, by installing a 
key-logger or rootkit. 
InSight grants access to the banking resources provided that they have correctly entered the username and 
password credentials. Unlike traditional multi-factor authentication, the user is also granted access when the 
hardware and behavioural profiles are not matched. This results in a lower trust score, representing an Indicator 
of Malice. Insight will consequently monitor their activities and deploy attribution mechanisms such as 
honeypots. To show the practicality of the Insight approach the honeypot features allow for delayed execution 
mechanisms and confirmations through independent channels. For example when money is moved from one 
account to another, InSight lets them appear to the illegitimate user as having been processed legitimately, thus 
increasing potentially the interaction with the honeypot. Two alternatives to achieve this behaviour are: 
1. Carry out and then later roll-back transactions - Any actions that take place on a compromised account 
would be rolled back to their original state. In our e-banking scenario, this technique is problematic 
when funds are transferred to external accounts. 
2. Buffer transactions - Actions are buffered for a given amount of time or until a certain condition is met. 
An example of such is that enough attribution data has been collected. Based on the user's trust-score 
adjusted over a period of time, Insight can then choose to either process or drop the action. This 
approach will produce a lag in transactions which a nefarious user may become suspicious of. This 
approach is deemed to be acceptable as banking transactions already have similar systems in place, 
causing a similar lag. 
Figure 2 shows the simplified banking website from the observation point of a logged in user. 
 
Figure 2: Simplified Banking Website for Experiment 
Figure 2. Simplified Banking Website for Experiment
Theexperimentconsists ofanumberofrealisticusecases thatrepresentlegitimateand                         
ilegitimateusers whohaveobtainedvalidusername/passwordcombinations.Theusecases for                     
the experiment are as folows:
Legitimate User
● Prerequisites ­ none
● Interaction Flow ­Logs In UsingCorrectCredentials,Common machineandCorrect                     
BehaviouralBiometric>InSightassesses credentials,common machineandcorrect                 
behaviouralbiometric.Useris loggedin,>Useris notmonitored,makes required                       
transactions > InSight accepts > User logs out.
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The experiment consists of a number of realistic use cases that represent legitimate and illegitimate users who 
have obtained valid username/password combinations. The use cases for the experiment areas follows: 
Legitimate User: 
 Prerequisites: none 
 Interaction Flow: Logs In Using Correct Credentials, Common machine and Correct Behavioural 
Biometric  InSight assesses credentials, common machine and correct behavioural biometric. User is 
logged in,  User is not monitored, makes required transactions  InSight accepts  User logs out. 
Illegitimate User 1 (Local Nefarious User) 
 Prerequisites: Acquired correct credentials by installing a keylogger onto a local shared machine (e.g. 
library). The illegitimate user uses the same machine to login with the stolen credentials. This user has 
physical access to the machine and therefore has a correct common machine and thus correct device 
signature. 
 Interaction Flow: Logs In Using Correct Credentials, Common machine and Incorrect Behavioural 
Biometric  InSight assesses credentials are correct, common machine is correct and biometric is 
incorrect. User is logged in,  User is monitored, makes required transactions  InSight buffers  
User logs out. 
Illegitimate User 2 (Remote Nefarious User) 
 Prerequisites: Acquired correct credentials by compromising a legitimate user’s remote machine. The 
illegitimate user compromised the machine with a phishing email and installed a rootkit which contains 
a keylogger, which is able to record all interactions (e.g. keystrokes) and covertly send them to a remote 
server which the illegitimate user controls. 
 Interaction Flow: Logs In Using Correct Credentials, Non-Common machine and Incorrect Behavioural 
Biometric  InSight assesses credentials  correct, common machine  incorrect and biometric  
incorrect. User is logged in,  User is monitored, makes required transactions  InSight buffers  
User logs out. 
RESULTS 
We find that within a controlled environment InSight operates as expected. The login screen provides controlled 
test accounts for each of the three outlined users (legitimate, local nefarious and remote nefarious). Figure 3 
showed a successful login to the system by a legitimate user. The debugging and output panel shown in the 
bottom left corner shows the current trust-level of the user and the deployed deception mechanisms. It is only 
present during debugging mode and is described further below. 
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Figure 3. Simplified Banking Website for Experiment
Figure 3 shows the web­based debugging and output panel that we used during experiments. 3A                           
shows the results of a legitimate user login. In this case the output states that no honeypot                               
functionality is deployed. 3B shows the results of the first illegitimate user login. In this case a                               
persistent cookie has been deployed to track the user, however, passive fingerprinting has not                         
been deployed. At this level and below transactions are buffered. Finally 3C shows a low profile                             
score, using correct credentials, but the hardware profile and behavioural characteristics have                     
failed. In this case the user has been assigned a low profile score and all methods of profiling                                 
and tracking are enabled.
Figure 3 also demonstrates that the range of the profiling technique can be defined by the                             
operator. In this e­banking scenario we defined three distinct categories and the window for a                           
trusted user is small; the trust score must be between 83 and 100. For an e­banking website this                                 
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Figure 3 shows the web-based debugging and output panel that were used during experiments. The honeypot in 
this prototype features three features used for attribution: i) persistent cookies; ii) passive fingerprinting; iii) 
behaviour interaction profiling. The profile score is computed through the use of time-of-use and place-of-use 
profile combined with a key-stroke metrics to create a biometric. 3A shows the results of a legitimate user login. 
In this case the output states that no honeypot functionality is deployed. 3B shows the results of the first 
illegitimate user login. In this case a persistent cookie has been deployed to track the user, however, passive 
fingerprinting has not been deployed. At this level and below transactions are buffered. Finally 3C shows a low 
profile score, using correct credentials, but the hardware profile and behavioural characteristics have failed. In 
this case the user has been assigned a low profile score and all methods of profiling and tracking are enabled. 
Figure 3 also demonstrates that the range of the profiling technique can be defined by the operator. This 
e-banking scenario defined three distinct categories and the window for a trusted user is small; the trust score 
must be between 83 and 100. For an e-banking website this seems to be appropriate. However, adequate testing 
and base-lining using real customer data would help to identify a suitable range to minimise false positives and 
false negatives. The categories and ranges are customisable. 
DISCUSSION  
The previous section showed that the InSight approach performs well and delivered promising results. This 
section critiques the approach with respect to a real world implementation. The following are considered: i) 
costs, ii) false positives, iii) human factors, vi) performance factors and compromise. 
Costs 
Current multi-factor authentication systems require physical devices, e.g. one-time password (OTP). Newer 
solutions place the OTP device within the payment card itself, which is convenient for the user, but simply shift 
the costs into the production of the card.  
Other systems such as iris scanners, fingerprint readers and RFID readers also require physical hardware to be 
present that is unlikely to be owned by a home user. When considering online banking, a high-street bank would 
need to send millions of these devices to home-users. To place this cost into perspective, personal USB device 
fingerprint readers currently range from GBP30 to GBP100, while eye scanners are not available for home-use. 
Eye scanners, such as retina scanners are costly and are invasive to individuals. The use of these devices is 
common in high security facilities but has not transcended to home use. 
The multi-factor authentication system presented in this work does not require any new hardware to be present 
and therefore avoids the associated costs. Instead, the approach uses something the user already has across 
multiple devices; a keyboard and a device signature. So a software solution would need to be developed which 
implements the approach and is available on multiple device platforms. 
With regard to the deceptive system, the maintenance costs can be better understood by examining the 
honeypots. A critical aspect is that honeypots should be maintained by a skilled team; the higher the interaction 
level the greater the maintenance requirements. The honeypot system for this approach need not have high 
interactivity, since in fact the user has full use of functionality, but their requests are buffered. The costs of 
honeypot maintenance may be a barrier to entry for smaller organisations. The key is the integration into the 
organisations’ business processes.  If a user is only partially trusted, the additional delay or additional effort in 
establishing his/her identity in the case of high-value transactions is allowing to dynamically adjust the risks to 
the organisation against experience of the user. 
False Positives 
If a user is having a stressful day and their behaviour profile is unusual, they may slip into the honeypot side of 
the gradient; this is a false positive. This may result in their activities being monitored and their requests, such as 
banking transactions, buffered. Depending on the system, this may be highly inconvenient. In fact, this result is 
not problematic two reasons. One, it is anticipated that the user would be contacted by an additional channel (e.g. 
telephone), as is already standard practice for unusual banking transactions. Two, this increased monitoring is 
not wasted; it can be used as part of a feedback loop which further improves the system and the novel approach, 
creating a better baseline of the correct user. With regard to false positives, the approach is similar to intrusion 
detection systems. Tuning is required and depending on the system in question, an appropriate number of false 
positives and false negatives should be known from the offset. 
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Human Factors 
The multi-factor authentication technique offers significant benefits in the real world. Humans and passwords 
are not a particularly good combination (Kovet 2015) (Nag 2015) (Charab 2007) (Kumar 2008). Using InSight 
the authentication technique is based on a behavioural pattern that is difficult to replicate and is inherent to the 
individual. Also, while behavioural patterns do change slowly over time, such as a user becoming adept at touch 
typing, the algorithm can actually account for this. 
Performance Factors and Compromise 
In our approach there are opportunities for compromise at the client and at the server. At the client side a 
nefarious user with access to a compromised machine could potentially record a user's keyboard timing data and 
their hardware details. These could be replayed along with the correct username and password. 
The InSight server collects a corpus of behavioural data. If the system is compromised then the unique 
behavioural records could be exposed. Therefore it is of importance that the system is hardened to deter and 
prevent compromise. It is also important that behavioural data is encrypted when stored. 
Regarding performance of a system that were to implement such an approach, it is likely that there would be an 
increase in processing and that this would increase the further into the honeypot the user is. Therefore, if the 
adversary was aware of the system, they might be able to identify the depth at which they are located based on 
timing data. One solution to this problem is to normalise output to a pre-determined and acceptable speed or 
duration and add randomness so that output is not 'too similar'. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper discussed the inherent weaknesses in single-factor authentication systems and current multi-factor 
authentication systems. InSight was presented and demonstrated to be a novel system that uses behavioural 
aspects and hardware profiles for multi-factor authentication to compute a trust score. This score is used to 
determine the users position in a deceptive environment. Insight offers the attractive capability of being able to 
create a corpus of adversary activities. While the experiment demonstrated the capability within a simulated 
e-banking environment, the approach could be used in any other system that requires authentication. This data is 
useful for detecting ongoing attacks using signature matching and is especially useful for attribution, traceback 
and profiling purposes. 
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Abstract 
Automation and control systems, such as SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition), DCS (Distributed 
Control Systems) and are often referred to as Operational Technology (OT). These systems are used to monitor and 
control critical infrastructures such as power, pipelines, water distribution, sewage systems and production 
control,).  Traditionally, these OT systems have had a degree of physical separation from Information Technology 
(IT) infrastructures.  With changing technologies and a drive towards data-driven and remote operations the two 
technology environments are starting to converge. With this convergence, what was a relatively standalone secure 
and isolated environment is now connected and accessible via the Internet/cloud. With this interconnection comes 
the cyber security challenges that are typically associated with only with IT infrastructures. OT data that is then 
accessible from these environments could include critical information such as pressures, temperatures, proximity 
levels, control signals and other sensor signals. Due to the aforementioned convergence, OT data and associated 
control mechanisms are now significantly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.  This paper provides an understanding of 
cyber security in an operational technology context (rather than traditional IT environments) and discusses the 
underlying causes, vulnerabilities, and the risks that are created by convergence and interconnection.  We report on 
evidence of convergence between IT and OT, and use Hofstede’s model of organisational culture to explain the 
different attitudes and value drivers in IT and OT. 
Keywords: Operational Technology, Critical Infrastructure, Cyber-physical systems, Internet of Things, Network 
Security 
INTRODUCTION  
Operation Technology (OT) refers to the hardware and software used with the automation controls systems within 
infrastructure. OT networks and systems including, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) or Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) are used in multiple industries such as power, oil & gas, water treatment, 
transportation, defence, traffic control and even within private facilities to monitor and control functions such as 
heating and cooling (Shahzad et al., 2015). These industries form part of our national critical infrastructures 
without which society and economy would fail. OT systems were designed to integrate data acquisition systems, 
data collection/transmission systems and Human Machine Interface (HMI) systems to create a centralised control 
and monitoring solution. Thus, allowing an operator to visually interpret the state of the plant for control and 
monitoring purposes (Shahzad et al., 2015). 
The majority of the OT systems in use are decades old. These were the forerunners of today’s ‘smart’ solutions. 
These systems are often highly engineered and use proprietary protocols that are specific to project requirements. 
There are a limited number of people capable of supporting these systems therefore such targets are relatively easy 
to exploit.  
Threats to OT systems are evolving daily with cyber-attacks increasing in both frequency, sophistication and 
impact. As recently as July 2017, cyber-attackers gained access to a Kansas nuclear power network and other 
energy companies. The consequences of a cyber-attack on critical infrastructure OT systems goes further than a 
financial loss to include prolonged outages of critical services (e.g., electricity), possible environmental impacts, 
and even loss of life. 
This research seeks to examine if the differences between IT and OT management structures, cultures and values 
explain the different attitudes to cyber security. The remainder of the paper describes the security landscape for 
Industrial IoT (IIoT) systems, describes the key differences between IT and OT systems and discusses the findings 
of the research. 
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SECURITY ISSUES IN IIOT (INDUSTRIAL IOT) SYSTEMS 
The lack of security in IIoT systems has been a cause for concern recently, as noted by Harp & Gregory-Brown 
(2016). Many control systems run on standards, protocols and software designed and implemented at a time when 
the attack surface was small, due to limited interconnection between devices and networks. However, given the 
(reasonable from a facility manager’s point of view) drive for interconnected systems, IIoT systems are gaining 
attention from cyber adversaries.  
Lee, Assante & Conway (2016) point out that in 2015, Ukraine's power grid was attacked and availability severely 
compromised after attackers gained access to OT systems and shut down parts of the grid. This cyber-attack on 
power infrastructure, allegedly by a nation-state, indicates the level of sophistication of attacks against critical 
infrastructure. The attack did not only directly target OT systems controlling the electrical grid but also systems 
that owners would rely on to respond to the attack e.g., disabling the telephony systems.  This outcome is, perhaps, 
unsurprising as other protocols have also been found to be vulnerable, e.g., BACnet, used in building management 
systems (Peacock & Johnstone, 2014). Table 1 describes a range of attacks on critical infrastructure that have 
occurred over the last 35 years. 
The vast majority of OT systems are operated in relative isolation from IT systems and infrastructure, which is 
commonly referred to as ‘air gapped’, and are simply not designed with a cyber-attack in mind, neither from a 
detection or defence perspective.  OT operating companies use the air gap theory as a barrier, believing that their 
respective sites are not vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This complacent mindset represents a significant vulnerability 
as during maintenance periods, where contractors use multimedia devices such as laptops, portable hard drives 
and USB flash drive as maintenance aids within the industrial infrastructure. The Stuxnet attack was an example 
of malware was transmitted through an infected USB flash drive allowing the virus to spread resulting in the 
centrifuges speeding up to the point they self-destructed (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011). 
Contractors may also have set up full-time Internet access, through a cloud infrastructure, to workstations and 
equipment to enable remote management, including monitoring, technical support and software updates. On 
December 2014, ICS CERT identified that malware campaign ongoing from 2011, a variant of BlackEnergy 
malware known as BlackEnergy3, was delivered through Internet connected devices, which compromised 
industrial Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs). The alert “Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign 
Compromising ICS” was issued in 2014 and later updated in 2016. The Ukraine power grid outage in 2015, 
initiated through a spear-phishing campaign targeting IT staff, was attributed to the BlackEnergy malware 
(Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E) | ICS-CERT, 2016). 
Both the Stuxnet and Ukraine power grid attacks are examples where human intervention, either deliberate 
malicious intent or inadvertent, provided the opportunity for cyber-criminals to exploit OT environments. Hence, 
organisations must consider deploying multi-layer cyber-security defence measures, including implementing cyber 
technology, educating OT personnel in cyber risk reducing behaviours, introducing cyber resilient policies and 
physical security.   
As OT systems evolve so does the need to apply updates, i.e., software updates and software patches. As explained, 
within OT systems production is the highest priority or in the CIA structure availability is pivotal. This 
juxtaposition on prioritisation comparative to traditional IT security has led to some OT systems operating for 
years without a patch being applied, leaving them highly vulnerable. Furthermore what exacerbates the issues 
around updates is that many OT equipment suppliers “freeze” the operating systems and subsequent application 
for elements in an OT system. This practice demands use of arcane and outdated systems. 
Finally, when the opportunity does present itself to apply the update/patch, the air gap still exists and requires 
direct connection to these systems via vendor computers or USB drives, both of which are potential entry points 
for motivated, capable cyber criminals. The concept, or approach, of using the air gap as a means to avoid/stop a 
cyber-attack is now flawed and must be addressed in a meaningful way. This modus operandi is exactly how the 
zero day Stuxnet malware was introduced to spread through OT systems. 
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Table 1:  Selected Disclosed OT Cyber Attacks 
 
 
Possible results that could occur from an OT cyber-attack include: 
 A delay in the information that is being communicated to an ICS/DCS/SCADA Master from a Remote 
Terminal Unit (RTU). These could ultimately lead to a catastrophic event as the information could be 
turbine speed, level sensor, alarm sensor or actuators. 
 Interrupting a connection between an ICS/DCS/SCADA Master to engage an event through a safety 
system. 
 Changing the values received from an ICS/DCS/SCADA Master. This could either have an automatic 
response, e.g., shutdown a section of a plant or it could lead to a human response which could lead to an 
inappropriate action.  
 Set point values of the RTUs. An example would be changing the HH set point for an alarm for a level 
sensor for a vessel. Hence causing the vessel to overflow. 
 Change/modify the operation of equipment protection systems e.g., speeding up a turbine in a plant 
causing the blades to be destroyed. 
Considering the wide range of vulnerable protocols used in the IIoT, and the high cost of data breaches (e.g., plant 
re-start costs, declining stock price), further research is necessary to reduce the risk to critical infrastructure. The 
following section describes the convergence between the IT and OT worlds and highlights the discontinuity caused 
by widely differing priorities.  We do not assert that OT priorities are correct and that IT priorities are faulty in 
some way, just that they are different and that this is the root cause of a security issue.   
 
Date Cyber-Attack 
Name 
Industry Location Description Effect 
Oct 1982 Siberian Pipeline 
Explosion 
Natural Gas Siberia Pipeline software programmed 
to reset pump speed and valve 
settings above the specifications 
of the pipeline joints and welds. 
Allegedly conducted by the CIA.  
Explosion visible from space. 
Vapourised part of the Soviet Union’s 
Trans-Siberian pipeline. 
1992 Chevron 
Emergency 
System 
Oil & Gas USA Chevron employee disabled the 
emergency alert system for 22 
states in the USA. 
Emergency occurred and no alert was 
issued. 
2000 Maroochy Shire 
Sewage Spill 
Sewage Australia Disgruntled employee spoofed 
controllers opening valves of the 
sewage system 
264,000 raw sewage flooded into 
hotel and the surrounding parks and 
river. 
2002 Venezuela 
Pipeline control 
system 
Oil Venezuela Allegedly cyber criminals 
penetrated the SCADA system 
responsible for tanker loading at 
a marine terminal.  
PLCs operating systems erased. 
Tankers couldn’t be loaded for 8 
hours. 
2003 Israel Electric 
Corporation DoS 
Electric Israel DoS attacks originating from 
Iran penetrate the Israel Electric 
Corporation  
DoS attacks penetrated however 
failed to shut down the power grid 
Nov 
2007 
Stuxnet Worm Nuclear Iran Supposedly created by 
American/Israeli Governments 
to attack Iran’ Nuclear Facilities.  
Centrifuges and valves were 
sabotaged/destroyed 
Nov 
2011 
Pump SCADA Water USA Destroyed a pump remotely 
from gaining access through a 
SCADA network. Allegedly the 
access from gaining user names 
and passwords from 
manufacturer’s customers. 
Chemicals in treatment plant were 
changed. 2.5 million customers had 
data exposed to the internet. 
Jan 2015 German Steel Mill Steel Mill Germany Cyber criminals used Phishing 
emails to gain access and 
prevented the blast-furnace from 
shutting down. 
Catastrophic damage to the steel mill. 
Mar 
2016 
Ukraine Power 
Grid 
Power Ukraine Cyber criminals gained access 
remotely and cut power to 30 
substations through the 
installation of customer 
firmware.  
225,000 customers without power. 
Deleted files from the master boot 
records and also shutdown 
telecommunications. 
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THE CONVERGENCE OF IT AND OT 
 
Figure 1 highlights the trend in industry to converge the IT and OT systems in order to access real time data and 
to interconnect facilities. The convergence is being driven by the need for quantitative management reporting, 
assisted by ‘big data’ and sensor technology, artificial intelligence, physical automation, remote operations, cloud 
computing, analytics. All of which have the potential to enhance productivity/production. To facilitate all of this 
requires operators to increase network connectivity and access to both IT and OT systems using Ethernet, WI-FI 
and TCP/IP standards (Shahzad et al., 2016).  
 
By converging IT and OT, systems that were previously closed in many respects are now linked and exposed to 
all of the risks that have existed in the IT space for years. With this exposure, and not unexpectedly, individuals 
or groups looking to exploit these new-found vulnerabilities have emerged. 
  
Convergence of itself is not the problem, although figure 1 highlights some obvious differences between the IT 
and OT worlds.  What is a significant problem is the profoundly different priorities between IT and OT that cause 
a discontinuity in the security space. 
 
 
Figure 1: Convergence of IT and OT 
As shown in table 2, IT security focuses where the concerns are most often associated with financial integrity, 
denial of service or loss of information, properties can be grouped and prioritised into confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, as is common in information security.  
1. The confidentiality of data is of paramount importance,  
2. The integrity of the data, and; 
3. The availability of the data (Zhu, Joseph & Sastry, 2011).  
In an OT control system environment, safety and operational risk are critical, which changes the order of security 
properties to: 
1. The availability of the data is paramount to safely maintain production, 
2. The integrity of the data, and 
3. The confidentiality of the data (Zhu, Joseph & Sastry, 2011).  
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Table 2: Differences in IT and OT priorities 
 
 
As explained, the priority of IT is to protect data, therefore the IT evolution has seen tools, practices and procedures 
put in place to protect IT systems from cyber threats.  
In the OT space the main priority is to protect the asset base and its associated production. This has translated to 
minimal effort or changes being undertaken in the OT cyber security space, as production almost certainly would 
have to be taken offline to accomplish this goal. This production loss, and the associated loss of revenue combined 
with the cost of designing and implementing the necessary solutions has resulted in OT systems significantly 
lagging behind IT systems in addressing cyber security threats. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this initial work, based on our combined experience in the IT/OT spheres of at least (conservatively) 60 years, 
we posited that there is a convergence occurring between IT and OT.  There is evidence of that convergence in the 
IoT area identified by Baig et al. (2017) in terms of the range of disparate IoT networks and systems that are being 
connected in smart cities-of course critical infrastructure, as managed by OT systems, is one aspect of a smart city.  
Further, we suggested that security problems might arise from the different priorities encountered in the IT and 
OT spheres.  We assert that these differences are due to elements of organisational culture that have not yet been 
examined and compared across these two intersecting spheres. 
In this section, we use Hofstede’s theory of organisational culture as a lens through which to view and explain the 
differences between IT and OT.  Hofstede (1998) perceives culture as ‘programming of the mind’ where members 
of one culture can be distinguished from members of another culture.  Pertinent to our discussion, Ahmed, et al., 
(2012) note that when teams from different cultures interact, the complexity of the work relationship can be 
challenging. 
Hofstede’s work has been widely cited by many subsequent researchers, but acceptance of his theory and 
constructs is by no means universal.   Probably the most often-cited criticism is that Hofstede studied a single firm, 
as pointed out by Soares et al. (2007).  Nonetheless, a single multi-national firm can exhibit a myriad of cultures.  
As noted by Jones (2007), Hofstede’s survey covered 60,000 employees of a multi-national firm over 50 countries 
and “the research framework used by Hofstede was based on rigorous design with systematic data collection and 
coherent theory”.  
Hofstede’s model comprises five dimensions or variables, viz.: Power Distance Index, Individualism/Collectivism, 
Masculinity/Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance Index and Long Term Orientation.  Of the five, 
Masculinity/Femininity deals with social gender roles and is therefore not relevant to this analysis.  The remaining 
dimensions are discussed briefly below. 
A high power distance index culture accepts the decisions of superiors in a hierarchy without question. Such a 
culture accepts inequality in the power relationship.  Conversely, a low power index culture may operate by 
consensus and discussion of the decisions of superiors is the acceptable norm.  Interestingly, with respect to the 
deployment of system development methodologies, Iivari and Huisman (2007) found in their study of organisation 
culture, that IS managers promoted a hierarchical culture that was oriented toward security, order, and routinsation-
a stark contrast to managers’ take-up and acceptance of agile methodologies.  
An individual culture values individual authority and achievement, the right to make self-decision, to hold self-
opinion and to exercise some degree of autonomy. In contrast, a collectivist culture values a group’s well-being 
over any individual’s desires. 
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Uncertainty avoidance index is a measure of the extent to which members of a culture feel vulnerable or 
endangered by uncertainty. In uncertainty avoiding cultures, members are seen to be expressive, and in uncertainty 
tolerating cultures the expression of thought is repressed.  Thus, in the former there is a necessity for consensus. 
Long-term orientation is perhaps self-explanatory and refers to a cultural orientation that is not focussed on short-
term goals. 
 
 
Table 3: Core cultural dimensions related to IT vs. OT teams. 
Cultural dimensions IT OT 
Individualism / Collectivism Collectivist Collectivist 
Power Distance Index Low High 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index Low High 
Long-term Orientation  No Yes 
 
Our preliminary analysis, summarised in Table 3, shows that IT and OT exhibit widely-differing cultural values 
across several dimensions.  Both IT and OT are classed as collectivist as they both value a team outcome (product, 
in the case of IT, and production in the case of OT).  IT teams are also likely to be using agile development 
methods, which tend to promote values resulting in a low power differential within a team.  Similarly, in IT, 
changes in technology are embraced swiftly, leading to a low uncertainty avoidance index.  This same dimension 
is paired to a lack of long-term orientation in IT, which is a marked contrast to OT, where the operating technology 
has not changed for decades (because the focus is availability, as noted in the previous section).  This contrast in 
values, coupled with the difference in priorities described in table 2 leads to the inevitable conclusion that, rather 
than a peaceful co-existence or a smooth transition to convergence, the clash of cultures will lead to less secure 
OT systems and the benefits accrued from experiences in the IT world will likely not be realised in the OT world 
without a substantial readjustment and realignment by both parties.  
CONCLUSION 
This research set out to examine the state of cyber security in operation technology (OT). As was outlined 
previously, there is evidence that OT systems have been attacked. We showed that the convergence of IT and OT, 
whilst inevitable due to other forces, is problematic in terms of cyber security. Additionally, we used Hofstede’s 
organisational culture theory to show the contrast in values between the IT and OT worlds.  This variance in 
cultural values explains the difference in importance placed by each group on information security properties, viz., 
that OT values availability and that IT values confidentiality.  
In future work, we intend to explore both the technical and social dimensions of the problem that we have identified.  
In the former, we will examine unknown-unknown vulnerabilities of physical and virtual OT systems using a 
machine learning approach.  To address the latter, we will embark on an action research programme to surface and 
examine the cultural differences in detail and provide a framework for successfully fusing the IT and OT worlds 
whilst maintaining both availability and confidentiality. 
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